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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the dramatic increase in the social demand 
for education, especially at the tertiary level, in Greece during 
the past twenty-five years. In the context of Human Capital 
theory a variety of public and private data sets, covering nearly 
29,000 employees, are analysed and presented for the period 1960 
to 1987.
The results indicate that (i) the rate of return to 
education has declined considerably during the post-war period. 
It dropped from about nine per cent in the early 1960s, to almost 
five per cent in the mid-1970s, then declined further to about 
four per cent by 1981, and finally levelled at about three per 
cent in 1987. (ii) There is not enough evidence to support the 
existence of "screening" or the "certification" effect of 
education in Greece. (iii) The teaching profession is found to 
be relatively underpaid compared with other occupations requiring 
almost the same levels of human capital. According to this study 
the main reason for the declining rate of return during the last 
decades is attributed to the substantial rise in the average 
years of schooling of the population, that is, from 5.0 years in 
1961 to 6.9 years in 1981. Equally interesting has been the 
change in the number of Greek students abroad. During the period 
of expansionary policies in the Government sector, the number of 
Greek students abroad increased from 7,000 in 1960 to a peak of 
about 45,000 in 1982, and has recently dropped to almost 27,000 
with the adverse economic developments in the 1980s.
These findings lend support to the economic explanations of 
education and, in particular, the Human Capital approach. The 
thesis is concluded with the examination of some educational 
policy options which are evaluated against equity-efficiency 
criteria.
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INTRODUCTION! PURPOSE OF THE STUDY
It has been amply demonstrated that investment in human capital 
is one of the prime means, if not the sine-qua-non, by which a 
country develops and sustains economic growth. The link between 
education and economic development is in the form of an 
investment in human capital. Empirical evidence has consistently 
shown that investment in education yields higher returns than 
other types of investment (for a general review see
Psacharopoulos and Woodhall, 1985).
It should follow that education as an investment is subject 
to the law of diminishing returns. There is, therefore, a point 
where the returns might fall to the extent where further 
investment in education might not be justified on economic 
grounds.
With these considerations in mind, this research presents 
new estimates of the rate of return to education in pre-1981 and 
post-1981 Greece. In post World War II history, 1981 is a 
landmark of the country, as two significant changes occurred in 
Greek public life. A Socialist Government was elected, and 
Greece became a full member of the European Community. The
former is important for two reasons. First, it was only then
that almost 50 years of uninterrupted Right Wing rule came to an
end. Second, the Socialist Administration has repeatedly stated 
its determination for changing public life towards the interests 
of the "non-privileged". In addition, the then emphasis of the 
socialists on ta king control of the "commanding heights" of the 
economy was in direct contradiction to the Community's
Introduction, p. 20
established policy of economic and social integration of the 
Member-States through the release of market forces.
It is now obvious that these proclamations have fallen short 
of a radical change. The ambitious economic reforms for the 
equalisation of life-time opportunities among individuals, and 
socialisation of production, came eventually under the hammer of 
market forces which proved too challenging for a small, open 
economy tied to the periphery of capitalism. A programme of 
severe austerity was introduced in 1985 (after the second 
election victory of the Socialists) which survives very much 
intact to-day. However, the educational system at all levels was 
significantly reformed by statute in 1982 (Yannoulopoulos, 1986; 
Ministry of Education, 1983). The new legal provisions still 
remain operative and shape educational processes.
New estimates of the rate of return to schooling in Greece 
are calculated and subsequently compared to those derived from 
other sources in 1960 and 1964 (Psacharopoulos, 1982a), and 1977 
(Psacharopoulos, 1982a & 1985, and personal estimates). Since 
economic rates of return to education depend both upon 
educational input and labour market outcome, they are juxtaposed 
to the changing characteristics of the labour market from the 
mid-1960s until today, paying particular attention to the recent 
government policies in Greece.
Having estimated the rate of return to education and given 
the context of rapid educational expansion, we have a fertile 
ground for explaining the predictions of the Economic approach to 
education. In spite of rapid domestic educational expansion.
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Greece is also an outlier in terms of the number of students 
abroad and, in general, the demand for higher education.
To what extent have the returns to education changed during 
the period of expansion? How do they compare to those of other 
countries for which data are readily available? In addition, 
what drives the demand for higher education, for domestic study 
or abroad? What is the role of the public sector as a dominant 
employer of highly educated labour? What implications can be 
drawn regarding future educational investment priorities in the 
country? These are some of the questions we attempt to answer in 
the chapters which follow. It is interesting to find out whether 
the Greek case follows the patterns observed elsewhere, and if 
the post-1981 changes in policies have accelerated/halted the 
trends.
The thesis is organised as follows: Chapter 1 presents the
existing international literature on the Human Capital approach 
to education. Chapter 2 gives a description of the Greek 
educational system, the changing profile of educational 
attainment of the population, and a review on Economics of 
Education studies in Greece. Chapter 3 documents the 
characteristics of employment, paying particular attention to the 
educational level of the labour force and the pay policies, and 
examines to what extent there has been a wage compression in the 
economy. Chapter 4 tests the Mincerian specification of
earnings functions, and, also, extends the estimation to include 
the effect of other human capital characteristics on earnings. 
In Chapter 5 estimates of rates of return to schooling, in 
general, and to investment in different levels of education, in
Introduction, p. 22
particular, disaggregated by gender and economic sector, are 
presented using data from a variety of sources for the period 
1960-1987. In Chapter 6 empirical analyses designed to test the 
screening hypothesis, and evaluate the position of teachers' pay, 
are attempted. Chapter 7 further examines the phenomenon of the 
observed excess demand for higher education, paying particular 
attention to the issue of the demand for study abroad. Chapter 8 
concludes the thesis by attempting to provide an explanation of 
the apparent puzzle of a strong demand for higher education in 
Greece, despite the low observed returns to education, and a 
number of equity-efficiency policy considerations are offered.
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CHAPTER 1
SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE
The present chapter summarises the development of the theory of 
the effect of schooling on earnings.
1.1 ECONOMICS OF EDUCATION
1.1.1 Human Capital
In the last three decades economists have spent a great deal of 
time and effort in developing the concept of human capital by 
applying it to education and on-the-job training.
The inclusion of human abilities and skills as a component 
of capital and the idea of investing in human beings as a means 
of increasing the economy's productivity are by no means recent 
innovations (for a comprehensive review of the historical roots 
of the concept of human capital, see Kiker, 1966). This 
direction of thought can be traced back to the work of classical 
economists in the 18th and 19th century such as Adam Smith (1776, 
Ch. 10) and John Stuart Mill (1878, p. 47) . For example Adam 
Smith talks about 'human machines' and gives an explanation of 
the higher pay of the more educated. Alfred Marshal (1920), who 
was also influential in the study of capital formation, notes 
that the analogy between investment in machines and of human 
beings in the form of education is imperfect because the worker 
sells his work but retains his own "property", and this property 
is inalienable (in a non-slave society). In other words, Marshall 
recognised the importance of education as a factor in human
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progress (Marshall, 1920, p.212).
The first attempt to evaluate the economic significance of 
education in the United States was made by J.R. Walsh in the 
1930*s (Walsh, 1935). The "father" of modern ideas on human
capital though appears to be Theodore W. Schultz —  who was
concerned with the issue of 'human capital formation* 
especially after his promotional efforts in his Presidential 
Address to the American Economic Association in December 1960 
(Schultz, 1961) and later, in 1962, when the Journal of Political 
Economy published a supplement entitled "Investments in Human 
Beings". This marked the beginning of what Mary Jean Bowman
later described as "the human investment revolution in economic
thought" (Bowman, 1966).
Other pioneering works are contained in the Journal of 
Political Economy 1962 issue but the most important contribution 
was undoubtedly made by Gary S. Becker, providing the basis of 
the human capital framework, entitled "Investment in Human 
Capital: A Theoretical Analysis" (Becker, 1962). The fact that a 
substantial part of the growth in income in USA remained 
unexplained, when growth in physical capital and labour had been 
accounted for, forms the origin of Becker's study (Becker, 1975). 
The centre of his analysis was formal education and the idea that 
individuals invest in themselves for the sake of future returns. 
Consequently and as for any other investment analysis, investment 
in education embodies costs and returns.
The argument extends to the fact which Denison in "The 
Sources of Economic Growth in the US" (Denison, 1962) identified
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noting that the average labour force member of the US economy in 
1960 received 2.5 times as many schooldays as in 1910. He then 
attempted to quantify the contribution of formal education to 
economic growth in the context of an aggregate production- 
function model of the US economy. Clearly part of that increase 
would have been due to direct government subsidy to education. 
Human capital theory effectively deals with this by computing a 
•social rate of return' so as to assess the correct amount of 
subsidy, the composition of subsidy (by levels of schooling) and 
its distributional implications (by social group).
The basic human capital idea, in a nutshell, is that those 
with more schooling or on-the-job training have incurred a cost 
in the form of foregone earnings (on the supply of labour side). 
In addition, their productivity has also increased which in turn 
results in higher earnings, assuming that workers are paid 
according to their marginal product (on the demand for labour 
side) . Assuming that this cost is regarded as investment, the 
extra payment should be just enough to secure the same return on 
investment in human capital as on a comparably risky physical 
capital investment. The theory is therefore one of individual 
earnings differences in a competitive labour market.
It is worth noting, that although human capital initially 
started as a growth theory (see the recent work of 
Psacharopoulos, 1984 including a comment by T.W. Schultz with his 
revised views on the effect of education on growth) it later 
emerged as a theory of income distribution in the sense that it 
measures costs and returns to education by the earnings 
differential as different amounts of human capital between the
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individuals (see Tinbergen, 1975 and for an alternative view see 
Tzannatos, 1988, pp. 60-61) .
Since the phoenix-like birth of the economics of education 
in the early 1960s, the concept of human capital has been applied 
widely by educational planners and "has had a powerful influence 
on the analysis of labour markets, wage determination, and other 
branches of economics, such as the analysis of economic growth, 
as well as expenditure on health care and the study of migration. 
For it is recognised that these also represent investment in 
human capital, since they can help to determine the earning 
capacity of individuals, and therefore increase their lifetime 
incomes" (Woodhall, 1987).
In the economics of education literature the screening 
hypothesis, credentialism, or the sheepskin effect of education 
—  as Mark Blaug prefers to put it —  challenges directly human 
capital theory. In the context of human capital theory 
education is viewed as a productivity augmenting process (Blaug, 
1972). Contrary, screenists argue that education —  and by 
extension degrees —  primarily serves to screen individuals as 
opposed to enhancing their productivity (see Berg, 1970; Arrow, 
1973; Spence, 1973; and Stiglitz, 1975). A number of empirical 
studies, designed to test the validity of the screening 
hypothesis have employed alternative data sets and techniques, 
suggesting no clear consensus on the matter by reporting 
contradictory results. The majority of these studies however, 
have reached the conclusion that there is no solid evidence to 
support the presence of screening.
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1.1.2 Rate of Return Analysis
Three general approaches have been proposed and discussed in the 
literature to date. They are (i) the manpower requirements —  or 
forecasting — approach, (ii) the cultural approach, also referred 
to as the social demand approach to education and (iii) the rate 
of return approach (for a comprehensive review see Blaug, 1967) . 
In the context of human capital theory, rate of return analysis 
has become a powerful approach in educational planning.
The educational planning practice pursued in most Western 
countries uses a mix of the social demand approach and the
economic needs (implying both the rate of return and the manpower 
requirements approach) of the country. Briefly, the fundamental 
philosophy of the social demand approach is to provide education 
to all those who wish to receive it or are capable of receiving 
it. In contrast, the economic needs consideration implies 
regulation of investment in education, either on the basis of the 
manpower requirements of the economy or on the basis of the
economic efficiency of investment in education, in a manner 
similar to any other sector of the economy. There are ample 
number of empirical applications of these three approaches in the 
context of educational planning in the literature (for the Rate
of Return approach see Psacharopoulos & Loxley, 1985; for the
Manpower Requirements approach see Fames, 1962, Harbison and 
Myers, 1964, OECD, 1965a, and Armitage, 1971; for the Social 
Demand approach see Soumelis, 1979; and, for a combination of the 
Social Demand and the Manpower Requirements approach see, Robbins 
Report, 1963, and Moser & Layard, 1964).
In this thesis, we are mainly concerned with the issue of
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rate of return analysis as a whole as applied to education, 
rather than questions of social demand. Rates of return to 
schooling are generally computed either by the Internal Rate of 
Return (IRR) method or by the Earnings Function (Mincer, 1974) 
method. In the former, the costs and benefits of education are 
compared through the IRR discounting procedure. In the latter, 
schooling is entered in the earnings function either as a 
continuous variable (measured in years of schooling) resulting to 
an average rate of return to one extra year of schooling, or as a 
separate dummy for each level of education, resulting to an 
education level specific rate of return, hopefully holding all 
other relevant factors —  such as experience, ability —  constant 
(for a detailed discussion and presentation of the human capital 
earnings function and its extensions/variations see Section 1.2 
of the thesis). A brief review will be presented below.
Undoubtedly, the most frequently cited author in the 
economics of education literature throughout the 1970s and 1980s, 
in general, and on the rate of return analysis, in particular, 
is George Psacharopoulos (Blaug, 1989). Following the enthusiasm 
of academics in the field during the 1970s, especially after the 
introduction of Mincer's seminal work "Schooling, Experience and 
Earnings" (Mincer, 1974), rate of return analysis gained the 
ground lost by the neo-classicists in the 1950s and in 
conjunction with Psacharopoulos' work became an even "more 
frequent and less suspicious practice" (Blaug,1970, p. 234) 
aiding economists and educational planners in deriving investment 
I criteria in the field of education. The scattered evidence was
Chapter 1, p. 29
summarised by Psacharopoulos who presented a book entitled 
"Returns to Education: an International Comparison" in 1973 where 
he attempted to group existing sporadic rate of return estimates 
and identify/trace any patterns that might exist between the 
economic returns to education and other economic characteristics 
of the countries involved. A total of 53 rate of return case- 
studies were reviewed covering 32 countries.
Following the 1973 monograph, Psacharopoulos updated the 
earlier rate of return evidence by considering studies that have 
been conducted in the seventies which included 13 new country 
cases (Psacharopoulos, 1981). The latter reference includes a 
review of rate of return estimation procedures (ibid. pp. 322- 
326). This resulted in a series of controversial arguments 
associated with the rate of return literature of the 1970s, such 
as data quality, the issue of the social productivity of 
education, screening, the differential ability argument, the idea 
of the dual labour market, the problem of graduate unemployment 
and so on. Four underlying patterns were revealed (ibid. p. 
326), which were based on this universal survey:
(a) Returns to primary education (whether social or private) 
were higher than other levels of education;
(b) Private returns were always in excess of social returns, 
especially at the university level;
(c) All rates of return to investment in education (both 
private and social) were well above the 10 percent common 
yardstick of the opportunity cost of capital; and
(d) Returns to education in less developed countries were 
higher relative to the corresponding returns in more 
advanced countries.
He gives four specific points of policy, following the previously
cited patterns (ibid. pp. 3 33-3 34):
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1. Top priority should be given to primary education as a 
form of human resource investment;
2. Secondary and higher education are also socially 
profitable investments;
3. The observed large discrepancy between the private and 
social returns to investment in higher education suggests 
that there is room for private finance in this level;
4. Returns to education fall as a country develops and/or 
the educational system expands.
In 1985 the same author updated the 1981 paper in the 
Journal of Human Resources (Psacharopoulos, 1985). In this 
paper, in addition to the enrichment of the existing data set 
with evidence on new countries and more recent figures, a very 
thorough grouping of rates of return to investment in education 
around the world is presented by different variables. A detailed 
assessment of market returns to education by sex, region, 
economic sector, selected university faculties, alternative 
school curricula, and type of country is made, aiding further the 
formation of efficient public policy on education.
Behrman and Birdsall (1987, p. 603) however, argue that 
Psacharopoulos neglects to "discuss a number of studies that 
challenge the conventional wisdom about the market returns to 
education in developing countries". Their fundamental proposition 
is based on earlier empirical research conducted by the authors 
(see Behrman and Birdsall, 1983 and 1985) where they incorporated 
a measure of schooling quality into an analysis of the 
determinants of earnings for males in Brazil and argue that the 
quantity of schooling as an explanatory variable alone —  as 
often utilised by human capital theory —  is misleading and tends 
to give upwardly biased results. As an alternative, they suggest
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that school quality should be taken into account in the 
estimation procedure (e.g. the average years of schooling of 
teachers in the area of the country in which the individual grew 
up) . That is so because schooling quality and years of schooling 
interact with each other. Their major finding was that the 
standard procedure overstated the private rate of return in 
Brazil by almost 90 percent (Psacharopoulos gives 20.5% in his 
study compared with their finding of 11.5%). Similarly, 
Boissiere et al (1985) in an analysis of data from Kenya and 
Tanzania reported that the inclusion of cognitive achievement in 
standard earnings functions reduces the coefficient of schooling 
by about two-thirds in both countries.
Notwithstanding the above criticisms and other objections on 
the theoretical foundation of human capital (e.g. the alpha 
coefficient and screening hypothesis, which are presented in 
later sections of the thesis —  see Chapter 4, Section 4.3), a 
plethora of empirical studies have been conducted by several 
authors, conforming the available literature. It is worth noting 
briefly here that Carnoy and Marenbach (1975) for the United 
States for the year 1969 and the monographs by Adrian Ziderman
(1973) and Psacharopoulos and Layard (1979) on the United Kingdom 
experience, for the years 1967 and 1972 respectively. The latter 
study also includes interesting advancements on computational 
complications of the Mincerian specification of earnings 
functions and a critique (results appear in Table 1.1).
The general conclusion from the majority of studies in the 
literature confirms that investment in education is present and 
profitable (for both the individual and the society). There is
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Table 1.1. Estimates of Private Rates of Return to Education 
given by Studies in the USA and England and Wales 
(1967-1972) (%)
Incremental
Schooling
Level
USA
Male 
White Black
1969
Female 
White Black
High School
(12 vs. 8 years)
14 20 15 19
College
(16 vs. 12 years)
16 14 15 19
Incremental
Schooling
Level
England
1967 
Male Female
and Wales
1972
Male
High School 
plus University
(18 vs. 10 years)
15.0 20.5
'A' Level only
(14 vs. 12 years)
10.0 ... 11.7 (9.2)*/
University Degree 22.5 ... 9.6 (7.7)*/
Source: Siebert, S., 1985, Table 2.2, p. 29
for USA: Carnoy and Marenbach, 1975
for England and Wales: 1967 - Ziderman, 1973;
1972 - Psacharopoulos and Layard, 1979 
Notes: (...) not applicable
All figures relate to annual earnings 
*/Refer to weekly earnings
still a question as to whether human or physical capital 
represents the more profitable form of investment. This is 
because the rate of return to schooling is expected to be similar 
to the equally risky physical capital and to the market interest 
rate. It should be admitted that, although relevant studies on 
the difficulties in interpreting rates of return to schooling 
have been conducted (Harberger, 1965 and Psacharopoulos, 1973) 
and some clouds have cleared away, a question still remains that 
has no straight forward answer and is of vital concern to
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economists and planners. As far as the private rates of return 
appearing in Table 1.1 are concerned, it could be said that, on 
the one hand, they are of a plausible order of magnitude (see 
Becker, 1975) and, on the other hand, they are on the high side 
when judged against the return to physical capital. As Siebert 
(1985, p. 30) notes: "The point remains that the numbers are
reasonable, and this corroborates the model. Had the figures been 
much above or much below 10 per cent, this subject would not have 
received the attention it has".
Summarising, one could argue that all methods have something 
to offer. On the one hand, the manpower requirements approach is 
more appropriate where there are fixed-type coefficients. On the 
other hand, the costs of producing an ideal ratio of occupations 
for educational profile and the population should be considered 
as well and, it is here where Human Capital theory intervenes. 
Human Capital theory as an approach is important as it evaluates 
the costs and benefits associated with the educational investment 
simultaneously. As manpower planning became gradually less 
important —  except in some fundamental sectors —  throughout the 
period, the profitability of education, or rate-of-return, 
approach, has instead increasingly been utilised. All in all, 
the sensitivity of the frequent use of the rate-of-return 
approach during the past 25 years pulls the threads together and 
assesses what we have learned, including the provision of 
valuable information to us on the computation methods, various 
adjustments, interpretation, and the philosophy beyond the 
approach itself.
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1.2 EARNINGS ANALYSIS
Among various explanations of the positive correlation between 
education and earnings there is the so-called "Economic 
Explanation" as discussed in Blaug's paper "The Correlation 
Between Education and Earnings; What does it Signify?" (Blaug, 
1972). Human capital theory forms the basis of this economic 
explanation. This is accomplished by asking a number of 
questions such as:
1. What are the sources of earnings differentials?
2. Are they associated with differences in education? and
3. If they are, how much of the variance of earnings of the 
more educated is explained by education?
The notion that an individual must have a certain degree of 
skills in order to earn his living is common sense. It is argued 
that these skills are partly genetic but they can also be 
acquired through learning. Learning is not an end-in-itself 
process, but it takes place throughout the life of the individual 
in various forms, such as transfers of information from parents, 
friends, schools, media etc. In theory it should be possible to 
estimate the effect of such additional skills on the earnings 
capacity of the individuals. However, in practice the only 
measure that is usually available is the amount of formal 
education of the individual and the time spent in the labour 
market acquiring information, which in turn result to higher 
earnings (assuming a competitive world) by increasing his/her 
productivity, thus marginal product.
Following standard economic theory, Blaug overcomes this 
problem by suggesting that wage differences are a by-product of
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the demand and supply mechanism where scarcer types of labour 
secure higher wages. In such a manner, a more productive factor 
represents itself as a scarcer type.
1.2.1 The Basic Human Capital Framework
Having indicated the above, it is time to proceed with the 
development of a simple but formal model of the Human Capital 
theory.
Let us begin by supposing that there is only one type and 
level of education. This implies that first present workers 
either have this education or not, and second prospective workers 
can either undertake this education or not.
As usual, one can think of a demand (D) curve for and a 
supply (S) curve of education, where D is the demand for educated 
labour by employers and S stands for the supply of educated 
labour (or the demand for education by individual workers). If 
we denote the wage rate of the educated worker as W® and that of 
the uneducated worker as W", then the relative wage rate (W = 
W®/W" is depicted on the vertical axis in Figure 1.1. This is on 
the price side. On the quantity side (horizontal axis) we will 
use not the number of educated workers but the percentage of the 
workers who are educated (E*).
This is illustrated, where the two curves have the usual 
slopes, ie. D is negatively sloped while S is positively sloped. 
In detail, D indicates the education mix of the demand for labour 
force at various Ws. It is negative because as W rises, firms 
will tend to substitute the cheap factor (uneducated labour) for 
the expensive factor (educated labour). This is a standard
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prediction of the economic theory of the demand for inputs in the 
theory of the firm. Additionally, S traces out the proportion of 
the labour force who would acquire education at different Ws. It 
is positively sloped because the psychic and pecuniary costs of 
acquiring education rise as more people become educated. This is 
so because, on the one hand, the supply of education services has 
a positive slope and, on the other hand, people have different 
financial endowments or time preference or satisfaction from 
learning or, in a catch-all word, different tastes. 
Consequently, at each and every different W only some of them 
will undertake education while the rest would be attracted only 
if the W rises.
Figure 1.1
Relative demand and supply of educated and uneducated workers
Relative
Employment
100%
One can also add differences in education in the model, 
which can be incorporated in two ways. First, differences in 
education or completed years of schooling rather than one type 
and level of schooling whereby some undertake it and others do 
not. Second, differences in education can be seen as differences
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in the ability to learn, so less able people find it more
to
difficult/costly to acquire education and need be compensated 
accordingly —  through higher wages —  in order to stay on in the 
educational system. These refinements can be easily incorporated 
into the basic model mentioned earlier (that is, the "all 
identical individuals" case) to which we stick for reasons of 
simplicity.
So far, we have firmly established that the demand and 
supply curves would have the expected slopes. The intersection 
of the two curves determines the equilibrium W, that is W*. This 
wage reflects exactly, in theory, the ratio of marginal products 
of the educated to uneducated workers (on the demand side) and 
the compensating differential for the marginal worker who is just 
indifferent between becoming educated or not (on the supply 
side).
The comparative statistics of the model are the expected 
ones. A shift of the demand curve to the right, that is increase 
in the demand for more educated workers, will result in both 
higher Ws and higher equilibrium level of the education mix of 
the labour force. Alternatively, a shift of the supply curve to 
the right will, as before, increase the percentage of the labour 
force who is educated but the equilibrium wage will now fall.
Despite the lack of realism in the above model, the previous 
remarks are common sense and were noticed as early as in Adam 
Smith's "Wealth of Nations" where they were expressed as 
compensating differentials from the supply side point of view. A 
further refinement of the theory, although at the cost of 
additional abstraction, has come from Mincer's (1974) formulation
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of the problem.
1.2.2 Mincerian Refinements
Assuming perfect competition and supposing that all individuals 
are ex ante identical in all respects (tastes, ability, health, 
socio-economic background, financial endowments or access to
capital markets and so on) , then the S curve will be horizontal
at that level measuring the common compensating differential for
all individuals (see Figure 1.2).
Figure 1.2
The demand for educated and uneducated workers 
implicit in the fixed-supply hypothesis
*w
Relative
Employment
In this case W is given at the height of the supply curve. 
The only role that demand fulfils is to determine the equilibrium 
education mix between educated and uneducated labour (or the 
length of schooling under the alternative interpretations 
outlined earlier). This approach enables us to construct an 
explicit formula for estimating W.
To do that. Mincer utilised a few more assumptions. First, 
that there are no costs to education other than foregone
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earnings. Second, that education lasts for a given number of 
years, s, and is full-time (thus, to become educated is an all or 
nothing decision). Thirdly, that all workers have the same 
working life (in terms of length of time), irrespective of 
whether they undertake education or not. Fourthly, there are 
only two wage rates, one for uneducated and another for educated 
labour, which are invariant over time (this implies that there is 
no on-the-job training (OJT)). Fifthly, that with the exemption 
of the wage rate, other characteristics of jobs requiring 
educated and uneducated labour are identical —  or, they 
evaluated equally by the prospective workers. Sixthly, and 
finally, that the rate of interest is r and also for reasons of 
simplification continuous discounting is assumed (that is, 
through the use of "e", the base of the natural logarithms which 
is approximately equal to 2.7183).
Most of these assumptions are captured in the following 
Figure 1.3.
Figure 1.3
Flat age-earnings profiles of educated and uneducated workers 
implicit in Mincer's assumptions
w
w*
Age
18 22 65 69
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On these assumptions, the present values (PV) of uneducated 
and educated workers at the point they start work are 
respectively;
PV^  = (WVr).(l - e'"*) (eq. 1.1)
PV® = (wVr).(l - e ^ A) .e'"^  (eq. 1.2)
The interpretation of the two equations is given as follows. 
The ratio of wages to the interest rate (first parenthesis) is 
simply the PV of an annuity paid for ever; the term in the second 
parenthesis is simply the finite life correction factor; and the 
third term in equation 1.2 takes into account the fact that 
earnings for educated workers will start to be paid at s years 
ahead.
With individuals ex ante identical, the two PVs should, at 
equilibrium, be equal for both types of careers —  that is wages. 
Thus, equating the right hand sides of equations 1.1 and 1.2, 
eliminating the finite life correction factor from both sides, 
and rearranging we obtain:
= W" . e''® (eq. 1.3)
and taking the logarithms on both sides:
ln(W®) = ln(W") + r.S (eq. 1.4)
The model given by equation 1.4 is usually referred to as 
the "Schooling Model" (Mincer, 1974, pp. 24-28).
In conclusion, this simple model provides a linear 
relationship between the logarithm of earnings for educated 
workers and years of schooling, with the coefficient of schooling 
being the rate of interest or, in perfect markets, the
rate of time preference in the society or, the average rate of 
return to an additional year of schooling. Obviously, the theory
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predicts the sensible result that W® > W".
Consequently, if one runs a regression of earnings of 
workers with different level of schooling on a constant and the 
length of schooling, the coefficient of schooling would be the 
rate of return to education, as it is easy to extend the analysis 
beyond the case outlined so far where the length of schooling has 
been assumed to be fixed (equal to s). In theory, the regression 
coefficient for the constant term should be equal to the pay of 
the uneducated worker.
The merit of this approach lies in the fact that it is 
derived from an explicit and relatively meaningful foundation 
which dictates the functional form (log-earnings —  InY —  on 
years of schooling) that econometric estimation should take.
The disadvantages are that it ignores all other aspects of 
human capital (HC) formation such as on-the-job training. For 
example, for many jobs not much HC from schools and universities 
is required but other ways of acquiring HC are necessary (ie. 
employer provided training). In the case of training, the usual 
practice is for the employers to pay part of the trainees' costs 
unlike in the case of formal education where everything is 
usually paid by the individual before he enters the labour 
market.
It is reasonable to regard experience as a significant 
determinant of HC and, this "makes it possible to expand the 
schooling model to include post-school investments in an 
econometric analysis of the distribution of earnings" (Mincer, 
1974, p. 83).
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To accommodate this criticism, one can amend the last 
equation as follows:
InY = Constant + r.s + (some function of EX)
where Y is annual earnings and EX is years of labour market 
experience.
This is what Jacob Mincer (1974, pp. 83-96) did when he 
estimated the relationship between earnings, length of schooling 
and experience for pre-tax annual earnings of male, urban, non­
student workers below the age of 65 in USA in 1959, having 
derived the human capital earnings function as:
InY. = a + b.s- + c.EX. + d.EX? + u. (eq. 1.5)
where b = "^ InY/^s = r or, the average private rate of return to 
one extra year of schooling. That is, the rate of return is 
nothing else than the relative change in earnings (^  InY) 
following a given change in schooling (^ s) , and u is the error 
term.
The important implication of the above model is that 
unobserved post-school investment is now transformed into an 
observed variable, namely years of work experience (EX). It is 
also noteworthy, that variable EX was been calculated from the 
formula:
EX = Age - Schooling - Age of starting education
This indirect estimation of labour market experience assumes that 
people have been employed since the end of their formal education 
without interruption. This is not as unrealistic as it may sound 
today as Mincer's sample was based only on men and the 
unemployment rates then were not as high as those which have 
prevailed since the early 1970s. Moreover, experience may be
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included as an explanatory variable in the regression equation in 
a quadratic form on ad hoc but intuitive grounds, meaning that it 
becomes successively less important in the determination of 
earnings (for an implicit justification of the inclusion of 
Experience see Psacharopoulos & Layard, 1979).
The main disadvantage of computing equation 1.5 and deriving 
r is that it does not account for any direct cost except income 
foregone for the individual at any given level of education. 
However, it has been shown that foregone earnings are the prime 
cost of education. Additionally, because of its inability to 
incorporate any other form of cost data, one cannot use it for 
social rate of return estimates. Coming back to the former 
point, one should also emphasise that this method by definition 
understates the returns to primary education by automatically 
assigning foregone earnings to all levels of education even at 
the compulsory stage (see Psacharopoulos, 1981). Therefore, one 
should have this understatement in mind when interpreting the 
results.
1.2.3 Other Extensions
Having computed the average rate of return to one extra year of 
schooling, the next question is that of the rate of return to any 
particular level of schooling. There are two regression 
techniques suggested by Psacharopoulos (1981) where an 
"educational level" dimension is added to the "average" rate of 
return concept, thus enabling us to derive "marginal" rates of 
return to education.
According to the first technique the regression line of
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equation 1.5 becomes:
InY. = a + b.s. + c.EX. + d.EX? + e.s? + u. (eq. 1.6)
where e is the coefficient on years-of-schooling squared. By 
differentiating eq. 1.6 with respect to s we obtain that the rate 
of return (r) is:
r = b + 2es. (eq. 1.7)
Having defined completed educational levels according to 
years of schooling completed, we substitute the respective values 
of s in the right hand side of equation 1.7 and derive a 
regression rate of return.
The second way of adding an educational level dimension in 
the HC earnings function, is by redefining s into given 
educational levels in a form of a series of dummies (D.) having 
the value of 1 if observation lies in the particular educational 
level and 0 otherwise. Thus, by substituting s in equation 1.5 
we result the following function:
InY. = a + b|ç.D|^. + c.EX. + d.EX? + u. (eq. 1.8)
where subscript k, k=l,2,3, stands for the level of education 
(i.e. primary, secondary, tertiary).
In this specification the rate of return to the kth level of 
education (r,^) has been estimated by comparing the coefficient of 
with that of the latter acting as the control group.
Then, this is divided by the difference in the number of years of 
schooling (As) between the kth level (n,^) and the control group 
or, in detail 
As = (n^  - n^_i) . That is,
^kvsk-i = (bk - bk-i)/As (eq. 1.9)
Equation 1.9 is based on the rationale that one computes
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effectively the rate of return (r,^) by comparing the logarithm of 
the potential earnings of the desired educational level k with 
the one of the control group k-1, ie.
r^  = (InY^  - lnY^ .,)/dS (eq. 1.10)
The advantage of the "Step" (eq. 1.8), as compared to the 
"Non-linear in s" (eq. 1.6), method is that a great deal of 
sensitivity is added in the former, while the latter suggests a 
smoother descending (or ascending) pattern of the rate of return 
to schooling, favouring the educational levels where s is lower 
(or higher) depending on the sign of the coefficient e (see eq. 
1.7) .
Taking a mathematical approximation of ln(l+x) ^ x, which is 
good for values of x of the order of the rate of return to 
education (i.e. if x < about .20), we obtain from 1.10:
= (Yk - Y^ .i)/(4s .Y^ .^ ) (eq. 1.11)
where Y refers to mean earnings of employees with the subscripted 
educational level. In other words, estimation of equation 1.11 or 
what Psacharopoulos (1981) calls the "Short-Cut" method, is doing 
in an explicit way what the earnings function is doing implicitly 
under the following assumptions:
(a) the age-earnings profiles are either flat or equidistant 
between adjacent educational levels throughout their 
range ;
(b) the age-earnings profiles last for ever; and
(c the only cost of schooling is the forgone earnings of 
the individual.
Thus, the great advantage of this simple formula (eq. 1.11), 
where the rate of return to schooling is easily computed by using 
already tabulated information on earnings of various groups of
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workers by educational level. Though, since the method depends on 
mean earnings —  and not median as suggested earlier in the 
literature (e.g. Renshaw, 1960) —  the experience or earnings
standardisation is absent. A rectifying procedure owing to the 
previously described problem is that when the data are grouped 
for experience or age, a choice of a particular experience or age 
group (e.g. 35-45 age group) will prevent biases associated with 
the early experience profiles (see Psacharopoulos, 1981, p. 323). 
However, because of the simplistic nature of the method an 
"aggregation bias" as compared to results from the previously 
described methods is evident. Besides the above disadvantages, 
it is worth mentioning that the great advantage of this formula 
is that it easily overcomes assumption (c) to the extent that it 
allows any average direct cost to education to be added in the 
denominator. This offers a greater sensitivity on cost issues, 
as well as allows a social rate of return calculation by
adding in the denominator the average resource cost of schooling.
Lastly, some studies in the literature have utilised the 
internal rate of return (IRR) calculation procedure —  or what 
Psacharopoulos (ibid.) calls "Elaborate" method —  in deriving 
rates of return to education. This method stems from investment 
theory, where the rate of return of a project is summarised by a 
statistic (that is the IRR) describing the costs and benefits 
associated with the project. Coming to the application of this
method, which uses detailed data on age-earnings profiles of 
individuals, the problem of small cells (appearing as a saw-tooth 
pattern) is tackled by employing a smoothing-out regression
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procedure, where absolute earnings are regressed against the age 
of the individual. This, eventually allows for the construction 
of an idealised age-earnings profile within each subgroup of 
workers with the same educational level, thus the effective 
calculation of the IRR, offering a marginal rate of return to 
schooling (ibid., p. 323). The advantage of this rate-of-return 
calculation method is that one can easily incorporate any direct 
cost of schooling as well, on top of the indirect one —  that is 
the earnings forgone —  in the estimation procedure. 
Nevertheless, the main disadvantage associated with the 
utilisation of this calculation method in deriving rates of 
return to education is that the procedure is quite lengthy, as 
well as the assumptions implicit in the IRR methodology as 
applied to education.
1.2.4____ The Choice of the Dependent Variable
We now come to the question of which dependz^ nt variable to use. 
Mincer's basic Human Capital model was explicitly presented 
in Section 1.2.2 (and its extensions in the previous Section 
1.2.3). This model has been widely used in the literature of 
economics of education offering a pioneering framework for the 
estimation of the returns to education and post-secondary school 
investment. The model suggested by Gril iches (1977) has 
concentrated on estimating a version of the following equation: 
y. = in Y i = a^ +ag. S.+a^ . X. + u. (eq. 1.12)
where, Y is a measure of income, earnings or wage rates, S is a 
measure of schooling (usually in units of years or grades 
completed), X is a set of other variables assumed to affect 
earnings, u is a disturbance representing the other not
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explicitly measured forces affecting earnings, assumed to be 
distributed independently of X's and possibly S, and i an index 
identifying a particular individual in the sample.
Concentrating on Y it is noteworthy that Griliches
continues by posing certain questions to be answered relative 
to the above equation, commonly referred to as earnings or 
income-generating function, and he proceeds by stating,
"Obviously, I don't intend to, nor I am able to, answer all these 
questions today". This is simply to elaborate on the complexity 
of the application of the above "straight-forward" model, even 
after its theoretical assumptions and validations.
Here, we are concerned with the left-hand side of the
equation, namely y. = in Y .. What Y should really be? Does it
really matter if somebody chooses any form of Y? What is the 
"right" specification of Y in the equation? Answers to the 
previously mentioned questions will be given in accordance with 
the available theory.
Psacharopoulos offers a stimulating discussion on the matter 
and some of the clouds clear away. Initially, one should point 
out that income data should not be the measure of Y, but rather 
earnings, simply because it will distort the required measure 
inasmuch as individuals differ in wealth (Psacharopoulos, 1973). 
Some authors, however, have used total income as the dependent 
variable in the absence of data on earnings (see for example 
Chiswick and Mincer, 1972).
Secondly, the question moves towards earnings, suggesting a 
choice between salary and wage rates. Should therefore, the
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measure of earnings be in a monthly or annual basis? Blinder in 
his paper "On Dogmatism in Human Capital Theory" (Blinder, 1976), 
documents the use of wage rates as the best choice for the 
dependent variable. He also suggests an "eclectic model" treating 
variable experience in two different parts. That is, denoting 
relevant to the present job experience and Xg=X-X^  denoting all 
the rest. This is of course justified for those people paid on a 
wage basis and it is in contrast with annual earnings.
In the vast majority of studies though, the dependent 
variable is the logarithm of monthly or annual earnings rather 
than, of course, absolute earnings. This is either for easier 
interpretation of the effect of individual variables (in terms of 
per cent increment of earnings) or for theoretical reasons 
following the human capital school (see Mincer, 1974).
Finally, when questioning the specification of the dependent 
variable, that is inY rather than Y , being widely accepted and 
seldom being subjected to empirical tests, Heckman & Polachek
(1974) and, Dougherty & Jimenez (1987) experimented with the 1960 
and 1970 public use samples of the US census and, with the 1980 
Brazilian census respectively, offering the conclusion that: the 
natural logarithm of earnings is indeed the correct specification 
of the dependent variable in earnings functions.
1.2.5____ Extended Earnings Functions
So far we have presented the framework of the model, its 
Mincerian refinements and the Psacharopoulos' extensions to the 
HC earnings function, as well as argued on the "correct" 
specification of the dependent variable of the model. We now 
discuss other forms of the earnings functions which have appeared
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in the literature.
Mincer, in his pioneering work entitled "Schooling, 
Experience and Earnings" experimented with the inclusion of (the 
logarithm of) the weeks worked in 1959, as an improvement of his 
model, and the coefficient of determination almost doubled, while 
the coefficient of schooling remained still unbiased (Mincer, 
1974) . His finding was an interesting one, by the means that 
earnings is an increasing function of the period of work within a 
particular year.
As stated in Section 1.1 we saw that Human Capital theory 
has become the "bread and butter" of the economics of education. 
Economists and educational planners in general, have derived 
results useful for policy purposes. Likewise, both severe and 
constructive criticisms of the model (for example Psacharopoulos 
and Layard, 1979; Blinder, 1976; Griliches, 1977; Psacharopoulos 
and Tinbergen, 1978; and specifically for the rate of return 
approach see Merrett, 1966; Soumelis, 1981) in particular, and 
the theory, in general, have resulted in further refinements and 
complicated extensions of the basic model known in the literature 
as "Extended Earnings Functions".
We are now in a possition where a great deal of sensitivity 
has been added to the human capital analyses. These analyses, 
apart from the two basic forms of human capital, that is 
schooling and labour market experience, incorporate:
(i) interaction terms between the two variables (Psacharopoulos 
and Layard, 1979);
(ii) segmented experience especially at the early years, so as to
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take into account the non-strictly parabolic nature of the 
earnings of these early years (Blaug et al, 1982) ;
(iii) other factors which account for the so-called in the 
literature "alpha-coefficient", where "a" stands as a mnemonic 
for ability (Blaug, 1970; Boissiere et al, 1985; Taubman, 1975, 
1976 and 1978; Taubman and Wales, 1973);
(iv) factors such as the type and quality of schooling (Behrman 
and Birdsall, 1983 and 1985) ;
(v) whether the employee belongs to minority group;
(vi) trade union variables;
(vii) for testing discrimination hypotheses (Sloane, 1985);
(viii) a vector of family related characteristics (Hill, 1979). 
Also, the basic human capital framework, in general, and earnings 
functions, in particular, have been used in the literature to 
test labour economics issues. For example, an issue of great 
importance with relevance to education is whether members in a 
profession, like teachers, are overpaid relative to those in 
other professions who have the same human capital and personal 
characteristics as teachers (see Arrow and Capron, 1959, 
Rottenberg, 1962, and Psacharopoulos, 1987b). In addition, an 
extensive presentation of annotated bibliography in the field of 
the economics of education has been presented by Blaug (1978) and 
research on the presentation of results of recent studies has 
been carried out by Psacharopoulos (1981 and 1985).
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1.3 SUMMARY
As evidenced so far, earnings functions take into account both 
the costs and the benefits of education. This, in turn, has a 
great impact in the practice of educational planning. Also, in 
conjunction with the frugality of the data the earnings functions 
demand —  that is information on the earnings, schooling and, 
experience of employees —  in deriving investment criteria (rates 
of return) to education makes the approach more popular among 
others. The rate-of-return approach has been heavily utilised in 
policy making, as evidenced from the existing literature and, in 
the context of the human capital earnings functions (basic and 
extended), will be utilised in this study as well.
In detail, earnings functions for the Greek case will be
presented in Section 4.2 and, rates of return estimates will be
given in Section 5.1. In the meantime , the Mincerian
specification of the experience variable, as presented in Section
1.2.2, will be put on test in Section 4.2.1.5 using recent Greek
data. In addition, the status of human capital theory in Greece
as challenged by the screening hypothesis will be empirically
tested in Section 6.1. Moreover, within the Human Capital
framework developed so far, an evaluation of the teachers' pay
position in Greece will be attempted in Section 6.2.
that
Summarising, the reason in this thesis I have adopted the 
rate of return model (rather than the competing ones of the 
social demand and manpower requirements) is that the former has 
dominated the literature of educational planning -- this is 
especially since 1967 when Mark Blaug delivered a paper in the
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Economie Journal entitled "Approaches to Educational Planning" 
(Blaug, 1967). Social decisions regarding education entail 
costs, and such costs must be weighted against a set of benefits 
in order to rationalise the investment.
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CHAPTER 2
THE GREEK CONTEXT
In our study of rates of return to investment in education in 
Greece, following the presentation of the human capital 
theoretical framework, we should then look at the country's level 
of educational development. This can be seen from two 
complementary points of view. First, from the educational side, 
that is the flow of students and graduates through the school 
system; and, second from the demographical side, that is the 
stock of the educated persons in the population, as well as, the 
evolution of its size through time.
Educational expansion in Greece has been very rapid during 
the post-World War 11 period. Primary education has been 
universal since 1960. According to UNESCO data (UNESCO, Table 
3.2) the coverage of secondary education has increased from about 
50 per cent to 90 per cent of the 12 to 18 age group during the 
1965 to 1984 period. And higher education coverage has jumped 
from covering 4 per cent of the population in 1960 to one quarter 
of the population aged 20 to 24 in the eighties. As will be 
shown in Chapter 7 of the thesis, below, the 24 per cent higher 
education enrolment ratio, reported by UNESCO, is an 
underestimate of the true higher education coverage of the 
population because it refers to enrolment in domestic 
institutions and does not take into account Greek students 
studying abroad. According to our estimates, when study abroad 
is considered, as much as 40 per cent of the 20-24 age group
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could be covered by higher education.
Having commented the above we should then proceed to the 
presentation of the Greek system of education. Particular 
attention will be given to post-secondary education, the main 
topic of this research, and especially on issues associated with 
the evolution of the flow of students, the planning and admission 
policies, as well as finance and cost issues pertaining that 
level of education.
Next, we are going to examine the demographic aspect of 
educational development by studying official census data. That 
is, we are going to give the magnitude of the population growth, 
followed by an examination of its distribution by region. Then, 
given the developments in the flow of students and graduates in 
the school system, as these were briefly depicted in terms of 
enrolments ratios above, we are going to examine any reflections 
in the changing profile of the level of educational attainment of 
the population.
Finally, we are going to present the current relevant 
economics of education literature in Greece, so as to form an 
overall picture of the Greek context.
2.1 THE GREEK EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM
Before we can look at the implications of different economic 
models of return to education, we must first have a clear 
understanding of the stages of education in Greece. Education is 
provided on three levels:
(i) Primary education —  including nursery and primary schools;
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(ii) Secondary education —  including lower (GYMNASIUM) and 
upper (LYCEUM) cycles; and
(iii) Tertiary education —  which encompasses university-level 
(AEI) and non-university technological education (TEI). 
Compulsory education lasts for 9 years, that is 6 years at the
primary school and 3 years at the GYMNASIUM.
The available statistics are, in general, quantitative 
rather than qualitative which is good for model building. 
Therefore, the implementation of an input-output model is quite a 
common practice. In most of the instances though, data are 
somewhat old - especially for tertiary education - and they are
spread-out in many sources. For example, the most recent
"Statistics of Education" published by the NSSG refer to the 
academic year 1980/81. Finally, one great disadvantage of the 
published data on education is that it does not include any 
figures on the finance of the educational system.
2.1.1 Primary Education
The nursery schools (NEPIAGOGIA) are either separate institutions 
or incorporated in child centres. Nursery education lasts for two 
years. The enrolment of infants is subject to their reaching the 
age of 3.5 years not later than 1 October of the first year of 
attendance.
Attendance at primary school is compulsory and lasts for six 
years. The enrolment of children is subject to their reaching 
the age of 5.5 years by 1 October of the first year of 
attendance. Upward progression to the next class is automatic at 
the end of each school year. Text books are provided free. 
Transfer to the lower secondary education cycle is also
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automatic, depending on satisfactory completion of primary school 
studies.
The pupil-teacher ratio for this level of education improved 
considerably for all schools between 1975 and 1984, and current 
statistics show this trend continues. Nevertheless, the 
statistic of 23 pupils per teacher for 1984 ranks high among 
other EEC countries with the exception of Spain and Ireland 
(see Appendix Table A-1).
Appendix Table A-1 also shows that there is 8 per cent 
decrease of the number of schools during the same decade 
accompanied by a 5 per cent decrease in the number of primary 
pupils enrolled.
2.1.2 Secondary Education
Lower secondary schools fall into two categories: daytime and
evening GYMNASIUM. The latter operate for the benefit of persons 
in employment who are 14 years of age and over. Attendance at 
the GYMNASIUM lasts for three years and is compulsory. The 
transition from the one grade to the next is nearly perfectly 
elastic, that is no examinations are involved throughout for 
assessment. Graduating pupils are awarded a GYMNASIUM leaving 
certificate.
Schools for upper secondary education fall into the 
following types: general, classical, technical/vocational, and
the relatively new comprehensive LYCEUM. The upper secondary 
cycle lasts for three years and each year is divided into 3 
trimesters. At general LYCEUM —  which form the vast majority of 
this category —  pupils in classes 1 and 2 are taught a common
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core of subjects, while pupils in the final year (class 3) 
receive additional tuition in the subjects of one of five option 
streams "which are designed to prepare them for entry to specific 
areas of study at university-level or non-university tertiary 
institutions" (Commission of the European Communities, 1986). 
For a more detailed presentation on the matter, see later Section
2.2.3.
There are a few classical LYCEUM nation-wide and they are 
similar to the general ones. Their only difference lies in the 
additional emphasis they put on the teaching of the ancient Greek 
language, literature and Latin. Graduates of the classical 
LYCEUM can enter for university studies only in the classical, 
pedagogical and social sciences fields.
The technical/vocational LYCEUM combine general education 
with vocational training. Their pupils have the opportunity to 
acquire a diploma equipping them to carry out a profession 
immediately on graduating, or a leaving certificate (APOLYTERION) 
leading to tertiary-level education.
Finally, the comprehensive (POLYCLADICA) upper secondary 
schools started operating since 1984/85 school year and are 
gradually expanding over the main cities of the country. The 
branches of study they offer prepare the pupils either to 
continue studies at the tertiary level, or to carry out a 
profession, or to acquire a specialisation after study at a 
specialisation department for LYCEUM certificate holders. During 
the first year of their operation there were 14 such schools in 
total with 4,458 pupils, while during 1986/87 became 22 having 
15,565 pupils.
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Table 2.1 shows that the number of the total pupils enrolled 
has followed a considerable increase of about 21 per cent between 
1975 and 1984, elaborating on the three-year extension of 
compulsory education during the decade.
Table 2.1. Secondary Education in Greece by Type of School, 
1975, 1980 and 1984
Type
Pupil/
Teaching Pupils Teacher 
Year Staff Enrolled Ratio 
(1) (2) (2):(1)
Total
General
1975 ... 661,796 ...
(43)
1980 39,571 740,058 19
(49) (46)
1984 48,217 802,817 17
(53) (48)
1975 18,719 529,205 28
(53) (50)
1980 31,737 639,633 20
(55) (50)
1984 39,776 701,274 18
(56) (50)
1975 132,591
(13)
1980 7,834 100,425 13
(24) (20)
1984 8,441 101,543 12
(35) (30)
Source; UNESCO, 1988, Statistical Yearbook, Table 3.5 
(first two columns)
Notes: (...) not available
numbers in parentheses refer to female percentages 
of the immediately above number
When looking separately between General and Technical-Vocational 
statistics (Table 2.1), it becomes evident that the vast majority 
of students prefer the traditional and more "prestigious” general 
than the less "prestigious" technical-vocational schools. In
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addition, while the places are equally shared among males and 
females at the general stream, females are less likely to join 
the technical stream where subjects taught are more closely 
linked to professions traditionally followed by males. The same 
observation applies to the teaching staff.
Although the pupil-teacher ratio during the eighties has 
decreased by 2 students per teacher (see Table 2.1), elaborating 
on the intentions of the government policies towards improvement, 
the figure still levels high when compared with the respective of 
other EEC countries with the exception of Spain (see Appendix 
Table A-2).
In conclusion, the evidence shows that secondary, post- 
compulsory education, through the higher education entrance 
examination system, appears to simply serve as an intermediate 
stage before the tertiary cycle (for a more detailed presentation 
see later Section 2.2.3). If this is true, then there has to be 
a major redirection in the philosophy of the system towards the 
autonomy of this cycle of education. Of course, if the intention 
of the State is towards the "production" of promising graduates 
destined to study further at a higher education institution then 
there is little to be said. Otherwise, much more scepticism 
should be addressed about the role of secondary education as a 
whole. Its adequacy in coping and complying with the increased 
requirements of the world of work, in general, and the Greek 
labour market, in particular, should be globally re-examined.
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2.2 THE DEMAND FOR TERTIARY EDUCATION
This section discusses issues connected with planning, admission- 
enrolment-supply of graduates, courses and academic staff in the 
institutions of higher education. Institutions for teacher 
training and post-secondary, non-university technical-vocational 
education are included here.
Tertiary or higher education in Greece is divided into two 
categories. They are, university education (known in Greece as 
ANOTATI PAEDIA) including universities and independent graduate 
schools (AEI) and further —  post-secondary, non-university —  
education (known in Greece as ANOTERA PAEDIA) including 
Technical-Vocational education institutions (TEI). Institutions 
for teacher training have been recently abolished and upgraded 
into university faculties. The distinction between the two 
categories of tertiary education thereafter will be as university 
education (AEI) and non-university, post-secondary education 
(TEI); (for a description of the existing tertiary education 
institutions in Greece see Appendix A.l).
2.2.1 Courses Offered
I. University education (AEI) courses last a minimum of 4 years
up to the first degree and is provided free of fees. Degree 
courses in technical and medical subjects take 5 to 6 years. 
Examinations are held twice a year, in June and October. If 
students fail in some subjects they may repeat the year. Law 
studies have maintained their traditional prestige and 
importance. Organised postgraduate courses are limited in the 
Faculties of Law, Science, Philosophy and Agriculture-Forestry at
Chapter 2, p. 62
the University of Thessaloniki; in the Faculty of Science at the 
University of Athens; and at the Graduate School of Economics and 
Business Sciences in Athens (for a discussion on the Greek case 
see Lambropoulos, 1990a). These courses are also free of fees 
and normally last 2 years. Candidates for postgraduate diplomas 
must have graduated successfully and must submit a thesis in 
Greek (for an explicit presentation on courses offered by 
Universities, see Appendix A.l and for flow figures see later 
Section 2.2.4) .
II. Post-secondary, non-university institutions (TEI) provide 
vocational education for technicians and middle-level 
management education for graduates of secondary education. That 
is, for persons to be in charge of plant, but take their orders 
from graduates of university-level schools. The applied sciences 
TEI graduates, would work in the plant itself and direct the work 
in accordance with the schedules and programming of the 
engineers. Their teaching programmes cover engineering, food and 
agricultural technology, business management, graphic arts, 
health services, social services, and librarian studies.
As a general rule for both university and non-university 
levels, there is no institutionalised provision for part-time 
education and short-courses for mature students who with their 
employers are, nevertheless, more aware about the usefulness of 
education in production than -new school-leavers. This is 
mainly due to the nature of the higher education system itself 
where in many cases attending lectures is not compulsory. That 
leads to too much student absenteeism. Appendix Table A-3, 
presents results of a questionnaire addressed to some university
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level institutions filled by the respective chair (that is, 
department) in 1977, on what percentage of the registered 
students actually attended lectures (see Psacharopoulos and 
Kazamias, 1985, Table 5.1). The results ranged from as much as 
89% in Philosophy (Athens University) to a mere 10% attending
Piraeus School of Industrial Studies.
2.2.2 Overview of Educational Policies
Universal education among the younger generations has been 
achieved since the 1920s. To-day the minimum school leaving age 
is 15 years and the mean educational achievement of those under 
29 is 8 years of schooling (based on NSSG 1981 Population Census 
calculations) .
Since 1922, primary and secondary education was provided 
free of fees in state schools. In 1964 the liberal centrist 
Prime Minister George Papandreou extended the free provision to 
all levels (Kazamias, 1967). Though, it was during the Military 
Dictatorship that some of G. Papandreou's policies were 
implemented. That is, students pay no fees at the tertiary 
level, textbooks are provided free since 1968, grants are made 
towards meals and accommodation, medical attention is free and 
there is no charges for equipment, as well as, the authorisation
of the establishment of KATEE (Centres of Higher Technical
Education) in 1973 —  later renamed to TEI —  under legislative 
decree 652/1970, the latter perceived to be an important
innovation in educational policy in the post-war period.
The main reason for this change and the orientation of the 
higher education towards technical and vocational specialisations
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was the attitude that the country lacks such types of education. 
It was then that Professor Zolotas identified the issue in one of 
his studies (see Zolotas, 1960). It should be noted that
Zolotas' opinion could be the most appropriate with the data 
available during that period. In addition, it was considerably 
supported during the mid-sixties by the well-known "Mediterranean 
Regional Project" of the OECD (for the Greek reality see OECD, 
1965a and 1965b, and Williams, 1965) . The methodology of the 
above project was the Manpower Requirements Approach for the 
development of a country (for a presentation and discussion of 
the approach see Blaug, 1967, and, also, Armitage, 1971, Harbison 
and Myers, 1964, Parnes, 1962 and Psacharopoulos and Woodhall, 
1985) . The case was that Greece accepted both Zolotas' and
OECD's views, that is the country should "produce" only those
specialties which are needed for the future development and are 
defined from the future structure of production, and they are 
still evident until the present days.
Here, we should note that recent studies on the issue of the 
Manpower Requirements Approach internationally, have contributed 
substantially in assessing/challenging the credibility of the 
approach itself, but unfortunately, Greece has not taken
seriously into account those studies yet. The vast majority of 
the researchers agree about the complete failure of the model in 
question and they argue that, if pursued, it could be 
catastrophic, as well as a deterrent for the development of a 
country. An illustrative example is the recent Tanzanian 
experience, where —  even if it was quite delayed —  they revised 
that educational planning methodology because of the deadlocks
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the country was facing (for a discussion and analysis see 
Psacharopoulos and Loxley, 1985) .
In the post-dictatorship Greece, the New Democracy 
government headed by C. Karamanlis has given top priority in a 
series of educational reforms promulgated in Law 309/1976 such 
as, the reorganisation of secondary education and its distinction 
into lower (GYMNASIUM) and upper (LYCEUM) 3-year cycles, de­
emphasis of the dominant non-colloquial language (KATHAREVOUSA) 
and the use of DEMOTIKI throughout the school system, the 
abolition of the entrance examination to the lower secondary 
cycle, the abolition of lower technical schools and (by 
implication) the unification of the lower secondary cycle 
curriculum, the revision of the central and regional 
administration, and the extension of compulsory education (ROSLA) 
from 6 to 9 years, that is ages 6 to 15 (Psacharopoulos, 1982b).
Universities in Greece, by the time civilian rule was 
restored in 1974, are by constitution "self-administered" or have 
"legal independence", but are under the supervision of the State 
through the Athens-based Ministry of Education. In other words 
they are public establishments supported by the State and subject 
to public law. Their internal governance, the number of various 
ranks of the teaching staff and the terms of their appointment, 
the system of examinations (entrance, yearly and final) and 
grading, the method of distributing textbooks and other teaching 
materials to students, the student unions, the disciplinary codes 
as well as other issues, are all regulated by legislative decrees 
(ie. Law 815/1978 and Law 1268/1982) after proposals submitted by
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the Universities.
When the Socialist Party (PASOK) won the 1981 elections 
headed by Andreas G. Papandreou new changes emerged in the area 
of Tertiary Education. One year afterwards and after several 
proposals and discussions between groups of the academic 
community and the Ministry of Education a Law-Framework (Law 
1268/1982) was drafted, aiming "further démocratisation and 
modernisation" of the Universities (for a presentation and 
discussion of some issues of the Law 1268/1982 see Appendix A.2).
We should also note that the system of higher education in 
Greece has traditionally been dominated by the centre (Karmas 
et al., 1988). The reforms, described above, have never 
challenged this dominance, but, contrary, they have augmented the 
centre's position (Saitis, 1988). This is not surpdsing for the 
Greek case, given that the system of higher education has been 
heavilly influenced by the nineteenth century Bavarian model 
(Mouzelis, 1978). Also, as argued before in the literature "most 
innovations outside the USA, especially in European universities, 
are stuctural, hard reforms...dominated by hallowed traditions" 
(Bereday, 1973, p. 104).
So the picture which emerges is that the provision of 
education has traditionally been void of economic efficiency 
considerations, irrespective of party politics. Finally, for 
reasons reflecting the enthusiasm of the restoration of democracy 
in 1974 and the 1964 reforms, the 1975 Constitution stipulates 
that private tertiary education would not be allowed (Article 16, 
paragraph 2 —  see Appendix A.3).
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2.2.3____ Admission Policies
Since 1959 admission to post-secondary education has been based 
on highly competitive entrance examinations which are open to all 
who have successfully completed any course of secondary education 
(LYCEUM). The Ministry of Education sets a quota system for 
places each year. This constitutes the main bottleneck of the 
whole educational system. The entrance examinations take place 
in the summer, following the secondary education qualifying 
examinations. This contrasts with the situation before 1959 when 
there was direct admission for all students who had successfully 
completed 8 years'^secondary education.
At this point, it is worth noting the existence of numerous 
"para-educational" institutes (cram schools, else known in Greece 
as FRONTISTIRIA) which intensively prepare the students for 
university entry. Those institutes absorb substantial amounts of 
the family expenditure, but they are considered as an unavoidable 
expense of any Greek family aspiring higher education for their 
offspring (for a discussion on the cost issue see later section 
2.2.5). All in all, para-educational activities constitute the 
"Achilles heel" of the educational system because such institutes 
are not liable to official control and their expansion became 
immensely high during the recent years, especially after the 
recent reforms.
Given a possible failure of a student in entering a higher 
education institution, two possible scenarios exist. The first 
one is to try again in next year's examinations or to terminate 
his studies at this point and stay with the secondary education 
certificate. The second one is to continue his/her post­
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secondary studies either abroad (for a detailed presentation see 
Chapter 7) or within the country at the well-known proprietary 
schools, depending on the ability of his/her family to bear the 
cost of such studies.
Given the above, it is quite evident that there has been and 
still is enough controversy in Greece regarding the post­
secondary entrance examination system. Both students and parents 
and especially academics are not very happy with the existing 
system and there is always discussion towards change and 
improvement.
Continuing, there are a number of laws which, although they 
contradict the letter of the constitution, impose the wishes of 
the State upon Universities. With respect to entry to 
Universities, the latter inform annually the Ministry of 
Education what the size of the intake should be. However, the 
ultimate decision rests with the Ministry which has, 
traditionally, revised these suggestions upwards. The social 
demand for higher education is so much higher than the 
Universities' intended supply that, if left to the original 
suggestions, may prove costly to the Government on populist 
grounds.
Thus, the actual intake is usually 22,000 (1986) and
estimated to be almost 45 per cent higher than the Universities' 
original targets. Rectors of Universities around Greece, 
admitted to the Greek newspaper AVGI (5/3/87) that "the academic 
year 1987/88 is considered as the most difficult of the last 
years both in terms of finance and number of students enrolled".
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Table 2.2. Settlement Figures for First Year Entry in two
Departments of the University of Thrace, 1986/87
Department of: Electrical Engineering Civil Engineering
First Proposal 50 a/ b/ 90 a/ b/
After Negotiation 80 60% 120 33%
Ministry's Decision 150 200% 88% 250 178% 108%
Source; Newspaper AVGI, 5/3/87
Notes: a/ is deviation from First Proposal
b/ deviation from agreed number After Negotiation
Table 2.2 gives information on the settlement figures for 
first year entry in the departments of Electrical and Civil 
engineering of the University of Thrace. What is quite evident 
from this table, is the spectacular deviation percentages on both 
between (a) the proposed from the University number of intake and 
(b) the Ministry's actual decision, as well as, the negotiated 
and the actual figures. Thus, elaborating on the poor decision­
making power of the Universities in Greece as opposed to the 
political leadership. Summarising, we could say that this is not 
the exact planning procedure one should expect.
In addition, a number of students are selected without 
sitting the national examinations under the so-called "beneficial 
provisions" (or "open windows" using the favourite Greek 
expression). Some examples on the elaboration of these special 
measures are given in Appendix A.4.
In addition, the problem of internal transfers is strongly 
associated with the above. In such a case, and for a variety of 
reasons, students registering to a domestic higher education 
institution are granted permission to register with another. The 
vast majority of students though from outside Athens ask for a
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place to the capital area. This in turn results the
overcrowding and chaotic functioning of some Universities.
Table 2.3. Admission Figures to the First Year of the National 
Technical University (POLYTECHNEIO), 1983-86
Academic Year 1983/84 1984/85 1985/86
Admission after:
(a) Examination 
(b^ ) Special 
Excess (a):(bg)
(bg) Internal Transfer 
(b^):(b^ ) Ratio
728
595
82%
269
45%
723
680
94%
421
62%
882
769
87%
403
52%
Source: Newspaper AVGI, 5/3/87
Notes : (a)
(bi)
(bg)
through passing the national general examinations 
through beneficial provisions 
through inter-university transfers
This is highlighted in Table 2.3, which presents admission
figures to the first year of the National Technical University.
Table 2.3 shows that only 50 to 60 per cent of those entered the
most prestigious institution of higher education of the country
come through internal transfers from other domestic Universities
while the rest have been admitted through other channels of
special provision of places, 
from
Apart the above micro-data. Table 2.4 offers data on the 
higher education entrance examinations nation-wide from a macro 
point of view, elaborating on the previous discussion. The data 
in question is quantitative rather than qualitative, that is 
refer to the number of students rather than their 
characteristics, but one could identify the major trends and 
weaknesses of the system.
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Table 2.4. Higher Education Entrance Examinations Analysis, 
1955-89
Year
Number O f
Secondary
Education
Graduates
1st Year (Univ.)
Candi­
dates
Success
Univ.
Success
Total Total
First
time
18719 6946 5600
1956 20853 7088 5600
19996 6866 5600
20781 8575 7170
17332 8886 7456
18879 9688 8200
1961 28140 7965 22709 10543 7198
30000 8560 24799 13587 11255
34000 9360 28166 17470 13183
38000 14015 32069 31435 23119
40000 12663 34117 21221 15157
1966 41000 12335 35450 21000 14443
43000 16398 36800 21000 18330
44453 9191 11396 38150 21527 14651
50865 9024 11324 39500 21282 14152
53720 10651 13214 40835 21886 17044
1971 48017 10920 13344 44141 25486 19747
48701 11913 14218 45807 25392 21375
57331 13392 17588 49264 29985 26511
68063 14475 18803 52189 37550 35212
80417 14435 19691 64126 36548 32039
1976 83317 10870 18925 63995 34956 27080
85220 12100 19162 65167 35211 28251
87417 12715 21375 65105 38044 32371
91580 12365 21075 56956 35419 32334
84911 14200 24122 57830 37390 34304
1981 75206 14560 26754 21784 18796
78708 16375 33235 25459
110781 18920 41826 24323
129374 22880 51114 30143
149269 22930 51308 28978
1986 156289 22195 45752 ...
1987 151129 24081 44290 ...
1988 132727 23457 42769 ...
1989 ... 23432 42846 ...
Source: Ministry of Education, Service of Entrance Examinations 
NSSG, "Statistics of Education", (various years)
NSSG, "Statistical Yearbook", (1981-1985)
Note: (...) not available
Success Total, includes both university and non-university 
institutions
For example, one could easily observe from Table 2.4 that
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the number of applicants exceeds by far the number of secondary 
school graduates. The primary explanation is closely related to 
the fact that students who were not successful before are 
retaking examinations. A small percentage of those who applied 
for a place did not sit the examinations. That supports and 
builds on the excess demand for post-secondary education.
One could also observe from the same Table 2.4 that success 
to University institutions follows an upward trend from 1968 
until 1975, having an annual rate of growth ranging between 0 and 
18 per cent. Then a deterioration of 25 per cent is observed for 
1976, but thereafter the number grew steadily and from 10,870 in 
1976 has reached 22,195 in 1986. This is an increase of more 
than 100%, or an 9.5% annual average percentage increase while 
the same statistic between 1968 and 1975 was only 7.1%.
The question to be asked here is, what was the reason for 
such an increase and how can it be justified. Was it because of 
the expansion of universities and the addition of new buildings? 
A possible answer is that only a small figure is in line with the 
previous explanation. The rest illustrates the impact of 
politics on education.
Moving to the figures available in Table 2.4 for those 
succeeding in both university and and non-university higher 
education institutions (that is, total success), an increasing 
pattern appears between 1961 and 1967. Then the number dropped 
by 30% and reached again its previous size five years later. 
Thereafter, the growth was constant and the figure doubled by 
1982 reflecting the observed extremely high rates of increase of 
the 1980's. Between 1981 and 1985 the number doubled again.
Chapter 2, p. 73
reflecting the Socialist government's policy "Higher Education 
for all", which was not finally the case, considering the fact 
that the then concentration was lying heavily on non-university 
education, rather than university education as it was until 1980.
The above argument is justified on the grounds of analogies 
existing among individuals succeeding to university and non­
university institutions. Considering the young nature of the 
technical-vocational post-secondary, non-university institutions 
(TEI) until 1977 the analogy was 3 to 7 TE I for each 10 students 
at university schools. Since 1977, there was a rapid expansion 
of the TEI and that is the reason that the analogy has turned in 
favour of non-university students, being 10:12.
Consequently, the question is whether it was in the
intentions of the government to implement such a policy shift a 
priori, or whether the channelling of candidates towards TEI was 
based on such grounds so as to merely satisfy the already
increasing demand for post-secondary education, given the
overcrowded nature of the universities.
The fact of the decreasing nature of both university and 
total success figures during 1986 from the previous year by a 
modest 3.2% and a meaningful 10.8% respectively, despite a 4.7% 
increase in the number of candidates for the same year (see Table 
2.4), supports the argument of overcrowding and its realisation 
from the decision-makers (Appendix Table A-4 presents the success 
rates for university and for all higher education institutions).
Let us now look at the figures of Table 2.4 on the stock of 
secondary school graduates and actual first year university
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enrolments (distinguished in total and those who register for the 
first time) . This is in conjunction with the previously 
discussed number of post-secondary education candidates and those 
who actually succeeded to university sitting the national 
examinations.
Solid data which will enable us to examine the above is 
given in Table 2.4 for the years 1968 to 1980. The following 
three points can be identified:
1. the number of secondary school graduates depicts an ascending 
pattern for the majority of the years with the exception of a 12% 
deterioration between 1978 and the following two years.
2. total first year university enrolments follow a similar 
pattern with a 7% decline in numbers between 1978 and 1979.
3. there is a sudden increase of first year students and those 
actually registered in the first year for the first time being 
25% and 33% respectively in 1974 (that is, the first year after 
the restoration of civilian rule). The numbers then for those 
registered for the first time fluctuate between 35,000 and 
27,000.
So far, enough ha5 been said about the figures themselves.
The story behind Table 2.4 though, is the identification of
various phenomena. First, they show the excess difference
between the number of candidates and the actual stock. Second, 
they give further detail on the remarkably high excess of those 
attending first year university and/or actually registered for 
the first time in the first year, as contrasted with those
actually sitting and succeeding the national examinations, being 
almost half or less. Therefore, we can say that the picture 
emerging is strongly supporting on the one hand the issue of the 
extremely high social demand for education and on the other hand 
the mystery of the existence of various informal channels —  
apart the formal national examinations —  for university entry.
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Certainly, in the light of the above discussion and 
information provided, we could argue that given the quality of 
any system of education first depends upon the raw material that 
enters the system, if nearly one half of the university entrants 
belong to various groups, student selection defeats its purpose. 
That means that "if the less able are selected, the value added 
provided by higher education will be lower" —  equivalent to 
planting on arid land (Psacharopoulos, 1988, p.123).
2.2.4 Domestic Enrolment
The previous comments make evident that the demand for education 
exceeds by far its supply at tertiary level, despite the fact 
that in turn the actual supply by far exceeds the capability of 
domestic institutions.
Table 2.5 gives aggregate figures of student-teacher ratios 
by university institution between the mid- and late-seventies.
Table 2.5. University Level Student-Teacher Ratio by Type of 
Institution, 1976 and 1979
Institution
Students
1976
per Teacher 
1979
University of Athens 116 94
University of Thessaloniki 70 46
University of loannina 75 26
University of Thrace - 28
University of Patras - 35
Athens Technical University 48 48
Athens Business School 133 105
Athens School of Political Sciences 188 133
Piraeus Industrial Studies 271 164
Thessaloniki Industrial Studies 288 151
Source; 1976: Psacharopoulos and Kazamias, 1985, Table 5.2
1979: NSSG, Education Statistics 1979/80. Athens, 1983 
Note: Teaching staff includes full and associate professors 
and lectures
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There has been a spectacular improvement on the analogies of this 
popular educational quality statistic at the university level 
between the years 1976 and 1979 for different institutions. 
Although the changing nature of the analogy is quite evident in 
Table 2.5 during the 4-year period, it is also worthwhile noting 
that there are still "overcrowded" schools as far as the ratio of 
students to higher rank teachers is concerned. If there is no 
distinction between the ranks of teachers and low level teaching 
staff is also included in the calculations, then Greece appears 
to fare rather competitively when compared with other EEC
countries, especially France, Italy and Spain at both the total 
higher and the university level classification (see Appendix
Tables A-5 and A-6 respectively).
Table 2.6 shows that enrolment at domestic higher education 
institutions has been rising steadily during the past 3 decades. 
In detail, between 1956 and 1966 enrolment at university 
institutions have been almost quadrupled, bringing the figure
from almost 17,000 to about 61,000 students. The following years 
do not show any spectacular development as such; the figure is
growing by almost 50% between the mid-sixties and the mid­
seventies, while there is a modest slow-down of about 10% during 
the 1979 to 1981 period, when the government decided to keep
enrolment low. After 1981 there is an increase again —  the
figure became about 111,000 in 1985 and 117,000 in 1986 —
reflecting only a small part of the pre-election campaign 
proclamations of the then newly elected PASOK government "higher 
education for all".
According to Table 2.6, the flow into the Technical-
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Vocational tertiary education institutions presents a picture of 
rapid growth throughout the years.
Table 2.6. Higher Education Domestic Enrolment, 1956-86
Teacher Technical- Total 
Year University Training Vocational Higher
(1) (2) (3) (1+2+3)
1956 16 866 2 625 19 491
17 954 2 363 — —— 20 317
21 971 2 366 — —— 24 337
23 953 2 750 — — — 26 703
25 658 2 644 -- 28 302
1961 28 042 2 575 — — — 30 617
31 995 3 437 — — — 35 432
39 824 3 587 — —— 43 411
49 532 3 773 — 53 305
54 261 3 739 5 840 63 840
1966 60 624 3 967 5 615 70 206
68 236 5 202 6 355 79 793
71 259 3 637 8 810 83 706
72 616 3 565 9 324 85 505
72 269 3 929 9 578 85 776
1971 70 161 4 187 10 653 85 001
76 035 4 279 10 995 91 309
80 041 4 562 12 528 97 131
92 920 4 839 13 682 111 441
95 385 4 408 17 453 117 246
1976 95 017 3 587 24 229 122 833
96 650 3 063 23 716 123 429
95 899 4 426 25 919 126 244
84 510 5 782 28 140 118 432
85 718 6 588 28 810 121 116
1981 87 476 7 253 29 965 124 694
94 876 8 975 33 611 137 462
100 254 9 698 38 563 148 515
111 446 9 000*/ 45 000*/ 165 446*/
110 959 8 500*/ 55 000*/ 174 459*/
1986 117 470 7 000*/ 64 100 188 570*/
Source; NSSG, Statistics of Education, various years 
NSSG, Statistical Yearbook, various years
Note: (---) not applicable
*/ estimates
Their intake has been almost doubled during the sixties while it 
has tripled during the seventies, reflecting the operation of the
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then newly established KATEE. These institutions, which have
been renamed to TEI during the eighties, continue to show the
same picture of rapid growth, acting in numerous cases as a
substitute and trying to satisfy the excess demand for university 
education. As a result, the 30,000 TEI student population of 
1981 became 64,000 in 1986.
In addition, if we want to look at the student population by 
field of study and by gender, it is worth noting that although in 
1985 the total third level student population was almost equally 
shared between males and females, there is a difference in the 
fields of study they follow. This is shown clearly by Appendix 
Table A-7. For example, teacher training, humanities and fine 
arts appear to attract more females, while natural sciences,
mathematics and engineering are clearly male dominated. The same 
observation is also applicable when looking at tertiary education 
graduates by field of study and gender (see Appendix Table A-8). 
We can also say though, if we combine the information provided by 
both tables A-7 and A-8 that for the mid-eighties the supply of 
graduates was about 17% as compared to the respective total 
student population. That means, that on average, it takes almost 
6 years for a student to complete his higher education studies, 
which normally last for about 4 years, while the rest 2 years are 
taken as wastage.
2.2.5 Finance and Cost Issues
Expenditure on education in comparison to those on the other 
sectors of the economy indicates the State's intentions and 
priorities regarding the allocation of available funds. Besides, 
the disaggregation of a given education budget by level of
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schooling embodies the relative priorities the State attaches to 
the different levels of education.
The criteria for judging the allocation effects of an 
educational budget are not easy to specify, but viewed ex post, a 
change over time in the allocation of funds to education versus 
other sectors of the economy —  comparison is usually made with 
defence and health —  can reveal a trend in the State's 
intentions and can be evaluated by external technical criteria. 
Likewise, education budget data cover only a small part of the 
true cost of education. On the one hand, there are many hidden 
costs which do not appear in the budget because the vast majority 
of schools are state-owned. Also, the private expenditure on 
education does not appear either. The major part of the time 
social cost of education —  the forgone earnings of students 
while at school —  has to be assessed by alternative methods. On 
the other hand, the current expenditure part of the state budget 
is a unique source of information on the amount of money required 
to keep the schools running and subsequently maintain the quality 
of instruction they provide. And the capital account part of the 
budget shows the extra effort put by the State to expand the 
physical capital formation in the school sector of the economy.
The comparison of the relative weight of education in total 
public expenditure with the overall distribution of public 
current expenditure among defence and health and welfare expenses 
in the post-war period suggests, apparently, a low percentage 
allocated to education (see Appendix Table A-9). A critical 
comment is that it is generally low and only rarely has been over
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15%. It generally ranks higher than health and welfare expenses 
but fares far lower than the excessive defence expenses. 
Overall, the State does not appear to have allocated more 
relative importance to education in its budgeting.
The share of education to the GNP of the country is also 
extremely low throughout the 1960 to 1984 period. It has been 
stable around 2.0 to 2.5 per cent (see Appendix Table A-9). The 
level is low compared with all EEC countries for the mid-eighties 
(see Appendix Table A-10). Only Spain and Greece have a figure 
of less than 4.6% which is the EEC minimum.
Appendix Table A-11 shows the share of the public budget 
that was allocated to education for the years 1961-1984. Before
proceeding to the actual interpretation of the figures, it is
-Trom
worth noting that other sectors of the economy apart education 
compete for the same funds and also that different countries have 
different priorities as far as public spending is concerned. 
However, this statement, besides its validity, by no means 
relaxes the fact of the observed "low” side of the education 
share in the Greek budget. The upward trend of the statistic 
detected for the seventies is followed by a clear downward trend 
for the recent years. In other words, the share of public 
expenditure in the budget has remained practically stable at 8 to 
9 per cent for the last two decades, having only some exceptions 
over 10 per cent. Although, as it has already pointed out, 
international comparison logic have to be treated cautiously, the 
figure again fares low as compared to the rest of the EEC 
countries for 1984 (see Appendix Table A-10) and is about of the 
same order with the one for Portugal, Ireland and Germany, the
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rest being well above 11 per cent (with the exception of Italy 
being 9.6%).
A much better criterion for assessing the educational budget 
is the internal allocation of funds to the different levels of 
education, where each one has its own priorities relative to the 
rest. Table 2.7 presents this internal allocation of funds in 
Greece between 1961-1985.
Table 2.7. State Budget: Educational Expenditure by Level, 
1961-85, (%)
Univer­ Non- Total in
Year sity Univ. Secondary Primary Total million Drs.
1961 6.8 21.7 71.5 100.0 1,252
7.0 • • • 22.9 70.1 100.0 1,370
7.9 • • • 23.6 68.5 100.0 1,521
12.7 • • • 23.7 63.6 100.0 2,272
1965 13.2 ... 25.3 61.5 100.0 2,547
15.6 ... 25.4 59.0 100.0 2,988
14.2 ... 27.3 58.5 100.0 3,611
13.9 ... 28.3 57.8 100.0 3,937
14.0 ... 28.5 57.5 100.0 4,027
1970 14.7 ... 27.7 57.6 100.0 3,883
14.3 1.0 25.7 59.0 100.0 4,428
12.8 1.6 28.1 57.5 100.0 5,156
14.8 1.9 27.3 56.0 100.0 5,913
19.5 1.8 26.7 52.0 100.0 8,581
1975 22.1 2.8 27.7 47.4 100.0 10,591
22.8 3.7 25.9 47.6 100.0 12,156
23.4 3.3 28.3 45.0 100.0 15,455
17.2 2.4 34.4 46.0 100.0 28,131
12.4 2.3 37.3 48.0 100.0 33,936
1980 14.9 3.1 36.9 45.1 100.0 41,584
16.7 3.3 38.2 41.8 100.0 53,709
17.0 3.2 38.6 41.2 100.0 72,173
16.1 3.0 40.8 40.1 100.0 85,381
16.8 3.6 40.4 39.2 100.0 107,514
1985 18.3 4.4 42.3 35.0 100.0 ...
Source: Pesmazoglou, 1987, Table 4, p. 84 
Note: (...) not available
The emerging message is that the pattern over time is quite mixed
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and there is a gradual decline in primary education as more funds 
are devoted to post-compulsory levels. Also, as shown in Table 
2.7, the share of secondary education has increased steadily in 
the post-1974 period and currently levels equally with primary 
education and amounts to about 40% (for 1984) of the state 
budget, while for 1985 is estimated to have surpassed primary 
education allocation share.
As far as higher education is concerned, there has been a 
substantial slow-down of the growth rate of its share during the 
late seventies, but it clearly became more important during the 
eighties by following faster rhythms of growth (see Table 2.7). 
The relative importance of higher education in Greece, as 
evidenced by the substantial shift of funds especially from 
primary education, resulted to a better impression when compared 
to the rest of the EEC countries (see Appendix Table A-10), where 
the EEC minimum now, referring solely to higher education, is 
about 10% (for Italy) and the maximum about 27% (for the 
Netherlands) . All in all, whether this trend in the allocation 
of funds is in the "right" direction is a matter of a finer 
breakdown of where the resources are or will be devoted.
To this point we have examined and reported State-related 
expenditure on education, in general, and higher education, in 
particular. Though, in the economics of education context, one 
of the most important aspects of the finance of education is the 
one related to cost issues. It should be noted that a major 
distinction of the cost of education is into social and private. 
Also, we account for direct and indirect cost for both the 
individual and the society (see for example Vaizey, 1958 and
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Blaug, 1970) . When referring to the direct social cost we mean 
the direct public expenditure as it has been already portrayed so 
far. The direct private cost refers to expenditure borne by the 
individual for the sole purpose of his/her education (e.g. school 
fees, tutoring fees, book purchases, transportation, rent, and 
other miscellaneous expenditure). The indirect social cost is 
defined as the output of an individual which is forgone by the 
society while he/she is educated beyond the compulsory point. 
Following the same rationale the indirect private cost (or 
opportunity cost) is expressed as the earnings the individual 
would have received had he been employed while undertaking 
education or the so-called "forgone earnings". A final remark is 
that the indirect social cost is based on the forgone earnings of 
the individual before tax, while the indirect private cost 
relates to after tax earnings forgone.
Further to the above, the direct social and private cost 
will be presented and discussed, based on the available data. 
These costs will be adopted for the social rate of return 
calculation. The social direct cost is expressed as the average 
cost per student derived from the realisations of the public 
current expenditure. Table 2.8 depicts the average social cost 
per student of higher education —  in total and separately for 
the post-secondary, non-university education cycle —  in current 
prices. Undoubtedly, as shown by Table 2.8, the level of the 
average social cost remains quite high between 1970 and 1987 
(even if is adjusted for inflation).
While higher education in Greece is predominantly a State
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responsibility, as declared in article 16 of the 1975 
constitution (see Section 2.2.3 and Appendix A.3), one should 
expect that the only cost involved is the one borne by the State. 
Nonetheless, both the huge flow of Greek students abroad —  and 
consequently the massive flow of exchange out of the country (see 
later Chapter 7) —  and the unknown, though considerably high,
number of students at proprietary schools, which do not enjoy a 
university status in Greece, suggest otherwise. This is in 
addition to the high cost involved in attending domestic 
institutions apart from the earnings forgone by the students. 
All the above have considerable cost and equity implications for 
the Greek system of higher education.
Regarding data on the direct private cost of education at 
the higher level it is noted that it is extremely scanty and the 
only available sources are individual studies. One of the recent 
ones is made in 1987 by Papas and Psacharopoulos. It suggests 
that education in Greece is by no means free despite the 
proclamations of the State (op. cit.. Table A-3). In detail, the 
average annual cost per university student (176,348 Drs.) was 
estimated to be about 20% and 37% less as compared to TEI 
(219,036 Drs.) and proprietary school (279,333 Drs.) students 
respectively. Additionally, it is evident that the direct 
private cost for TEI students, reported by Papas and 
Psacharopoulos, is 40% higher, for the year 1986, than the 
respective social cost appearing in Table 2.8. Finally, cram 
school fees in preparing youngsters to enter university represent 
one of the most significant direct household expenditures 
(134,209 Drs. overall).
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Data on the average private cost (direct) per student abroad 
also appear revealing on Table 2.8. These data are derived from 
the total declared exchange for studies abroad over the 
corresponding number of students (for an explicit presentation of 
such data see Section 7.6). The credibility of the above data 
though is extensively discussed in Chapter 7 (Section 7.2). 
Papas and Psacharopoulos (op. cit.) reported a figure of the 
order of 890,417 Drs. for 1986, while the corresponding based on
Table 2.8. Average Cost per Higher Education Student, 1970-87 */
Domestic Average Average
Cost per Student Cost per
Student
Year Total Post-sec., Studying
Higher non-univ. Abroad
1970 13,846 — — — 38 458
1971 12,647 — —— 45 401
1972 15,553 — —— 46 655
1973 21,414 — —— 49 299
1974 26,800 ... 61 105
1975 34,234 ... 61 643
1976 39,060 60,970 66 714
1977 51,186 65,370 69 002
1978 59,333 56,590 75 591
1979 68,700 60,510 88 293
1980 73,844 62,200 109 908
1981 105,462 89,780 129 874
1982 127,287 95,380 181 779
1983 135,827 92,820 238 913
1984 181,756 133,500 275 902
1985 200,000 a/ 150,900 a/ 476 890
1986 ... 133,620 606 534
1987 305,116 b/ 209,189 614 900
Source; Domestic: 1970-1986, Ministry of Education
1987, Greek Newspaper TA NEA 25/11/87 
Abroad: 1970-1987, Bank of Greece
Notes: (--) not applicable
(...) not available
*/ data refer to realisations of the Public
Current Expenditure and is in current Drs. 
a/ Ministry of Education estimates 
b/ includes only AEI and TEI
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the Bank of Greece summary data is by a third less, that is 
606,534 Drs. as shown in Table 2.8. Therefore, it could be 
argued that the Bank of Greece data do underestimate the 
magnitude of the "real" expenditure. Although the data may be 
biased due to their grouped nature one could draw some 
interesting conclusions. In detail, when contrasted to the 
analogous social cost appears to be about double and for some 
years very close to it. That is a fact which reinforces the 
argument towards the "liberalisation" of higher education in 
Greece through the reform of the current legal status and the 
introduction of recognised private universities which in turn 
will absorb part of that cost.
2.2.6____ The Excess Demand Phenomenon
What determines the excess demand for post-secondary education, 
in general, and university education, in particular, evidenced 
thus far? There is no single explanation of this phenomenon as 
it results from numerous economic and sociological factors. The 
main social and economic explanations will be outlined below.
The widespread belief that the inclination towards learning 
is a "characteristic of the Greeks from the educationally lower 
classes" does not offer a satisfactory explanation. The validity 
of this argument has been challenged in the past and it has been 
confirmed that such a tendency "cannot, of course, be attributed 
to any innate characteristic of the population". An 
interpretation "should be based on the study of the social and 
economic conditions which determine a large part of the thinking 
of each Greek" (Nassiakou, 1981, p.69).
In the context of the sociological approach, both social
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reproduction (of mainly the public apparatus) and mobility issues 
are considered. As far as the former is concerned, the central 
hypothesis elaborated by Tsoucalas (1975 and 1977) is that higher 
education serves as a mechanism of social reproduction. The 
majority of higher education graduates are employed in the public 
sector (see below, Table 4.1), and demand for higher education is 
motivated by the students' desire to gain admittance into that 
sector. Therefore, higher education acts as a means of the 
reproduction of the public sector. The source of the belief that 
employment in the civil service could be provided for all 
university graduates goes back to the late nineteenth century. 
It was estimated that an overgrown public sector was larger in 
Greece than in much more developed nations. For example, in the 
1970s, the number of civil servants per 10,000 population was 
seven times greater in Greece than in the United Kingdom 
(Dertilis, 1976, Table 14; cited in Mouzelis, 1986, p. 57).
Social mobility dimensions of the excess demand phenomenon 
are important, especially when considering the urban and 
agricultural workers. In this respect, Lambiri-Dimaki (1973) and 
Frangoudakis (1981) argue that "prestigious" university education 
is viewed as a valid ticket which, apart from the increased 
pecuniary benefits, leads to social recognition and the creation 
of the "elite". In addition, we should note that "social class 
discrimination", as has been discussed and demonstrated 
frequently in the literature, is very low in Greek higher 
education. For example, almost a third of all university 
students come from rural areas, despite the fact that the
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majority of the population lives in urban centres (see below, 
Section 2.3.2). This representation is high as compared to many 
European countries (Lambiri-Dimaki, 1983, Mouzelis and Attalides, 
1971, Tsoucalas, 1981); for example, Bordieu and Passeron (1977, 
p. 225) demonstrated that in France, with a population that was 
60 per cent peasant and workers in the early 1960s, "only 15 per 
cent of the student population was of peasant or working class 
origin". This is particularly surprising for the case of Greece 
considering that attending tertiary education represents a 
significant part of the family expenditure as argued in Section
2.2.5 (see also Papas and Psacharopoulos, 1987).
A "good" higher education in Greece has historically been 
related with classical education, and, any other type —  as for 
example technical/vocational -- is considered as inferior; 
similarly, white-collar occupations are considered superior to 
blue-collar occupations (Kassotakis, 1981, p. 91) . This type of 
thinking is left over from the times of the Bavarian influence in 
Greek higher education and is still evident today. To put it in 
Mouzelis' terms, "German idealism and legalism, have for decades 
been disorientating whole generations of Greek students" 
(Mouzelis, 1978, p. 73). This is, perhaps, the reason that post­
secondary, non-university technical education is not demanded to 
the extent that university education is; thus it is not the first 
choice among secondary school graduates, and is viewed as the 
"poorest solution" (for evidence, see Section 2.2.4, Dragonas 
and Kostakis, 1986, Kassotakis, 1981, Kazamias, 1978, Papas and 
Psacharopoulos, 1987). This is also another reason aiding to 
explain, somehow, the excess demand phenomenon for university
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education which could be attributed to the State's decision to 
systematically and consciously "channel" demand towards the 
post-secondary, non-university cycle, the Technical Education 
Institutions (TEI), (see Section 2.2.4). However, a large 
proportion of TEI graduates are taking advantage of their status 
and attempt to enter a university school under the various 
"special provisions" (see Section 2.2.3). In the meantime, a 
small but significant proportion of those who have failed to 
enter higher education institutions in Greece, and could afford 
it, have followed the solution of studying abroad (see below. 
Chapter 7).
In addition, the nature of the transition process from 
school to higher education contributes to the excess demand for 
that level (see Section 2.2.3). In other words, the Greek 
educational system, through the national general examinations, 
has created the present situation where the upper secondary 
diploma means only one thing in the minds of most students, 
aspiration for higher education. This is also strengthened by 
the fact that each year the number of higher education applicants 
exceeds significantly the respective number of secondary level 
graduates (see Table 2.4) because of the provisions of the system 
allowing students to rewrite examinations year after year. Also, 
the fact that the State sets quotas for entry into higher 
education (numerus clausus) corroborates the observed excess 
demand simply by limiting the supply, thus creating the 
impression that higher education is something to be sought after, 
even beyond the social optimum.
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The economic approach, which is the heart of this study, 
assumes that prospective students act as rational investors. 
Based on this assumption, the various economic indicators —  and 
mainly the rate of return to the specific level and kind of 
education —  would be the determinants of the demand for further 
education. Therefore, one could say that a profitable return to 
investment in education, in general, and to higher education, in 
particular, will justify an incentive for demanding additional 
education. We are going to elaborate on this issue in Chapter 5, 
where we estimate the returns to education.
Further to the above, a rational economic explanation is 
associated with the perception which secondary school graduates 
have for the labour market. Secondary school seniors have been 
asked to indicate their expected salaries if they remained with a 
secondary school degree, and if they had a university degree. 
The availability of this type of information permits the 
estimation of an expected or, ex ante, rate of return to 
investment in university education. Table 5.16, below, shows 
that the expected rate of return, as perceived by the students, 
is unrealistically large for both 1974 and 1986. The above, in 
conjunction with the possibility that secondary school graduates 
are influenced by past trends, means that there may be some 
inertia signals acting as a "push factor" for further education, 
the demand for which is high and inelastic.
It could also be argued, based on the magnitude of 
employment of graduates in the public sector (see Table 4.1) and 
the belief that "guaranteed employment" is applicable for that 
sector (see above), that the demand for higher education is
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driven by the "wrong" incentives and counterproductive criteria. 
The prospective investors (i.e. secondary school graduates) may 
be overestimating the public sector remuneration package (i.e. 
tenure, social security, job environment, automatic promotion, 
reduced responsibilities) in contrast with the more rewarding and 
productive, but antagonistic and "insecure", private sector of 
the economy.
The issue also has a graduate unemployment dimension. The 
negligible opportunity of securing "good" jobs has been well 
documented (see for example Gedeon and Psacharopoulos, 1979 and 
1982, and for an explicit presentation of the graduate 
unemployment issue see Section 3.1.4 below). The fear of 
unemployment among Greek youth contributes to the demand for 
tertiary education because of the perception that a degree 
implies guaranteed employment in the public sector as argued 
above. This argument is factually depicted by official public 
sector employment data (see Table 4.1, and. Section 3.1.4) 
providing a rational explanation to the phenomenon.
A great part of the strong social demand for higher 
education in Greece must also be attributed to its low direct 
cost (that is, students pay no fees, see Section 2.2.5). Of 
course the individual student has to pay an indirect price in the 
form of zero or reduced earnings while studying. However, in 
periods of low employment prospects for secondary school leavers 
(see above), or when government-set criteria favour the hiring of 
higher education graduates, university study becomes cheap and 
investment in it can be carried out beyond the social optimum.
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One should also consider job aspirations. A highly-paid 
position in the competitive sectors of the economy or with 
multinational corporations brings with it salaries that are far 
above the respective averages of the public sector. Furthermore, 
in view of the imminent European Integration of 1992, a large 
proportion of prospective higher education students may be 
considering the option of working abroad. It is therefore far 
more profitable for a student to be educated in Greece (low 
private cost) and increase his future earnings capacity by 
"migrating" abroad.
Finally, beyond the above explanations, we should not 
overlook the consumption aspect associated with a university 
education. That is, individuals may demand higher education for 
non-pecuniary reasons, contributing to the excess demand.
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2.3 POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS
2.3. 1____Population Growth
Population-wise, the combination of such events as the 
territorial expansion, the disastrous military events of the 
1920*s in Asia Minor, the rural-urban migration, as well as the 
significant educational expansion resulted in a drastic change in 
the size and composition of the Greek population in the present 
century.
In detail, according to the National Statistical Service of 
Greece (NSSG) the 753,000 total population of Greece in 1828 grew 
to 1 million by 1853, 1.5 million in 1890, 2.6 million in 1907,
5.0 million in 1920, 6.2 million in 1928, 7.6 million in 1951,
8.4 million in 1961, 8.8 million in 1971, 9.7 million in 1981 to 
an estimated size of nearly 10 million in 1988. Moreover, the 
percentage composition of the population in terms of gender is 
stable during the last three decades, that is males account for 
about 48% and females for 52%.
2.3. 2____Distribution of Population
Greece has experienced intensive rural-urban migration during the 
last decades. A major reason for the above, amoTig other, was the 
lack of adequate educational facilities in the villages and the 
fact that it is uneconomical to keep schools with very few 
students in remote areas of the country. The strong urbanisation 
movement, mainly towards the greater Athens region, and migration 
abroad have greatly influenced the distribution and structure of 
the population.
In particular, the population of the greater Athens area
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grew rapidly from about 32,000 in 1848, to 180,000 in 1896, 
803,000 in 1928, 1.4 million in 1951, 2.5 million in 1971 to a
present estimate of over 3 million. This drastic shift of 
population with concentration in the Athens region is closely 
related to the increasing pressure for secondary education and 
the rising demand for higher education, as it will be shown in 
the next sections.
The picture for the distribution of population by region in 
1920 was 62.0, 15.2 and 22.9 per cent, for rural, semi-urban and 
urban centres respectively. The urbanisation process started in 
the 1940's and was intensified in the decade 1961-71. As shown in 
Appendix Table A-13, according to the 1961 census, 42.2 per cent 
of the population was living in rural areas (less than 3,000 
inhabitants), 12.9 per cent in small towns (3,000 inhabitants and 
over) and 44.8 per cent in large urban centres (10,000 
inhabitants and over). By 1971 the situation changed towards the 
urban centres, where the distribution of population became 34.5,
11.5 and 54.0 per cent for rural, semi-urban and urban areas 
respectively. The same picture is presented for 1981 where the 
respective statistics are 3 0.6, 11.5 and 57.9 per cent, following 
the same order.
The major shift of the population distribution from rural to 
urban areas was accompanied (a) by a shift in the distribution of 
economically active population in the major sectors of the 
economy, (b) by an increase in the participation of women in the 
labour force and (c) by a decrease in the proportion of the 
economically active population in the urban, semi-urban and rural 
areas.
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2.3.3_____ The Educational Level of the Population
Participation in education also increased dramatically during the 
last three decades. Greece is the country par excellence where 
changes in enrolments can be attributed mainly to all other 
factors except demographic changes. The level of education of 
the population has been improving steadily in both absolute and 
relative terms. More specifically:
As shown in Appendix Table A-12, the illiteracy rate for the 
population aged over 10 years was 17.8 per cent in 1961. Between 
1960 and 1970 the absolute figure of illiteracy dropped by more 
than 20 percentage points. The 14.0 per cent illiteracy rate 
figure for 1971 jumped to 8.6 per cent in 1981. That was a 
spectacular change of about 40 per cent, and this percentage was 
evenly distributed in the male and female population of the 
country (see also Appendix Table A-12).
This change can be attributed to the increasing 
participation of youngsters in primary education, the changing 
role of women in the Greek society and to the natural decrease of 
the older generation which traditionally has had the lowest 
literacy rates. For example, 95 per cent of the illiterate 
population was over 3 0 years of age, 76 per cent was over 45 and 
38 per cent is over 65 in 1971. Furthermore, according to the 
same Appendix Table A-12, if examined separately by gender, 21.3 
per cent of the women and 6.2 per cent of the men were 
illiterates in 1971 where the respective statistics for 1981 were
13.4 and 3.6 per cent.
In addition, it should be mentioned that illiterates were 
mostly people in rural areas, the analogy being between rural.
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semi-urban and urban areas in 1961,. 1971 and 1981 respectively, 
as follows; 23.9:18.5:11.8, 21.3:15.5:8.9 and 14.4:10.1:5.2 (see 
Appendix Table A-13).
Finally, we should point out that the overall illiteracy 
rate is a grossly misleading statistic. As it has already been 
said, most of the illiterates were old-age persons in rural 
areas, mostly women. The long life expectancy in Greece (75 
years) and low fertility rates (2.1) and the turbulent history of 
Modern Greece, especially the influx of 1.5 million refugees from 
Asia Minor in 1922 (accounting for almost 1/3 of the native 
population during that period) were mostly responsible for this 
anomaly (Mouzelis, 1978).
The decrease of illiterates indicates one aspect of the 
upgrading of educational level of the population which has taken 
place the last three decades. In particular, graduates of higher 
education have increased at an average annual rate of 5.5 per 
cent between 1961 and 1971 and by 9.4 per cent between 1971 and 
1981. This has occurred mainly in the urban areas with the semi- 
urban following and has affected women more than men.
Graduates of secondary education have increased at an 
average annual rate of 4.5 and 4.1 per cent for the 1961-71 and 
1971-81 periods respectively. Again, this primarily occurred in 
the urban areas and affected mostly women.
Overall, as shown in Table 2.9, the average years of 
schooling have increased by about 4 0 per cent for all regions and 
both sexes, between 1961 and 1981. Women were found to be 50 per 
cent better off, while men by about 30 per cent.
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Table 2.9. The Educational Level of the Population, 
by Gender and Region, 1961-1981
Population Education Index 
(OOO's)
Average Years
Year of Schooling
per Person
Increase
%
1961 Males 3314.2 5.8
Females 3563.3 4.1 — ——
Total 6877.5 5.0 — — —
1971 Males 3514.7 6.5 10.6
Females 3753.5 5.0 20.5
Total 7269.2 5.7 14.9
1981 Males 3995.6 7.5 15.8
Females 4219.4 6.3 25.7
Total 8215.0 6.9 20.4
1961 Urban 3083.0 6.2
Semi-Urban 889.5 4.5 — ——
Rural 2905.0 3.8 — — —
1971 Urban 3925.7 6.8 10.2
Semi-Urban 835.8 5.1 12.2
Rural 2507.7 4.2 10.2
1981 Urban 4754.9 7.9 16.1
Semi-Urban 945.3 6.1 21.4
Rural 2514.8 5.2 23.5
Source; NSSG, Population Censuses for 1961, 1971, and 1981 
respectively 
Note: (-- ) not applicable
In addition, according to Table 2.9, rural population shows 
an increase of the average years of schooling between 1961 and 
1981 of more than 35 per cent, while the statistic is about the 
same for semi-urban and levels to about 30 percentage points for 
urban population.
Summarising Table 2.9, we could say that the higher average 
years of schooling in 1981 were those of the urban population 
(7.9) and of men (7.5), while the lower years of schooling were
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those of the rural population (5.2) and of women (6.3).
Table 2.10. University Graduates by Field of Study, 
1961, 1971 and 1981
Field of Study Year Greece
Total
%  O f  
Total
Capital 
Area %
Graduates (Total) 1961 85603 100.0 59.9
1971 150656 100.0 60.6
1981 329489 100.0 56.4
A. Humanities 1961 9620 11.2 46.5
1971 18372 12.2 50.4
1981 44780 13.6 48.5
B. Art 1961 799 0.9 80.4
1971 716 0.5 90.0
1981 2454 0.7 73.2
C. Law & Social Sciences 1961 39041 45.6 78.1
1971 59812 39.7 70.6
1981 120622 36.6 66.0
D. Science 1961 7939 9.3 54.4
1971 11364 7.5 54.1
1981 30270 9.2 46.5
E. Technology 1961 7686 9.0 71.6
1971 17000 11.3 68.5
1981 39766 12.1 60.1
F. Medicine & Pharmacy 1961 15477 18.1 53.9
1971 24024 15.9 55.9
1981 46240 14.0 50.8
G. Agricultural Studies 1961 3690 4.3 25.7
& Veterinary Sciences 1971 5292 3.5 28.7
1981 9032 2.7 27.3
Source; NSSG, Population Censuses for 1961, 1971, and 1981 
respectively
Note: The excluded categories are Teacher Training, Military 
Academies, and other 'not specified field' graduates
Finally, if we look at the composition of the University 
graduates' stock by field of study during the past three decades 
as presented in Table 2.10, we can identify the following; 
first. Law & Social Sciences graduates have the lion's share
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among all the rest (around 40%); second, Medicine & Pharmacy 
graduates constitute almost 15% of the total. Humanities 
graduates follow with a 14% share in 1981 and Technology 
graduates appear to be 12% for the same year, followed by Science 
graduates (9% representation); third, at the bottom of the 
distribution are the Agricultural Studies & Veterinary Sciences 
and Fine Arts graduates, having 3% and 1% representation 
respectively; fourth, the stock of all graduates is doubled or 
more than doubled between 1971 and 1981; last, more than 50% of 
the graduates in each category functions in the capital area 
(except those with Agricultural Studies & Veterinary Sciences 
degrees), highlighting the strong urbanisation effects of the 
1950's and the high centralisation.
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2.4 ECONOMICS OF EDUCATION IN GREECE
A quick review of the relevant literature on the Greek setting is 
revealing that little research exists on studies on the economics 
of education, rates of return to education, and similar topics. 
They are mainly limited in the works of (i) Professor Harvey 
Leibenstein (1964), (ii) the OECD, (a) in the context of the 
Mediterranean Regional Project (OECD, 1965a and 1965b, and 
Williams, 1965), and (b) the Individual Demand for Education 
programme (Soumelis, 1979 -- see also Psacharopoulos and
Soumelis, 1979), and (iii) George Psacharopoulos and Andreas 
Kazamias (1985; see also Psacharopoulos, 1982a). Some other 
studies, on the planning and economic problems of education in 
Greece, do also exist (see for example Bowles, 1969 and 1971, 
Caramanis and loannides, 1980, Lambropoulos, 1985 and
Pesmazoglou, 1987) and they will be presented as well. It should 
be also recorded that the original data of the above two 
principal research surveys (Leibenstein, op. cit.; and partly 
Psacharopoulos and Kazamias, op. cit.) were re-analysed in the 
context of Ph.D. theses. In detail, by Costas Kanellopoulos 
(1980) the former and by Alexios Pilavios (1980) part of the 
latter.
It is needless to say that the establishment of the 
Mediterranean Regional Project by the OECD was mainly attributed 
to what Marry Jean Bowman (1966) described as "the human 
investment revolution in economic thought" of the 1960s (see also 
Section 1.1.1). The main objective of the above project was to 
use education as a dynamic factor for the economic development of
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a country adopting the Manpower Requirements Approach. The Greek 
application of the approach consisted mostly of manpower 
forecasts and educational policy discussions in the context of 
future needs and reforms (see OECD, 1965a and 1965b). The 
highlight of the study's findings was the one "urging" the 
country towards the importance of technical education for future 
development. The previous finding was in line with what Zolotas 
(1960) has suggested some years ago, and it was adopted by Greece 
(see Section 2.2.3). In addition, it is also worth recording 
that Williams (1965) , in the context of the OECD activities, 
applied the Tinbergen model for Greece. His intention though 
was the investigation of the application of econometric models in 
education by utilising Greek data, rather than educational policy 
issues for the Greek educational system (see also Athanasiou, 
1978). The highlight of the concluding points of his exercise 
was the identification of some kind of "overinvestment" in 
education in Greece. Summarising, it is worth noting that the 
philosophy of the internationally questionable credibility of the 
manpower requirements approach still continues to dominate 
planning activities in Greece and the need for a re-assessment of 
the approach itself is very evident for the modernisation of the 
Greek educational system.
It has been extensively discussed and presented in the 
literature that education contributes to the economic growth of a 
country (see for example Denison, 1967). Sources of growth in 
the Greek economy with particular reference to the role of 
education in affecting labour quality were first studied by 
Bowles (1971) for the decade 1951-1961, following the basic
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methodological framework first expounded by Denison (op. cit.) 
and the approach proposed by himself (Bowles, 1969). Bowles, by 
using the KEPE-Leibenstein Survey, found that increased schooling 
contributed only to a small percentage of 2% to growth in the 
Greek setting and he explained his results as follows: first, the 
educational composition of the labour force did not change 
markedly over the decade in question (see also Bowles, 1967); 
second, with the exception of university education, the increase 
in productivity associated with additional years of schooling 
appeared to be small.
A similar approach was followed by Caramanis and loannides 
(1980) and in view of the availability of better data (the 1977 
NSSG Labour Force Survey) the Bowles's 1951-1961 exercise was 
repeated for 1961-1971. The study was carried out in the context 
of the Third Educational Project (see Psacharopoulos and 
Kazamias, 1985). The main methodological differences between 
their approach and that of Bowles (1971) were that (a) the human 
capital characteristic age —  serving as a proxy for variable 
experience —  was added in the analysis, (b) annual data and 
growth rates were analysed, in place of Bowles's ten-year 
averages, and (c) the non-agricultural sector was examined 
separately, in addition to the entire economy. Their results 
present a somewhat low contribution of education, they highlight 
no substantial differences with the 1951-1961 results (ibid.), 
and the annual fluctuations are not considerable. In detail, 
"the contribution of education ranges from 3% to 5%, among the 
examined cases, for the entire economy, and falls to 1% to 2%,
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when the agricultural sector is excluded" (Caramanis and 
loannides, op. cit., p. 153). Since the two economic growth 
studies are separated, datawise, by more than ten years the 
message is clear: "the returns to education are relatively small 
and perhaps declining" (op. cit., p.155).
Following the Bowles study and during the 1960s we have the
first rate of return to investment in education in Greece study,
which was conducted by Professor Harvey Leibenstein (1967) in
collaboration with the Athens based Centre of Planning and
Economic Research (KEPE) (for a description of the data set see
Section 3.3). In brief, the study was based on a survey of large
firms in the private sector in the Athens area and was conducted
during 1960 and 1964, covering 2,820 observations. The
methodology used was the Internal Rate of Return (IRR), involving
net present values and the choice of an interest rate for the
discounting (rates of 6 and 7% were chosen) . A major finding of
the study was that "the rates of return to a secondary education
as terminal education are frequently close to zero or negative,
at a zero growth rate" (Leibenstein, 1967, p.16). Another
important result that was unambiguous had to do with technical
education at the secondary school level. Leibenstein also notes
that "if secondary general education does not pay then technical
education of the type and under the conditions given in the past
certainly does not pay" (op. cit., p. 24) which was contradictory
with the Mediterranean Regional Project outcomes. The main
points of his conclusions could be summarised as follows: (a)
\
priority should be given to all educational activities except the 
secondary and university (excluding doctors, chemists and
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engineers) education cycles; and (b) reallocation of the 
secondary education funds towards primary and non-university, 
post-secondary education. In addition, the relatively low rates 
of return lead Leibenstein to assume that the country may be 
"overeducated".
Further work utilising this data set was done by 
Kanellopoulos (1980 and 1982), and Psacharopoulos (1982a). In 
detail, Kanellopoulos identified the existence of "some kind" of 
sex discrimination in the Greek labour market, that is female 
employees are in a distinct disadvantage as compared to male 
employees. The three main reasons for the above observation 
were, "shorter seniority within the firm, short previous 
experience and unfavourable occupational distributions" 
(Kanellopoulos, 1982, p. 239). Additionally, differences in 
education were not found to account for any important part of the 
pay differential (ibid.). The analysis of the data set by 
Psacharopoulos (1982a), within the rate of return to investment 
in education context, produced a 9.2 and 8.6 per cent average 
rate of return under the Mincerian specification for the years 
1960 and 1964 respectively (op. cit., p. 340). Also, under the 
step specification of the human capital earnings function the 
calculation of the private rate of return to higher education was 
made possible amounting to 15 and 14.4 per cent for 1960 and 1964 
respectively (ibid.) and they ranked favourably as compared to 
those available for other countries during that period.
Psacharopoulos in one of his early papers (1970), by using 
shadow pricing, estimated shadow wage rates for different skill
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levels of Greek labour for the period 1954-1965. Having done 
that, shadow rates of return to investment in education were 
calculated and they were compared to the actual rates of return. 
A major finding of the study highlighted that investment in skill 
levels requiring only primary education is more socially 
efficient than the higher skill levels, also suggesting that 
privately advantageous decisions in the human capital respect may 
be quite inefficient when assessed in social terms.
During 1977, in the context of the Third Educational Plan, 
the National Statistical Service of Greece (NSSG) directed under 
the supervision of George Psacharopoulos and Andreas Kazamias a 
nationally representative labour force survey, covering 8,756 
observations in urban centres (for a detailed description see 
Section 4.1.1.1 and Psacharopoulos and Kazamias, 1985, also 
papers published utilising this data set, such as Psacharopoulos, 
1982a, 1983a and 1983b). Psacharopoulos (1982a) reports the
average rate of return to one extra year of schooling being 5.8 
per cent and the rate of return to investment in higher education 
of the order of about 6.8 per cent (op. cit. p. 340; low rates of 
return to investment in higher education in Greece were also 
found by Lambropoulos, 1985, for the mid-1970s and the mid-1980s, 
calculated by the IRR approach, and utilising public sector 
payroll scales). The above rates of return permitted the 
comparison with those of earlier years and it was clear their 
declining pattern. In addition, he presented rates of return to 
education in Greece by detailed educational level and university 
faculty (the highest being Law with 13.8% and the lowest 
Philosophy with 0.0%). As far as the screening debate was
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concerned, Psacharopoulos (1983a) found higher rates of return to 
schooling in the private rather than the public sector of the 
Greek economy. His verdict for 1977 was that the Greek data 
pointed against the screening hypothesis (op. cit., p. 128). 
Coming to the testing of sex discrimination hypotheses, 
Psacharopoulos (1983b) found that adjustment for years of 
schooling and occupational experience explained only 11 per cent 
of the gross annual earnings differential, the rest to be 
interpreted as an upper bound of the degree of sex 
discrimination.
In addition to a data base referring to the National and 
Commercial Banks of Greece employees, part of the NSSG, 1977 data 
set (public sector employees) was also analysed by Pilavios 
(1980), in an effort to assess the rationale for the high demand 
for post-secondary education given the declining and low rates 
reported so far. An interesting aspect of his analysis consists 
on the identification of the peculiarities of the Greek 
educational system which in turn lead Pilavios to hypothesise 
that it is theoretically possible for an individual to experience 
zero forgone earnings while at full employment after the 
completion of the secondary school cycle and parallel studying at 
the university (see also Section 2.2.3). The calculation method 
utilised in his analysis is the internal rate of return (IRR) one 
in the context of what Psacharopoulos (1981) describes as the 
"elaborate method". This method allows to take into account the 
amouTit of forgone earnings, as well as any other direct cost to 
education, as contrasted to the Mincerian specification for the
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calculation of the rate of return to investment in education 
which assumes a priori zero forgone earnings (see also Section 
1.2). Based on the previous advantage of the method, Pilavios 
experimented and recalculated the returns to education by 
assuming zero to four years of forgone earnings. When zero 
forgone earnings are considered the individual could 
theoretically experience infinite rates of return. Also, when 
four years of forgone earnings are accounted the returns are very 
low, but they rise instantly by the time fewer years of forgone 
earnings are assumed. Pilavios puts also a number of plausible 
explanations to justify his assumptions and concludes that the 
high demand for higher education by the Greeks is not due to 
income differentials, but state legislation that allows an 
individual to minimise the costs of that education.
It becomes clear therefore, that although investment in 
education appears to be non-profitable on economic grounds, the 
social demand especially for higher education was evident and 
increasing. Soumelis (1979), attempted to answer the puzzle in 
the context of the "Individual Demand for Post-Secondary 
Education" OECD study, where he was responsible for the Greek 
part. The data were collected through a questionnaire (OECD, 
1976) administered to a national random stratified sample of 
7,425 Greek pupils (about 7% of the eligible population) who were 
in the last two years of secondary school in Spring 1974. The 
series of questions asked raised information on a host of 
characteristics relating to pupils' plans for further education, 
family background, scholastic achievement and psychological 
(perception) factors.
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The analysis of the plans of the pupils in deciding to 
continue or not for higher —  university —  education studies to 
the particular institution they aspired entry indicated the 
dominance of school grade as the key variable among others. 
Additionally, parents' education was found to be —  through an 
educational production function —  the main variable relating to 
scholastic achievement which in turn is giving a clue as to the 
process of transmission of educational aspirations. Namely, the 
more educated the parents are the more they push their children 
to obtain high grades, thus making it easier for them to continue 
into all forms of post-secondary education.
It is noteworthy, that similar conclusions were reached 10 
years latter by Papas and Psacharopoulos (1987) when studying a 
significantly smaller sample of about 500 secondary school 
seniors in 12 high schools in the Athens area. Another key- 
factor found to be of significance in that study was the status 
of the school attended. In detail, the more selective the 
school, being either private or state, the higher the possibility 
in entering university. Such an identification creates further 
questions on the efficiency of the regular schools in Greece and 
the role of the selective schools in promoting inequality. What 
is of interest in the present study though, is the first-hand 
information on the cost of education that it provides. It is 
well known and extensively stated that education in Greece is 
free at all levels. The numbers, contrary to the proclamations, 
speak for a different pattern indiscriminately for all students 
and they indicate high costs for all levels (for a discussion on
Chapter 2, p. 109
the matter see Section 2.2.5).
Finally, Pesmazoglou (1987) contributed to the little 
literature existing on education and economy in Greece with a 
study aiming to examine in depth the traditional structures of 
the Greek economy and production, as well as the social 
implications associated with it. The study is dealing 
extensively with educational finance issues in a descriptive and 
enquiring rather than institutional Economics of Education 
framework. Particular attention is given also on the EEC context 
and the educational process in relation to all three sectors of 
economic activity. A central argument is the identification of a 
"crisis" in the system of education which is leading to a 
negative relationship between education and production, the 
vicious circle of underdevelopment and dependency. It was not in 
his intentions though, to offer any form of vital "prescriptions" 
in facing the problem, but he is rather dealing with the 
identification of the various phenomena. In addition, he argues 
that existing "models", as far as the planning of education is 
concerned, are neither adequate nor appropriate in approaching 
the core of the various issues associated with education and for 
that reason he puts a severe critique. However, he suggests an 
"ecumenical" approach of the educational sector, through 
considering seriously civilisation, tradition and distinct 
international developments. Eventually, the dominant feature of 
his research findings, in general, is the reproduction role of 
the educational mechanism, as this was studied extensively 
through the level, distribution and the allocation of the 
educational expenditure during the post-war period.
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2.5 SUMMARY
There is little doubt that at present the supply of education in 
Greece is near-perfectly elastic for primary and secondary 
levels. Demand for education at these levels, as evidenced by 
enrolment ratios, is equally high (106 per cent and 88 per cent 
for primary and secondary levels, respectively, for 1984, see 
Sections 2.1.1 and 2.1.2).
However, with respect to post-secondary education, as 
evidenced in section 2.2.4, it appears that demand exceeds by far 
the availability of places. The enrolment ratio in the tertiary 
level is 24 per cent of the relative age group for 1984, although 
this grossly understates the true enrolment as it excludes Greek 
students studying abroad (the issue of the demand for study 
abroad is dealt with in Chapter 7). If Greek students studying 
abroad are included, then the ratio increases substantially (to 
more than 30 per cent) and compares favourably to Italy, Spain, 
France, Germany and the Netherlands (UNESCO, 1987, Tables 2.10 & 
2.2) .
In addition, as shown in Table 2.6, higher education 
enrolment grew by sevenfold between the early sixties and the 
mid-eighties (that is from about 30,000 to nearly 200,000 
students —  excluding students abroad). During these years, the 
competition for entering into the university has been fierce. In 
the sixties and seventies, entry into the tertiary system as a 
whole never exceeded one third of the candidates. Entry to a 
university per se has been restricted to as low as 13 percent of 
those applying (see Table 2.4). Success rates to the tertiary
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system as a whole have increased in the eighties as a result of a 
Government policy to defuse the demand for higher education by 
reorienting it towards 3-year Technological Institutes (see 
Appendix Table A-4).
Excess demand for higher education, and by extension the 
evolution in enrolments, resulted in the marked increase of the 
average years of schooling of the population (see Section 2.3.3). 
According to official census data we found that the educational 
status of the population has improved considerably, that is by 40 
percentage points, between 1961 and 1981 (see Table 2.22). The 
most telling improvement, though, in the educational attainment 
of the population, has been the dramatic decrease of the 
illiterates during the same period, that is from about 18 per 
cent in 1961 to almost 8.5 per cent in 1981 (see Section 2.3.3). 
That was a result of the educational policies followed during 
that period (see Section 2.2.2) and the strong urbanisation 
movement of the 1950s and 1960s evidenced in Section 2.3.2.
Finally, as shown in Section 2.4, research on the economics 
of education is sparse in Greece. In Section 2.2.6, on the 
apparent social demand for higher education, we have given the 
explanations put forward for that phenomenon. In the context of 
the economic explanation, which is the heart of our study, one 
might expect that the returns to a higher education —  and 
especially a university degree —  in Greece would be extremely 
high. That is, if someone decides to spend four or five years of 
his/her life studying at the university, then that person 
anticipates to realise a significant return on the capital 
invested in education. Have Greek students and their families
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been rational in seeking higher education based on the economic 
returns associated with this type of investment? To answer this, 
we should consider the benefits associated with higher education 
as they will be presented in Chapter 3 and 4 and analysed in 
detail in Chapter 5.
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CHAPTER 3
THE LABOUR MARKET
So far we have concentrated on two issues; first, the explicit 
development of the Human Capital framework, and second an 
examination of the Greek setting from the educational point of 
view. We have also presented background information on the 
developments in population characteristics and studies which fall 
within the economics of education in Greece.
We will now look at three issues in the Greek labour market: 
the structure of employment, pay determination, and the structure 
of earnings, during the 1960-1987 period. Studying these three 
areas will enable us to form an overall picture of the economic 
aspect of employment in Greece during the period under 
consideration. This, in turn, in conjuction with the topics we 
have examined so far, will establish the background for the 
determination of earnings stucture which will be attempted in the 
following chapter.
The size of the overall labour force in Greece remained 
virtually stable between 1961 and 1985. Nevertheless, one would 
expect effects on the labour force, in general, and employment, 
in particular, stemming from the educational expansion 
demonstrated in Chapter 2. We would expect the quality of the 
labour force to improve even though the quantity has shown a 
relative stability over the period. Which sector of economic 
activity has been the prime beneficiary of such quality 
improvements, if any? What were the effects of such rapid
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educational —  and particularly higher education —  expansion on 
graduate unemployment? Did pay policies in the public sector 
influence demand for post-compulsory education? Finally, how did 
the market respond —  in terms of earnings differentials among 
employees with different educational levels -- in such 
educational and pay policies?
3.1 THE STRUCTURE OF EMPLOYMENT
Table 3.1 gives statistics on the labour market characteristics 
among the EEC countries for the mid-1980s.
Table 3.1. Labour Market Characteristics, by Employee and Own- 
Account Workers, EEC Countries, mid-80s
Country Year
Total 
Labour 
Force 
('000s)
Employers & 
Own-Account 
Workers 
(%)
Employees
(%)
Primary
Sector
(%)
Greece 1985 3,892.4 33 .1 45.5 26.7
Portugal 1986 4,680.5 24.0 62.8 20.1
Italy 1986 23,617.0 21.4 62.9 9.5
Spain 1986 13,781.2 18.0 67.6 14.5
Ireland 1985 1,299.4 18.0 77.0 13.3
France 1985 23,618.6 14.2 75.6 6.7
Belgium 1985 4,202.2 12 .1 71.8 2.5
U.K. 1986 27,452.0 9.6 78.7 2.2
Luxemburg 1981 153.8 9.4 85.1 4.9
Denmark 1985 2,753.0 9.3 87.9 6.4
Germany 1985 27,685.0 8.7 87.3 5.0
Netherlands 1985 5,765.0 8 . 0 79.2 4.7
Source: ILO, 1987, Yearbook of Labour Statistics, Table 2A
One of the immediately obvious characteristics is that the Grrek 
labour market is equally segmented and there is high 
proportionate representation of employers, self-employed and 
unpaid family workers in the total labour force. This is not new
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for Greece. The Greek labour market has traditionally been 
"dominated by a large number of self-employed, a hypertrophy of 
agriculture and a high concentration of small-sized commercial 
undertakings, tourism and the building sector" (Skaliotis, 1987, 
p. 11). As a matter of fact Greece has by far the lowest 
percentage of employees in the labour force among EEC countries. 
Table 3.1 shows that the corresponding ratio for Italy, Spain and 
Portugal is almost 50 per cent higher than that for Greece.
So far we have firmly established that the Greek economy, in 
general, and its labour market, in particular, are among the 
least typical developed, among European market economies. In 
addition, as we will see in Table 3.2 the issue of open 
unemployment has appeared forcefully into the arena during the 
1980s. These findings set the tone for the rest of the analysis.
Trends in employment are equally illuminating. Employment 
in the primary sector, as this is depicted in Table 3.1, accounts 
for 26.7% (1985) of the total labour force and is still the
highest among European market economies. Employment in 
manufacturing is predominantly in small firms. Many of those 
engaged in the industrial sector, as well as in services are 
self-employed (e.g. craftsmen, family workers, engineers, 
doctors, architects, lawyers, hotelliers and so on).
Table 3.2 presents employment statistics by sector in Greece 
for selected years, that is 1961 to 1985. These statistics 
correspond to the periods to which our estimates of rates of 
return to education relate, presented in Chapter 5.
We can identify the following patterns from Table 3.2 with
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respect to the three main sectors of economic activity, namely 
primary, secondary and tertiary. In the first place, there was 
a dramatic decline in the importance of the primary (or 
agricultural) sector which was shared more or less equally by 
the pre-1970 and post-1970 periods. Secondly, the secondary (or 
industrial) sector benefited little from the release of labour 
from agriculture and only during the earlier period. We see that 
the share of industrial employment has remained stagnant at 
around 25-30 per cent since 1971. The prime beneficiary has been 
the tertiary (or services) sector, where employment has almost 
doubled. As we will see in Section 3.1.4, this is primarily due 
to Government policies especially with respect to graduate 
employment.
Table 3.2. Employment in Greece, 1961-1985 (%)
Economic Sector
Economically Active Population by Year
1961 1971 1981 1985
1. Primary 55.7 41.4 28.8 28.9
2. Secondary 19.8 27.0 30.9 27.4
3. Tertiary 24.5 31.6 40.3 43.7
A. Private 80. 0 74.5 67.8 69.1
B. Public 20.0 25.5 32.2 30.9
All Sectors
('000s) 3,638.6 3,235.0 3,543.8 3,588.5
Unemployed 5.9 3.1 4.2 8.5
Source; NSSG, Population Census. 1961, 1971 & 1981
NSSG, 1986, 1985: Labour Force Survey. Athens 
Notes: Private-Public Sector based on crude calculations
A crude disaggregation of the data into private and public 
sector employment illustrates a dramatic increase of those
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employed in the public sector from the 1960s to the 1980s in both 
absolute and relative terms (Table 3.2). The small 2.5% increase 
in employment during the 1982-85 period is mainly due to the 
significant growth in female employment, mostly in the public 
sector as witnessed by both the labour force surveys and the 
national accounts demand components (showing a sharp growth in 
government consumption) . A number of socially oriented criteria 
(age, number of dependent children etc.) applied to candidates 
for recruitment in the public sector and this explains to some 
extent the employment growth among females.
Table 3.3 presents statistics on employment by industry and 
status for 1985.
Table 3.3. Economically Active Population by Industry and 
Status, 1985 (%) */
Economic Sector
Employers Self-
Employed
Employees
Unpaid
Family
Workers
1. Primary 2.3 50.9 4.0 38.4
2. Secondary 8.2 16.8 71.3 3.7
3. Tertiary 4.8 23.7 65.5 6.0
A. Private 7.3 43.5 27.6 21.6
B. Public 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0
All Sectors 5.0 30.9 49.3 14.7
Source; NSSG, 1986, 1985: Labour Force Survev. Athens 
Note: */ refers to percentages of the respective row totals
Private-Public Sector based on crude calculations
The highest proportion of self-employed is observed in 
Agriculture, that is primary sector, (51%) while a massive 38% 
are classified as unpaid family workers. The share of both 
employees and employers in the same sector is almost negligible
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(less than 5%). In Industry and Services, that is secondary and 
tertiary sector, respectively, employees form a substantial 71% 
and 66%, employers 8% and 5%, and self-employed 17% and 24%, 
respectively. The contribution of unpaid family workers in these 
sectors of the economy is very low, as compared to Agriculture.
3.1.1____ The Educational Level of the Labour Force
We have already seen that the changes in the educational 
composition of the population (as witnessed in Section 2.3.3), 
resulting from the educational expansion, were significant. 
This, ha5 affected the educational level of the economically 
active population, as well. These changes are depicted in Table
3.4, which gives the educational level of the economically active 
population, based on census data, for 1961, 1971, and 1981.
Table 3.4. The Educational Level of the Economically Active 
Population, 1961, 1971, 1981 (%)
Year 1961 1971 1981
Educational Level
University Graduates 2.9 4.9 10.9
Secondary School Graduates 7.9 11.4 17.9
Primary School Graduates 47.2 53.3 54.8
All the Rest */ 42.0 30.4 16.4
Total ('000s) **/ 3,663,1 3,283,9 3,543,8
Source; NSSG, Population Censuses of the respective years 
Note: */ refers to incomplete primary education or less
**/ The total of the economically active population is 
based on the 2% sample of 1961, 5% of 1971 and 10% 
of 1981 censuses
The largest section of the economically active population was 
primary school graduates, accounting for around half of the 
total, while secondary education graduates formed only 7.9% in
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1961, 11.4% in 1971, and 17.9% in 1981 of the respective total
population. The average annual rate of increase of secondary 
education graduates for the 1961-71 period was 2.7% and has more 
than doubled, that is to 6.3%, during the last decade. Although 
university graduates constituted only three, five, and a sizeable 
11 per cent of the economically active population in 1961, 1971, 
and 1981, respectively, they have had the largest increase 
amongst all levels of education. Their average annual percentage 
rate was 3.9% between 1961 and 1971 and a spectacular 12.6% 
between 1971 and 1981.
Further to the above, when we disagreggate the economically 
active population by occupation and educational level (Appendix 
Table D-1) , we can see that primary school graduates form the 
larger proportion of farmers, workers, workers in services and 
those occupied in commercial activities. Secondary school 
graduates fit largely in the section of clerical and office 
workers, while finally, graduates of higher education 
institutions constitute the larger proportion of professional, 
technical, administrative and managerial occupations.
A more detailed presentation of the educational composition 
of the labour force appears in Table 3.5. The table shows 
clearly how the labour force changed in its educational 
composition during the last quarter century. In detail, average 
years of schooling show a fast-growing pattern between 1961 and 
1971 (35% improvement from 1961) and a spectacular 85% between
1971 and the eighties. That is explained (a) by the dramatic 
decrease of the proportion of illiterates —  from 42% in 1961 to 
an impressive record-low 3.9% in 1981 -- and (b) by the
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Table 3.5. The Educational Composition of the Labour Force,
1961, 1971, 1981 (%)
Educational Level 1961 1971 1981
Full Higher 2.9 4.9 11.3
Full Secondary 2.8 4.6 15.1
Part Secondary 5.1 6.8 12.8
Full Primary 17.4 24.0 44.5
Part Primary 29.8 29.2 12.5
Illiterates 42.0 30.4 3.9
Total Labour Force
in ('000s) 3663.0 3284.0 3570.0
Average Years of
Schooling 3 . 2 4 . 3 7.9
Source: NSSG, 1976 & 1986, Statistical Yearbook
Note: Members of the labour force with incomplete
tertiary education are included in the complete
secondary education category
expansion of the share of workers with additional
schooling. The present structure of the labour force (1981) 
mainly consists of persons with elementary education (45%), a 
significant proportion (15%) have completed secondary education 
and those with university degree or equivalent represent some 11% 
of the total labour force. The target group for most of the 
current training schemes is the secondary education youngsters 
who represent about 38% of the total number of the unemployed.
Table 3.6 gives the educational composition of the labour 
force by sector of economic activity for 1985. The table shows 
that the vast majority of those involved in agriculture for 1985 
are primary education graduates (68%) followed by those with 
incomplete primary education (19%) and illiterates (6.6%). That
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Table 3.6. The Educational Composition of the Labour Force
According to Sector of Economic Activity, 1985 (%)
Economic Sector Agriculture Industry Services
S e r v i c e s  (Disaggregated)
Commerce Transport & Banking & Other 
Communie. Insurances ServicesEducational Level
Full Higher 0.3 3.2 19.8 4.7 4.4 44.1 34.7
Part Higher 0.0 0.4 1.2 1.1 0.8 2.9 1.1
Full Secondary 2.6 16.8 31.1 28.5 32.4 43.4 30.2
Part Secondary 3.4 9.6 7.3 9.5 9.3 3.0 5.3
Full Primary 67.7 62.9 35.3 48.3 48.5 5.7 24.3
Part Primary 19.4 5.9 4.3 6.5 3.9 0.8 3.3
Illiterates 6.6 1.2 1.0 1.4 0.7 0.1 1.1
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Total Employed: 1036.9 981.8 1568.9 570.9 249.5 132.6 615.9
COOOs)
As % of the Total L.F. 28.9 27.4 43.7 36.4 15.9 8.5 32.2
Average Years of 
Schooling 5.3 7.4 10.0 8.3 8.6 13.3 11.4
Source; NSSG, 1986, Labour Force Statistics. Table 9, pp.56-57
results to their 5.3 average years of schooling, which is some 
1/3 lower than the respective for the total labour force. Again, 
from Table 3.6, we can see that primary school graduates form 
about 63% of the industrial sector employment, but then a 
sizeable proportion (17%) has completed secondary education. As 
a result, industrial workers have, on average, two more years of 
schooling compared with their counterparts in agriculture (that 
is, 7.4 years). The workers with the highest educational 
qualifications appear, as expected, in the services sector where 
the vast majority of those with university or equivalent degrees 
are involved, boosting the average years of schooling to 10. This
Chapter 3, p. 122
figure is almost double than the respective figure in 
agriculture.
Services activities are disaggregated further, in Table 3.6, 
by commerce, transport and communications, banking and 
insurances, and other. These activities form 37%, 16%, 9%, and
32% of the broader Services category, respectively. In detail, 
we observe a similar pattern for those in commerce and transport, 
where almost one half have elementary schooling, one third 
secondary, and less than five per cent tertiary education 
qualifications. The picture is totally different/reversed for 
those involved in banking and other services where the proportion 
of higher education degree holders is substantial and has 
surpassed all the other categories. That is, the composition of 
those persons belonging in the other services category presents a 
somehow equally segmented pattern between the three main 
educational levels, accounting for 11.4 average years of 
schooling. As far as those in the banking & insurances sector 
are concerned, they are equally segmented between higher and 
secondary education graduates only, explaining the quite high
13.3 average years of schooling observed.
It is clear, therefore, from Table 3.6 that persons with the 
highest educational credentials in the labour market, seek 
employment in the services sector, in general, and the banking 
and public sectors, in particular. This is , especially after 
the unprecedented expansion of the government sector during the 
last decade, acting as buffer for graduate employment.
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3.1.2_____ Unemployment
Unemployment is a major characteristic of the functioning of the 
labour market, with significant socio-economic aspects. In 
Greece, however, it is argued that the "true" effects of 
unemployment have been of less importance, when contrasted with 
other European countries, due to the fact that, to a great 
extent, the unemployed are supported by other family members and 
relatives (Skaliotis, 1987). Moreover, the structure of 
employment itself did prevent a further expansion of 
unemployment, in the sense that self-employment and family work 
(dominating in Greece as we saw in the previous Section 3.1) may 
easily be transformed into underemployment during the recession. 
This means that, they can simply work fewer hours while paid 
employees lose their jobs (op.cit.; also, for a presentation of 
the 'Job Search Model' see Pissarides, 1985).
In numerical terms, however, the problem of unemployment has 
been particularly acute in urban centres, as well as young 
people, in general, and women, in particular. The overall youth 
unemployment rate reached 24% in 1985, while it was almost 32% 
for young females aged 14-24; the overall share of young persons 
among the unemployed was about 4 3%. These rates clearly indicate 
that barriers exist in the transition from school to working 
life. One should not forget that the two years of compulsory 
national service conceal youth unemployment among males; this is 
a case of "disguised unemployment".
Table 3.7 gives the educational composition of the 
unemployed for 1985. It shows that the unemployment rate was 
about 8.5% in 1985, while 53% of those unemployed were women.
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Table 3.7. The Educational Composition of the Unemployed,
1985 (%)
Educational Level
A. Unemployed (Total) B. First-Job Seekers
Both Males Females Both Males Females
Full Higher 7.6 6.7 8.3 11.3 12.8 10.5
Part Higher 3.7 3.3 4.0 6.8 7.8 6.3
Full Secondary 37.9 30.2 44.7 49.4 47.7 50.3
Part Secondary 11.2 13.0 9.5 11.8 15.5 9.9
Full Primary 34.6 41.6 28.8 19.2 16.2 20.7
Part Primary 3.8 4.1 3.5 1.1 0.0 1.8
Illiterates 1.2 1.1 1.2 0.4 0.0 0.5
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Total Unemployed 305.0 143.0 162.0 122.0 41.0 81.0
('000s)
Total Labour Force 3590.0 2370.0 1220.0 3590.0 2370.0 1220.0
C'OOOs)
Average Years of 
Schooling 9.5 9,0 9.9 10.9 11.2 10.8
Source; NSSG, 1986, Labour Force Statistics, Tables 17 and 20
The unemployment rate for the male labour force was six per cent 
but double that for females. The share of "first-job seekers" in 
the unemployment figures was continuously increasing. Table 3.7 
suggests also that by 1985 they had reached 40% and the majority 
of those (66%) were women. The rest (44%) of the unemployed were 
classified as "job losers/leavers" and the 16% as "re-entrants" 
to the labour force.
3.1.3____ The Educational Level of the Unemployed
When looking at the educational level of the unemployed we can 
identify the following. Table 3.7 shows that the unemployed are 
persons with high average years of schooling. That is, 9.5 years 
on average for 1985, which is 25 per cent more than the
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respective average of the labour force for 1981 appearing in
Table 3.5. About one half of the unemployed have had full or
part secondary education, while more than one third have
completed elementary education and a sizeable proportion, of
about 11%, enjoyed full or part university education. Table 3.7
also shows that the share of those with no education at all is
very low, that is 1.2%, which is also less than half as compared
to the respective share in the total labour force. Women appear
to have, in total, longer schooling, that is, almost an 
compared
additional year to men.
The educational nature of those classified as "first-job 
seekers" presents a totally different pattern in contrast to the 
unemployed population as a whole. As evidenced from Table 3.7, 
first-job seekers are well-educated persons with almost 11 
average years of schooling, where more than 60% have had full or 
part secondary education and only 2 0% elementary education. What 
is striking though is the extremely high proportion of those with 
some kind or completed university education, which account for 
about 18% of the total, as well as the incredibly low/negligible 
proportion of illiterates. In this case, unemployed men appear 
to have a relative advantage in the form of better qualifications 
than women (see Table 3.7).
3.1.4____ Graduate Unemployment
Graduate unemployment has been rising steadily ever since it 
began in the early 1980s. This is illustrated through 
information available from two sources our disposable. Those 
two sources are (a) the National Statistical Service of Greece
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(NSSG) and (b) the Manpower Employment Agency (OAED). Both 
organisations collect detailed employment statistics but their 
methodology differs, in the sense that, the former administers 
questionnaires and, the latter keeps records of registered 
unemployed. That information is available from Tables 3.7, 3.8 
and 3.9. A first look at these tables shows, although the 
sources are not absolutely comparable, the share in the 
unemployed of those with higher education qualifications has been 
rising in both absolute and relative terms.
Table 3.8. Registered Unemployed by Level of Education, 1978
Educational Level Both Sexes Males Females
Full Higher 1,838 1,146 692
(1.8) (1.8) (1.8)
Full Secondary 19,519 10,851 8,668
(19.3) (17.3) (22.4)
Full Primary 74,646 48,902 25,744
(73.6) (78.0) (66.6)
Illiterates 5,360 1,798 3,562
(5.3) (2.9) (9.2)
Total 101,363 62,697 38,666
(100.0) (100.0) (100.0)
Source: OAED, 1979, Activitv Report
Note: Numbers in parentheses are percentages referring to 
the respective column total
In detail. Table 3.8 suggests that graduates constituted 1.8% of 
those unemployed in 1978. However, as shown in Table 3.7 the 
same statistic became 7.6% for 1985. There are two interrelated 
reasons for this. First, the de-emphasis of education planners 
on planning, in general, and in the absence of any serious 
involvement of private sector employers, while the 1970s and
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early 1980s were characterised by a massive expansion of tertiary 
education. And second, the rigid employment and wage policies in 
the public sector.
Table 3.9 presents, in detail, graduate unemployment 
statistics for 1987 by detailed level of higher education.
Table 3.9. Detailed Graduate (Un)employment Statistics, 1987 
(2nd quarter)
Total Female Total Female
Level and Type Labour Labour Unempl. Unempl.
of Higher Education Force Force (%) (%)
Postgraduate 15,516 2,790 2.6 2.4
Foreign 12,931 2,450 2.6 2.8
Domestic 2,585 340 2.6 0.0
Undergraduate 385,895 150,817 6.6 11.4
Foreign 38,861 12,658 9.8 15.1
Domestic 278,364 102,770 6.1 10.8
Teacher Training 48,525 31,374 8.4 11.9
Military Academies 14,632 612 0.5 0.0
Higher Tech/Voc 195,468 72,278 10.5 14.3
KATEE 25,046 9,187 13.3 15.6
TE I 11,979 6,194 18.7 23.1
Other 158,443 56,897 9.4 13.2
Total Higher 596,879 225,885 7.7 12.2
Grand Total 3,883,609 1,394,192 7.4 7.4
Source; NSSG, 1988, Labour Force Survev. Table 5 (Unpublished)
The overall unemployment rate was 7.4%, while the respective rate 
among graduates was somehow higher, about 7.7%, for 1987. The 
lowest graduate unemployment rate was for those of Military 
Academies, that is less than half per cent, where employment is 
guaranteed immediately after graduation. Very low rates were 
also observed among Doctorate and Master's degree holders, being 
2.6% or one third of the overall unemployment rate.
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The figure in the table which refer to first university 
degree graduates, in general, is about seven per cent, which is 
almost one per cent below the average rate. In addition, it is 
evident that almost one out of ten foreign universities* first 
degree holders is unemployed (that is, unemployment rate 9.8%). 
The respective analogy for domestic graduates is significantly 
less (that is, 6.1%). The explanation may be the existing 
difficulties in recognising foreign degrees set by the Inter­
university Centre for the Recognition of Foreign Degrees 
(DIKATSA) . This is more relevant for employment in the public 
sector where a foreign university credentials have to be 
recognised by DIKATSA. The substantial supply of graduates from 
domestic tertiary institutions, as well as the potentially low 
quality of the foreign qualifications (e.g. from small "obscure" 
colleges, Romania and so on) of those unemployed could be some 
alternative explanations. Graduates of Teacher Training 
Academies appear to have a high percentage of unemployment, that 
is 8.4%, as compared to domestic university graduates. This rate 
could be misleading, though, because the vast majority of these 
unemployed graduates are women (92%) who have probably decided 
not to join the profession for various reasons, and who are in a 
waiting state for their appointment —  which takes a few years 
for state schools, where in the meanwhile men serve their 
national service —  or they may be in search for a job in a 
different field.
We could also use Table 3.9 to examine the post-secondary, 
non-university education graduates of the Technical Education 
Institutions (TEI and KATEE). Their unemployment problem seems
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to be serious. Their unemployment rate is 10.5%, in total, which 
is almost the same for foreign degree holders. The rate 
escalates to 13.3% for the "old" KATEE graduates, but it is the 
"new" TEI graduates who suffer more, by reaching almost 19%, 
highlighting the "failure" of these institutions in the labour 
market, meaning that they do not "produce" the type of qualified 
manpower employers need.
In the case of women, figures from the same Table 3.9 
suggest that they seem to find easier employment when holding a 
domestic postgraduate title. The rate is very low, about three 
per cent, for foreign postgraduate degree holders, who actually 
form the vast majority among the overall number of postgraduate 
degree holders in Greece. When moving to University level women 
graduates, it seems that there is a high unemployment problem, 
which becomes more critical in the case of foreign U/G degrees. 
The problem of graduate unemployment is more illustrative as far 
as post-secondary, non-university Technical and Vocational women 
graduates are concerned. In such a case we observe unemployment 
rates of about 15%, and a dramatic 23%, for those women graduated 
from the recently established TEI.
To conclude, the problem of graduate unemployment (a) is 
quite vivid nowadays in Greece; (b) varies substantially among 
different types of graduates, especially among post-secondary, 
non-university graduates; and (c) is more severe among women.
The rising unemployment among graduates could be attributed 
to (i) the slowdown of job generation due to recession; (ii) the 
increase in the local and overseas supply of graduates; (iii)
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"mismatches" between training and requirements; and, (iv) lack of 
a proper mechanism to provide adequate labour market information 
to graduates. This is a more or less comprehensive list of 
reasons why graduate unemployment may take root and thrive in any 
economy. One has to bear in mind here that the first of the 
above reasons relates to ex post demand and supply which 
contribute in an "accounting" sense to the problem of graduate 
unemployment, if wages are not allowed to respond to the emerging 
conditions. This is the case in Greece today because of the 
duality in the labour market which has been created by some of 
the public sector policies. The third reason, "mismatches", is a 
crude and misleading way of summarising the lack of co-ordination 
between the education sector and employers and reflects the 
failure to invoke the private sector, directly or indirectly, in 
educational planning (through inflexible wage structures). The 
fourth reason (information) is a genuine reason which contributes 
to the creation of frictional unemployment and can be rectified 
relatively easily.
If the supply of qualified manpower is high and demand is 
low, then the natural way to reduce graduate unemployment is by 
reducing wage differentials. The gross overpayment of graduates 
does not help in this respect because it leads to the "diploma 
disease" and the "qualification escalation" syndromes common to 
most developing countries where salary structures are based on 
certification (see also Dore, 1976) . This is a legitimate way, 
indeed, of tackling the problem. However, it is quite puzzling 
in the case of Greece where the salary structure has been totally 
changed during the socialist administration favouring those with
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the least qualifications as we shall see in the discussion in the 
next Section (3.2). Nevertheless, the demand for higher 
education in Greece remains high and is increasing.
The relevance of these developments to education is that 
recruitment criteria may have changed significantly over time as 
the objectives of the public sector need not necessarily be the 
same as those of the private sector. The private sector relies 
more on actual performance and less on credentialism and pays 
more attention to individual effort and remuneration. Contrary
to the above, the public sector is perhaps more sensitive to 
issues of aggregate employment and rigid pay scales. The 
changing emphasis from private to public employment should have 
affected the structure of wages in the Greek economy and we turn 
to the examination of the wage setting in the next Section (3.2).
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3.2 PAY POLICIES
Employers and employees in Greece are extensively engaged in 
collective bargaining which is highly centralised (see Catephores 
and Tzannatos, 1986). The annual general national agreement for 
the private sector of industry is thought to cover about 25% of 
all paid employees.
The agreement is negotiated on the employers' side by the 
Confederation of Greek Industries (SEV), the Central 
Confederation of Artisans (GSEVE) and the three big cities' 
Commercial Employers' Associations (ESAPS). These three 
associations cover effectively all Greek employers. On the 
employee side, the far more important agent is the General 
Confederation of Greek Workers (GSEE) which represents around
400,000 employees of the 450,000 workers (around 30% of Greece's 
1.5 million employees is unionised). Another reason for the 
importance of the GSEE is that it has significant power as a 
pressure group itself, compared with the rest of the unions 
(around 3,500 unions, of which many have as few as 20 or 30 
members) (Tzannatos, 1987). It is noteworthy, that during the 
socialist administration GSEE was led by pro-governmental trade- 
unionists who, in line with the established practices by the 
conservatives, were also appointees. Union bargaining rights have 
de facto been given to GSEE for central level bargaining which 
almost exclusively determines national minimum pay and hours of 
work for manual and non-manual workers in the industrial sector. 
However, in so doing, the agreement also establishes a nation­
wide minimum wage rate for employees in other areas of the
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private sector.
The incomes policies undertaken by both the conservative and 
the socialist governments since 1975 fall into two categories. 
The first contains the norm-based policy of the 1975-81 period. 
The second contains the policy based on systems of indexation 
which were in operation throughout the period 1982-88. We 
could say that the incomes policies of both categories resulted 
in an increase of the labour share in the net domestic income, as 
well as the increase of real wages and salaries with faster pace 
than those of productivity (while profits and investment in the 
private sector were diminished). Their main objective was to 
restore the buying power of wage and salary earners which has 
deteriorated during the years of the military dictatorship (see 
Pavlopoulos, 1986 and, loannou, 1988).
3.2.1 Historic Review of Incomes Policies
There is no long tradition of wage setting through collective 
bargaining in Greece, as in most western industrial economies. 
Throughout the post-war period wage determination processes have 
been clearly dominated by: (a) the extensively used mechanism of
compulsory arbitration, along with (b) the legal right of the 
Ministry of Labour to reject and modify any collective agreement 
or compulsory arbitration award if considered as not being in 
line with the governmental economic policy (direct State 
intervention).
Wage determination processes were abandoned after the 
restoration of an elected civilian government in 1974 and the 
right to collective bargaining was re-established. It has.
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however, remained "bounded" by the continuously used mechanism 
of compulsory arbitration courts and this mechanism has in fact 
been under the control of the Ministry of Labour.
The informal processes of wage determination through 
extensive recourse to plant level strike activity were 
undertaken as a workers' response to high and rising rates of 
inflation, and as an effort to overcome the pay settlements of 
the official annual collective agreements, thus creating rather 
erratic wage rounds in the Greek scene. Later, in the 80s, under 
the influence of deteriorating conditions in the labour 
market, this informal system of collective bargaining became, to 
a certain extent, under restraint.
The period 1967-74
During the 1967-74 period, "all trade union activities had been 
suppressed by the military dictatorship, whereas at the same time 
capital owners received considerable government help" (Garantis, 
1982, p.292). No formal incomes policy was practised. Wages 
were set unilaterally by the military government, and the right 
to strike was suspended along with collective bargaining. 
Finally, the massive migration abroad during that period, while 
the level of unemployment was at its lowest level ever recorded 
in the post-war Greece, suggests that an "exit-voice" mechanism 
was in work.
The period 1975-81
As a result of these developments, "immediately after the fall of 
the military dictatorship in 1974, trade unions started demanding 
major pay rises in order to recapture part of the income losses 
they suffered in previous years. In order to improve partly this
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imbalance in incomes, the civilian government agreed to a massive 
increase of minimum wages and salaries of approximately 70%. 
This was in addition of course to substantial pay rises at all 
levels in 1975, and to a complete equalisation of minimum wages 
with the corresponding salaries between men and women by 1978. 
This increase of minimum wages was spread over the period 1975- 
1978, taking place twice a year and shown in the figures of the 
second and third quarter of each year" (Garantis, 1982, p. 293). 
In 1979, instead of the usual increase in two semestrial 
instalments, an increase of 15 per cent was granted from the 
beginning and for the whole year. Under conditions of 
accelerating inflation an identical incomes policy was adopted in 
1980. The norm was set for a 15 per cent increase from the 15th 
February. As shown in Table 3.10 both years 1979 and 1980, lead 
to a further sharp reduction in real earnings.
Table 3.10. Relative Change of Wages, Lower Bounds, 1975-87
Year
Current
Monthly
Constant
Monthly
1975
1976 17.0 3.2
1977 15.0 2 . 6
1978 22.5 8.9
1979 15.0 -3.4
1980 18.7 -4.9
1981 32.6 6.5
1982 49.7 23 . 8
1983 19.9 -0.2
1984 21.0 2 . 2
1985 17.8 -1.3
1986 10.9 -9.8
1987 9.8 . . .
Source: National Collective Agreements, GSEE: Athens 
Note: (...) not available
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In 1981, year of elections, a threshold clause was included in 
this year's policy as the authorities announced that to maintain 
real incomes, there would be an additional increase towards the 
end of the year in case inflation were to exceed the 20 per cent 
forecast.
The period 1982-88
During this period, the socialist administration introduced the 
system of indexation. This was in order to offset the erosion of 
real earnings of employees suffered in the 1979-81 period, and to 
fulfil electoral pledges. This took place in 1982, for both the 
public and the private sector, through the so-called "Automatic 
Inflation Adjustment" (ATA). It is acting as a correction 
towards inflation trends and is reflecting the philosophy of the 
newly introduced incomes policy where the dependant/is inflation 
leaving out productivity considerations.
This adjustment is a part of the earnings of the employee 
and it is given on top of the main salary of the employee, three 
times per year. The calculation of the ATA percentage to be 
allowed, from 1986 onwards, is based on predictions of the 
inflation (consumer prices rises) in the preceding four months. 
The distribution of this allowance is based on egalitarian 
criteria, thus decreasing proportionally favouring those with 
salaries belonging to the lower segmental bounds, totally 
ignoring the top earners.
In detail, this system of formal and partial indexation took 
effect in January 1982 with the first four-monthly adjustment due 
on 1st May. Full indexation was provided for average monthly 
earnings up to Dr.3 5.000. The band of earnings between Dr.35.000
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and Dr. 55.000 was indexed only to half of the consumer prices 
increase. The next band, between Dr.55.000 and Dr.80.000 was 
entitled a 25 per cent indexation, while no indexation was 
provided for the band of monthly earnings above Dr.80.000. 
Important amendments of the plateau and of the index used (ATA) 
for compensating inflation took place during 1984 and 1987. For 
an illustration of the adjustment through time and its 
distributional policy, see Tables 3.11 and 3.12.
Table 3.11. Egalitarian Effect of the Allowance of ATA
Section 
of ATA 
Allowed(%)
Earnings Plateau on which ATA allowance is based */
1/5/82-31/12/83 1/1/84-31/12/86 1/1/87-
100 -35,000 - 50,000 - 60,000
50 35,001-55,000 50,001- 75,000 60,001- 75,000
25 55,001-80,000 75,001-100,000 75,001-100,000
0 above 80,001 above 100,001 above 100,001
Source: Kioulafas, 1987, Table 2 
Note: */ in Greek Drachmas
To summarise, "during this period of formal indexation 
policies clearly oriented in favour of the low paid labour force, 
negative productivity and unit labour costs developments obliged 
the authorities to impose two short term wage freezes (see Table 
3.10) and then to modify the indexation scheme and impose it 
through statutory regulation. While claiming of being protecting 
real wages mainly of the low paid, the indexation incomes 
policies had to recourse to direct intervention in wage 
determination. Nevertheless collective bargaining was taking 
place through the formal system, at least when there was no 
incomes policy made compulsory by law, and through the informal
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as well, while the latter was under restraint by unfavourable 
developments in the labour market" (loannou, 1989).
Table 3.12. Development of the Inflation Adjustment (ATA)
Period for which 
allowed
Percentage
Increment
1/5/82 to 31/08/82 7.3
1/9/82 to 31/12/82 2.0
1/1/83 to 31/08/83 8.8
1/9/83 to 31/12/83 10.2
1/1/84 to 30/04/84 8.9
1/5/84 to 31/08/84 6.9
1/9/84 to 31/12/84 2 . 2
1/1/85 to 30/04/85 8 . 2
1/5/85 to 31/08/85 6. 6
1/9/85 to 31/12/85 2 .1
1/1/86 to 30/04/86 4.5
1/5/86 to 31/08/86 1.3
1/9/86 to 31/12/86 4.7
1/1/87 to 30/04/87 4 . 1
Source: Kioulafas, 1987, Table 1
3.2.2____ Pay Determination in the Public Sector
Public sector pay prior to 1984 was based on grades and also on 
sector of employment. Thus, employees with different educational 
qualifications were assigned to a particular grade and their pay 
increased as a resultant of length of service and progress 
reports by their superiors. In addition there were different 
scales for administrative and local authorities staff, as well as 
employees in the army, clergy, medicine, banking, judicial and so 
on. However, in 1984 the socialist government introduced a law 
(Law 1505/1984) with the view to unify the piecemeal practices of 
wage settlement in the public sector.
The main objective and philosophy of the new payroll (called 
"ENIAIO" meaning single and comprehensive) was to provide a more
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equitable and egalitarian distribution of personal earnings in 
the public sector. It purported to achieve these objectives 
through:
(a) the independence of an employee's salary from his grade, 
thus the automatic salary promotion of the employee every 
two years to the final scale with no obstacles in-the-way, 
according to level of education and years of experience, and
(b) the dramatic reduction of the gap between the starting and 
final earnings.
The payroll was introduced through a number of measures, 
taking into account the existing salary of employees, their 
educational qualifications and years of experience, so as to 
result in a "fair" ranking of the in-service employees (Ministry 
of Finance, 1985).
The innovation of the new payroll lies in its simplicity, 
achieved through the abolition of the numerous existing 
allowances and the adoption of only some basic allowances which 
are more commonly found among employees (such as. Time, Family, 
Smoothing, Postgraduate Studies, Christmas, Easter, Vacation and 
Unhealthy and Dangerous Working Conditions Allowances as the 
standard).
It is fairly obvious from this description of the payroll 
structure, still in force, that beyond its populistic objectives 
and philosophy it contradicts the basic ideology of productivity. 
It is doing so by allowing no such criteria but rather taking 
them as granted, by favouring especially the relatively younger 
employees. In addition, we could argue, that due to the 
impressive reduction of the gap of earnings differentials (the 
current analogy between the starting salary of a primary
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education graduate and the ending salary of a higher education 
graduate with six years of university is 1:2.7, previously being 
1:3.1) even between different educational levels it mainly 
favours secondary school graduates, thus discouraging graduates 
with higher degrees to join the service. If so we would expect 
that it would have a negative effect on productivity. But as we 
have already seen in Section 3.1.1 and, particularly Table 3.6, a 
significant proportion of the employees in the Services sector 
hayç had a higher education degree.
At this point it is worth noting that the new payroll is 
reflected through the 1981-87 incomes policy and has finally 
resulted in:
(a) an increase in the starting salary; Table 3.13 (left column) 
shows that the increase was higher for those with less years of 
education; and
(b) to a decrease of the ending salary; that decrease was even 
higher for employees with higher levels of education as this 
appears in Table 3.13 (right column).
Summarising the above, Drettakis quotes in his article in the 
Greek newspaper "NEA" (14/9/88) that the incomes policy in 
question "has turned against both education and experience".
Table 3.13. Relative Change in the Civil Servants' Starting and 
Ending Salary, by Level of Education, between 1981 
and 1987 */
Educational
Level
Starting
Salary
Ending
Salary
Primary +28.2 - 0.3
Secondary +22.0 - 9.7
KATEE (TEI) +15.9 -26.7
University + 10. 3 -26.3
Source: Drettakis, M., 14/9/88, Greek newspaper "NEA"
Note: Salaries are in constant prices, 2nd half 1981
*/ ending salary corresponds to 30 years of experience
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Finally, in the light of the above information we could say 
that the introduction of the new payroll in the public sector and 
the inflation correction adjustment, both forming and reflecting 
the priorities of the late egalitarian incomes policy in the name 
of "social justice", have had a dramatic equalising effect 
resulting in a marked squeeze of the earnings differentials 
between the top and the low salary earners and, neglects any form 
of productivity and meritocracy criteria.
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3.3 STRUCTURE OF EARNINGS
Our final step before proceeding to the estimation of human 
capital earnings functions is to look at the structure of 
earnings from salaried employment, in both the private and the 
public sector, in Greece. The question to be asked is, to what 
degree has the labour market responded to the above dramatic 
changes in the composition of the population, in general, and the 
labour force, in particular? To the extent that the labour 
market is competitive, one would expect a fall in the earnings 
differential associated with higher education, provided of course 
there have not been offsetting shifts in the demand for labour 
with higher education qualifications.
Several data sets are available from which one can trace the 
evolution of earnings differentials by level of education in 
Greece since 1960 (a detailed description of each of the data 
sets will follow in Section 4.1.1). Information can be obtained 
from (i) the KEPE-Leibenstein survey for the years 1960 and 
1964, (ii) the 1977 National Statistical Service of Greece (NSSG) 
Employee Survey, and (iii) the public sector data set for 1986 
and 1987. In addition, data from the Institute of Economic and 
Industrial Research (lEIR) data set will be utilised in the 
summary, referring to the years 1975, 1981 and 1985. Although
these data sets are not strictly comparable (e.g. representation, 
coverage and so on), they allow the establishment of some gross 
trends in the evolution of relative wages.
Athens Firms. 1960-1964
Professor Harvey Leibenstein in a pioneering effort to obtain
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information useful in the planning of the Greek educational 
system directed and designed in 1965, in collaboration with 
the Centre of Planning and Economic Research (KEPE) 
statisticians, a sample survey. The survey was carried out in 
the Greater Athens area between May and October 1965. The 
earnings information raised refers to October 1960 and 1964 pay. 
It was collected from the personnel departments of 31 private 
firms —  28 for October 1960, having three dropouts due to the 
inability of these companies to recover earnings five years 
backwards —  for their employees. Statistics on the sample 
size are presented below.
Fiaure 3.1. Samole Sizes of two Surveys , Oct.1960 & Oct.1964
KEPE-Leibenstein Sample Size
Data Set Oct.1960 Oct.1964 Total
Total Number of Observations
Males
Females
Number of Firms Examined
1,187
776
411
28
1,633
1,076
557
31
2,820
1,852
968
31
Table 3.14. Mean Annual Earnings and Educational Attainment
in the Private Sector: KEPE Data Set, 1960 and 1964
Educational
Level
1960 1964
Educ.
Attain.
(%)
Hale
Earnings
(Drs)*/
Earnings
Index
Educ.
Attain.
(%)
Male
Earnings
(Drs)
Earnings
Index
Primary 48.1 21,472 100 47.7 25,668 100
Secondary 40.3 26,541 124 39.5 33,504 131
Higher 11.6 54,209 252 13.1 61,199 238
OveralI 100.0 27,462 128 100.0 33,815 132
Source: Re-analysis of the KEPE sample, see Section 3.3 
Notes: */ 1960 earnings are in 1964 constant prices
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The earnings and schooling information obtained from the 
survey was used by Leibenstein (1967), Bowles (1969 & 1971), 
Psacharopoulos (1970 & 1981), and Kanellopoulos (1980) —  see
Section 2.4.
In Table 3.14, one can observe the within-year 
structure, in index form, of the annual earnings by level of 
education. Between 1960 and 1964 the earnings differential among 
primary and secondary education graduates remained practically 
unaffected, while for tertiary decreased by almost six per cent. 
National Data, 1977
Statistics for 1977 come from the nationally representative 
labour force survey of the NSSG, covering all sectors of economic 
activity. These data have been utilised by Psacharopoulos and 
Kazamias (1985) in the context of the 1977 Third Educational 
Plan. Table 3.15 gives mean monthly earnings from salaried 
employment by level of education of the NSSG sample for 1977.
Table 3.15. Mean Monthly Earnings and Educational Attainment in 
the Private and Public Sectors: NSSG Data Set, 1977
1977
Detailed
Educational
Level
Entire Sample Private Sector Public Sector
Educ.
Attain.
(%)
Earnings
(Drs)
Earni ngs 
Index
Educ.
Attain.
(%)
Earni ngs 
(Drs)
Earnings
Index
Educ.
Attain.
(%)
Earnings
(Drs)
Earnings
Index
None 0.3 6,545 57 0.2 9,000 86 0.3 7,300 60
Primary Incomplete 1.7 8,793 76 2.9 8,957 85 0.3 7,740 64
Primary Complete 10.0 11,556 100 21.8 10,523 100 5.1 12,077 100
Secondary Incomplete 3.8 13,406 116 7.4 11,840 113 3.4 12,475 103
Secondary Complete 16.0 13,764 119 23.1 12,489 119 16.2 12,668 105
Higher Incomplete 1.6 12,413 107 2.8 11,587 110 1.2 12,022 100
Higher Complete 66.5 16,873 146 41.8 20,596 196 73.4 19,384 161
Overall 100.0 15,441 134 100.0 15,272 145 100.0 17,521 145
Source: Based on the NSSG data set, described in Section 3.3;
for a detailed description see Section 4.1.2.1 
Note: Refers to salaried employment and, both sexes
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We can see the dramatic squeeze of the earnings advantage of 
the higher education graduates during the late seventies as 
compared to the early sixties. In detail, the structure of 
earnings among the salary earners —  where the current study 
refers to —  proves to be of some interest, especially where 
they are further disaggregated by type of employment, that is 
Private and Public Sector. It becomes clear therefore that there 
has been a considerable compression of the monthly earnings for 
those with higher education as compared to their counterparts 
with secondary education during the past decade. Specifically, 
as suggested by Table 3.15, there is no significant difference in 
the remuneration of the salary earners with incomplete secondary 
education as compared to their counterparts who have completed 
that level. This observation is also applicable to both economic 
sectors, that is private and public, under consideration. In 
addition, the finding of the pay inferiority of higher education 
drop-outs, that is index=107, in contrast to the secondary 
graduates, that is index=119, is extraordinary. This is in 
conjunction to the fact that to be classified as having 
incomplete higher education automatically means to have completed 
the secondary education cycle. Moving to higher education 
graduates, their pay superiority is clear, indicative of an index 
of 146, as compared to all the rest educational categories. They 
are the only educational group ranking above the 134 overall 
earnings index, while the rest lie well below.
Disaggregating for the two economic sectors in question, one 
could observe that internal pay structure in the public services 
appears to be closer to the overall figures in both absolute and
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index terms, without of course suggesting an identical pattern.
6^ the contrary, there is an even higher pay advantage of the
post-secondary over the secondary education graduates (161:105)
than the one presented above. A remarkable observation is that
of
persons who drop-out/university enjoy exactly the same earnings 
with those with primary schooling. Finally, the story of the 
incomplete higher education category, as discussed above, is re­
appearing.
The private sector figures, though, support to an extent the 
1960 pattern. They elaborate a huger gap between the primary and 
both secondary and higher education graduates pay. The degree of 
the analogy is 86:100:119:196, for those who have no education, 
and have completed primary, secondary, and higher education, 
respectively.
set
If we compare the two economic sectors we caniCthat primary 
education graduates receive higher pay in the public than the 
private sector. This means that competitive employers, that is 
in the private sector, value less their productivity than the 
institutionalised public sector (the same applies for all those 
belonging to incomplete education categories). As far as those 
with completed higher education in the private sector are 
concerned, they seem to earn slightly more when compared with 
their counterparts in the public services.
In conclusion, we saw that there is an ascending pattern in 
the earnings of employees for 1977. This is so, with the 
exception of the incomplete higher education category, where 
employees are earning less would be secondary education
Chapter 3, p. 147
graduates. Also, employees with primary education in the public 
sector are treated more generously than their colleagues in the 
private sector, highlighting the existence of institutional 
factors dominating the public sector pay, as argued through its 
incomes policy (Section 3.2.2). Finally, comparing the 1964 and 
1977 earnings structure, we can identify a moderate decrease, of 
about 16%, in the earnings differentials among those with 
secondary schooling, while tertiary education graduates have 
suffered a substantial loss of almost 70%.
Public Sector Emolovees. 1986 and 1987
Table 3.16 provides information on the public sector data set for 
1986 and 1987, reporting here for the first time.
Table 3.16. Mean Monthly Earnings and Educational Attainment: 
Public Sector Sample, 1986 and 1987
Educational
1987 
HIDB Bank
1987
Ministry of Education
1986
Ministry of Finance
Level Educ.
Attain. Earnings 
(%> (Drs)
Earnings
Index
Educ.
Attain. Earnings 
(%) (Drs)
Earnings
Index
Educ.
Attain. Earnings 
(%) (Drs)
Earnings
Index
Primary 13.7 66,381 100 5.7 59,924 100 6.5 53,639 100
Secondary 40.8 80,184 121 48.4 65,754 110 49.8 57,797 108
Non-Univ. 
Post-Sec. ■ ■ ■ ■ • • # # # 3.0 67,336 112 0.1 55,712 104
Higher 45.5 100,280 151 40.5 75,129 125 42.9 68,791 128
Postgraduate ... ... ... 2.4 79,213 132 0.7 71,300 133
Overall 100.0 87,415 132 100.0 69,587 116 100.0 62,333 116
Source: Based on the Public Sector data set described in Section 
3.3; for a detailed description see Section 4.1.2.3 
Note: (...) not applicable 
Refers to both sexes
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This is pictured through employment in two Ministries (that is 
Ministry of Education, and Finance) ahd a State-controlled Bank 
(that is the Hellenic Industrial Development Bank —  HIDB). 
These data were collected from the payroll departments of these 
organisations for the purposes of this research. An identical 
relative pay structure appears in Table 3.16 for both Ministries, 
that is Finance (1986) and Education (1987). Their only
difference is in the post-secondary, non-university (TEI) pattern 
mainly due to the insignificant number of observations in that 
category in the 1986 payroll. Earnings differentials in the 
Public sector show an even more compressed structure as compared 
to 1977, while as suggested by the figures, those with
postgraduate qualifications earn a mere five per cent on top of 
those with a higher education degree. For the three completed 
levels of education, in ascending order, the index ratio becomes
100:110:125, respectively.
Apart
It is also evident/from the table (3.16) that the pattern is 
slightly different for the Banking sector. The analogy is shaped 
as 100:121:151 for the three completed educational levels.
Lastly, apart the variation of the earnings differentials, 
differences are also highlighted in absolute earnings terms 
between the state-controlled Bank employees and the civil 
servants. They suggest the overall pay superiority of the Bank
employees, varying between 33, 23 and 11 per cent for higher,
secondary and primary education graduates, respectively. Another 
point worthwhile noting is the overall cohesion in the education 
attainment in the internal pay structure among all three public 
sector data sets.
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Summary
Table 3.17 attempts a grand summary of earnings and education in 
Greece from 1960 until 1987 based on original analyses presented 
so far of the available data sets, including the Institute of 
Economic and Industrial Research (lEIR) one as well (for a 
description of this data set see Section 4.1.2.2). As shown in 
Table 3.17, the earnings advantage of higher education graduates 
has declined considerably between 1960 and 1987. It has been 
reduced to nearly half its size in the 27 year period.
Table 3.17. Earnings Differentials by Level of Education in 
Greece, 1960-1987
Educational
Level
1960
KEPE
a/
1964
KEPE
a/
1975
lEIR
W
1911
NSSG
W
1981
lEIR
b/
1985
lEIR
b/
1987
Public
c/
Primary 81 77 106 84 101 95 83
Secondary 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Higher 204 183 201 123 162 138 125
Source; 1960 & 1964: based on Table 3.14
1975, 1981 & 1985: based on the lEIR data set;
for a detailed description see Section 4.1.2.2 
1977: based on Table 3.15 
1987: based on Table 3.16 
Note: Index base: Secondary education = 100
a/refers to male employees in the private sector 
b/refers to employees of both sexes in the private 
and public sectors 
c/refers to employees of both sexes of the Hellenic 
Industrial Development Bank (HIDB)
One obvious question in considering the evolution of 
earnings differentials by level of education over time, is to 
what extent the decline of the earnings premium of the more 
educated has been the result of a public sector incomes
Chapter 3, p. 150
equalisation policy (as this was presented in Section 3.2.2), 
rather than market forces. This issue is particularly important 
in the Greek case for three reasons. First, the public sector is 
dominant in the market for university graduates —  the Government 
and parastatal enterprises employ one third of the labour force 
in general as shown in Table 3.3, and about one half of the stock 
of university graduates, as we will see in Table 4.1. Second, 
collective agreements may influence pay differentials even in the 
private competitive sector as argued in Section 3.2.1. Third, 
the period under investigation corresponds to a major shift of 
the political orientation of the Government in power: from a
conservative government ruling until 1981, to a socialist 
government thereafter.
Also, our data sets allow us to make a distinction between 
the private and public sector of the economy in 1977 and 1985.
Table 3.18. Earnings Differentials by Level of Education in 
the Private and Public Sectors, 1977 and 1985
Educational
Level
1977 1985
Private Public Private Public
Primary 86 97 99 93
Secondary 100 100 100 100
Higher 162 153 143 134
Source: 1977: based on Table 3.15
1985: based on the lEIR data set; for a 
detailed description see Section 4.1.2.2 
Note: Index base: Secondary education = 100 
Refers to both sexes
According to the figures shown in Table 3.18 the higher education
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earnings advantage of university graduates has been squeezed much 
more in the public rather in the private sector between the two 
years under comparison. The fact that the private earnings 
differential has been more resilient to the increased supply of 
graduates, evidenced so far, means that competitive employers 
continue to value the productivity differential associated with 
employing a higher education rather than a secondary school 
graduate.
There are private/social and efficiency/equity effects of 
the salary compression reported above. One undoubted 
private/equity effect is a more equal income distribution. It is 
well known that Human Capital theory provides a behavioural basis 
for an analysis of the personal distribution of income. 
According to Becker and Chiswick (1966) the relative inequality 
of income is a function of the rate of return to the investment, 
the intensity of investment in a year, and the inequality in 
years of investment. In other words, the variance
in the natural logarithm of income is a rising function of the 
rates of return from schooling and post-school training (see 
Chiswick, 1974) . Therefore, as far as the Greek data is 
concerned we observe in Table 3.19 that the variance of the 
logarithm of earnings was reduced significantly between the mid­
sixties and the early eighties, while there is a dramatic fall of 
the statistic for the mid-eighties. The latest extraordinary 
reduction of the income inequality measure though, by about 40% 
between 1981 and 1985, is mainly attributed to the incomes 
equalisation policy followed by the government during that 
period, particularly for the public and by extension the private
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sector of the economy, as this was discussed in Section 3.2. 
Table 3.19. Income Inequality in Greece, 1964-1987
Year Sample Var(lnY)
1964 KEPE*/ 0.282
1975 lEIR 0.353
1977 NSSG 0.232
1981 lEIR 0.229
1985 lEIR 0.141
Source; Original analyses of the respective samples;
for a detailed description see Section 4.1.2 
Notes: Based on entire data sets except if otherwise stated 
*/refers to male employees in the private sector
A social/efficiency aspect refers to the nature of the 
signal given to prospective students and their families for 
investment in the various levels and types of education. 
Consequently, the main issue should be the role of public sector 
in setting the signals and incentives in demanding higher 
education (for an alternative view see Tsoucalas, 1975). This is
been
justified on grounds that have/extensively discussed so far, that 
is, the hypertrophy of the public sector in the Greek economy, as 
well as the fact that the public sector is the most dominant 
employer in the university graduates market as this was shown in 
Table 3.3, and will be shown in Table 4.1 as well. It could be 
said, therefore, that the "signal" in question —  which by 
definition does necessarily relates to productivity —  may be 
misleading in the sense that it forces people to invest in a type 
or level of education which is not the optimum from the societal
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angle. The ultimate efficiency question, of course, is whether 
the country is investing the "right" amount of resources on 
higher education or, perhaps, the country is "overeducated" as 
argued by Tsoucalas (1981) and, public resources should be 
allocated to uses other than education. In fact, the common 
perception in Greece is that the country has more higher 
education students than the country needs for economic growth, 
and this has been reflected in the numerus clausus set in public 
universities. (It is reminded that, according to the Greek 
constitution, higher education in Greece is provided only 
publicly and that private universities are prohibited).
To answer such questions it is necessary to estimate 
earnings functions, using our data sets, and rates of return to 
investment in education.
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CHAPTER 4
DETERMINANTS OF EARNINGS
The present Chapter refers to the empirical application of what 
we have discussed so far within the Human Capital framework. At 
first, in Section 4.1, a description of the basic and other 
demographic human capital variables to be used in this study will 
be given. The variable description will be followed by a 
detailed description of the available data sets. They cover 
about 29,000 employees in both the private and the public sectors 
of economic activity during the 1975 to 1987 period. These data 
sets are; (a) the 1977 National Statistical Service of Greece 
(NSSG) Employee Survey, (b) the Institute of Industrial and 
Economic Research (lEIR) data set referring to the years 1975, 
1981 and, 1985, and (c) the Public Sector data set for 1986 and 
1987. Lastly, a summary of the data sets to be analysed appears 
in Figure 4.3.
In Section 4.2, earnings functions will be fitted in the 
traditional human capital fashion to the available data sets, 
separately for both males and females in the private and the 
public sectors. In addition, we are going to utilise three 
alternative specifications presented in Chapter 1. That is (i) 
the basic human capital or Mincerian (see equation 1.5), (ii) the 
non-linear in years of schooling (see equation 1.6), and (iii) 
the step (see equation 1.8) specification. The above three 
variations to the basic model will enable us to estimate the 
effect of both the length and level of schooling on earnings and
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derive the respective rates of return (which will be presented in 
Chapter 5). Extended earnings functions will be fitted in 
Section 4.2.1.4 to examine the overall effect of gender, marital 
status, number of children and, training on earnings. Lastly, 
the Mincerian specification of variable experience against real 
labour market experience will be put on test in Section 4.2.1.5.
There are a number of questions we will attempt to answer in 
this section. Does Human Capital theory offer a plausible 
explanation, in the context of earnings decomposition, in the 
Greek case? How much of the variance of earnings is explained by 
education? Are there any significant differences when accounting 
for the sector of employment and gender of employees? What is 
the effect of other demographic characteristics of employees on 
earnings apart from education? How does the human capital model 
behave when accounting for such characteristics? Is there any 
statistically significant difference in the derived schooling 
coefficient when considering potential (Mincerian) rather than 
real labour market experience in the earnings functions?
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4.1 DATA DESCRIPTION AND SOURCES
Our analysis of earnings functions will be given in the next 
Section 4.2. Here we will present the human capital earnings 
functions variables and the data sets our disposal to be
analysed.
4.1.1 Variables used in Earninas Functions
Before proceeding to the description of the data sets and the 
human capital earnings functions, we need to define the variables 
used. These fall in the following categories: (i) Personal,
including the human capital category and (ii) Environmental. An 
additional distinction is between variables that are subject to 
the individual * s choice and those beyond his or her control. 
According to the above classification, Psacharopoulos (1987a) 
summarises these variables in the following Figure 4.1.
In our study of rates of return to education we need to fit 
earnings functions as these were presented in Sections 1.2.2 and
1.2.3 earlier in the thesis. Both the Mincerian specification, 
that is the basic human capital model of equation 1.5, as well as 
its extensions suggested by Psacharopoulos, that is equations 1.6 
and 1.8, require data on the earnings from salaried employment, 
levels and length of schooling, and work experience of employees. 
The extended earnings functions (as described in Section 1.2.4) 
require additional variables. The variables which we have 
available are the gender and, the marital status of the employee, 
as well as the number of children in the family. These variables 
are presented and discussed below. For a full exposition of the 
variables and the availability of each in the data sets we
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utilise for this study, see Figure 4.3 later in the thesis and, 
for their averages, see Appendix Tables B-1 through B-5.
Figure 4.1. The Determinants of Earnings
Personal Characteristics
Mostly Not Subject to Choice Sex
Age
Race
Genetic Ability 
Family Background 
(social class)
Motivation
Mostly Subject to Choice Occupation 
Marital Status 
Nunber of ChiIdren 
Weeks Worked 
Human Capital:
Years of Schooling 
Quality of Schooling 
Achievement 
Experience &
On-the-job Training 
Rate of Return to Schooling 
Migration 
(Health)
Environmental and Institutional
Geographic Locality 
Economic Sector 
Unionisation 
Monopoly, Monopsony 
Discrimination
Source: Psacharopoulos, 1987a, Figure 1, p. 220
4.1.1.1 Monthly Earninas 
The dependent variable in our human capital earnings functions 
will be the natural logarithm of monthly pay of employees. 
Monthly earnings from salaried employment is available in all 
data sets —  surveys and payrolls —  to be analysed (for a 
discussion on the choice of the dependent variable see Section
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1.2.4) .
In addition, we should consider the case of hourly, weekly 
and annual earnings. Hourly or weekly earnings are advantageous 
because they do not bear any high unemployment biased risk but 
are more appropriate for those employees where applicable. Also, 
annual earnings, if reported in such a form, although they bear a 
high measurement risk by the means of months worked, they 
automatically adjust for the unemployment factor. They also seem 
to be more sensitive in catching some peculiarities in the 
internal pay structure. For example, when comparing earnings 
between the banking and the public services on an annual basis we 
will have to include an extra half month pay for the former, that 
is 14.5 salaries per annum as opposed to the 14 salaries earned 
by the latter. The additional two months pay for both categories 
in question is attributed to bonuses for the Christmas, Easter 
(1/2 salary for each holiday) and summer vacations (1 salary), 
while the extra 1/2 month pay for the banking is considered to be 
a "productivity bonus".
However, the data sets we have available report earnings on 
a monthly basis. Thus, the choice of monthly salary, rather than 
hourly or weekly or even annual pay, as the dependent variable 
appears to have in our case more advantages than disadvantages. 
Since the purpose of this study is to examine, through the 
determination of pay, rates-of-return to schooling "moonlighting" 
opportunities are assumed to be minimal. Monthly earnings are 
for all data sets post-tax, also net of social security and 
various funds contributions. Distinction is made also, where
Chapter 4, p. 158
available, among males and females up to 65 years of age.
A final comment should be made on the exclusion of fringe 
benefits from the monthly pay to be analysed, as well as factors 
such as job security, work environment and conditions, 
opportunities for training and advancement and so on. Fringe 
benefits, in particular, are of high importance in the public 
sector as a whole and especially in the banking sector, where 
employees have from as little as one month's interest free loans 
to as much as home buying loans with preferential rate and a lump 
sum for their daughters when they will get married. Other such 
benefits, are better social security funds, Christmas presents 
and subsidised or even free summer vacation camps for their 
children and so on. Various privileges are enjoyed by the 
employees of many parastatal enterprises as well. Last but not 
least, in the case of lifetime earnings, one should also 
emphasise the existence of the so-called "EFAPAX", being a lump 
sum amounting approximately to 35 salaries given at the time of 
retirement given to all employees.
4.1.1.2 Level and Length of Schooling
Section 5.1 will focus on the main purpose of the thesis, that 
is, to present the rates of return to both levels and length of 
schooling, derived from the earnings functions analyses which 
will be presented in Section 4.2. Our data sets contain 
information on both the level and length of schooling. In 
detail, information on the length of schooling is brought by 
reporting the highest educational level completed by each 
employee (with the exception of the NSSG labour force survey 
where it could be also found in a more detailed form) and is
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measured by corresponding each educational level to the 
appropriate years of schooling it reflects. The available 
information on schooling is limiting us to treat it as in most 
empirical studies. This is years spent in conventional 
education, thus neglecting quality factors, school and degree 
types and so on. The following Figure 4.2 summarises the 
conversions used in corresponding levels of education to years of 
schooling in our analyses of earnings functions in the next 
Section 4.2.
Figure 4.2. Level of Formal Education and Corresponding 
Years of Schooling
Educational Corresponding Years
Level of Schooling
Primary Incomplete 3
Primary Complete 6
Secondary Incomplete 9
Secondary Complete 12
Higher Incomplete 14
Higher Technical (TEI) 15
Higher Complete 16
Postgraduate Studies 18
Finally, any form of specialised training could be regarded 
as "informal" schooling. In one of our data sets, namely the 
Institute of Economic and Industrial Research (lEIR) one, which 
will be described in Section 4.1.2.2, we can distinguish for such 
a variable. Training is usually defined as the acquisition of 
specific systematic knowledge and information by the individual 
which, in turn, will result in the improvement of his/her 
productivity (for an elaboration of worker trait requirements for
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4,000 jobs, see U.S. Bureau of Employment Security, 1965). The 
inclusion of this variable in the extended earnings functions of 
Section 4.2.1.4 is based on the assumption that employees have 
acquired specialised training in order to perform better, that is 
increase their productivity, in their specialty. That implies an 
investment from both the employee and the firm. In our analysis, 
we are going to approach the issue form the employee's side. We 
expect, therefore, increased earnings for those employees with 
such training on top of their "formal" education. For the use of 
variable training in the particular data set see later Section 
4.1.2.2.
4.1.1.3 Labour Market Experience 
The labour market experience variable here is in years of 
experience on the job, being either real or potential.
In detail, in the case of the 1977 National Statistical 
Service of Greece (NSSG) employee sample survey, labour market 
experience is treated as a proxy. It is calculated in the 
conventional Mincerian way, that is, EX=AGE-S-6, according to the 
explanation given in Section 1.2.2, where S stands for years of 
schooling corresponding to the level of education reported by the 
employee (see Figure 4.2 above) and 6 is the school starting age.
In the case of the Institute of Economic and Industrial 
Research (lEIR) data set the variable experience refers to the 
real experience of employees on the job and it is available in a 
grouped form. There are four experience groups, referring to 
those with 3, 8-9, 15-16 and 24-25 years of labour market
experience. In that respect, in the analysis, the variable is 
treated in a continuous form and for that reason the respective
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averages were obtained for each experience group.
Coining to the Public sector data set, and particularly the 
Ministry of Education and Hellenic Industrial Development Bank 
(HIDB) payroll data bases, it is treated as a continuous variable 
and refers to real experience within the service and it is also 
including any recognised experience from previous employment. 
In the case of the third Public sector data set, that is the 
Ministry of Finance payroll data, where experience was not 
readily available as a continuous variable, it was computed from 
a relative concept variable based on its definition. That 
variable was called "Time Allowance in per cent" and was varying 
from 0 to 60 per cent. In detail, after the completion of the 
first year the employee receives 4% time allowance on the basic 
salary and an additional 4% thereafter —  up to a total of 60% —  
every two years. Having available both the age, as well as real 
experience of the employees in both the 1987 payroll data sets, 
we are going to examine empirically in Section 4.2.1.5 its 
differences with the proxy measure (also called Mincerian or 
Potential Experience).
At this point, one should note the main advantage of the use 
of variable experience instead of age in earnings functions 
analyses. The former is more in accordance with the human 
capital theory allowing to measure returns to education holding 
other kinds of human capital constant as this has been explicitly 
presented in Section 1.2. In mathematical notation the argument 
is as follows:
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log (Y) = ÜQ + a^ S + a^ EX ,
EX = AGE-S-6 , and
& i  =  r  "
Therefore, by substituting we get 
log (Y) = ajj + rS + ag (AGE-S-6) 
which gives us
log(Y) = (ag-S.ag) + (r-a^ ) S + a^ AGE
highlighting that the schooling coefficient (r) will be 
underestimated if age (AGE ) is used rather than experience (EX) . 
Blinder (1976, p.19) though, argues that the whole matter is 
"trivial enough to be ignored". There is evidence to indicate 
that the inherent age factor affects earnings to only a minor 
degree during the usual working life. In data where age and work 
experience are statistically separable, the earnings curve is 
found to be mainly a function of experience rather than age (see 
Mincer, 1976, p.140).
4.1.1.4 Gender. Marital Status and Number of Children 
Information on the gender of employees is available in all data 
sets with the exception of the Ministry of Finance payroll 
(Public sector data set) . The nature of this variable is of a 
dummy form having the value 1 if observation is male and 0 if 
female. This variable will enable us to test differences and 
possible sex discrimination hypotheses in the Greek labour market 
and form an over-time picture of its levels, if any.
Marital status as a variable is common to all data sets. It 
has a dummy form as well, of 1 if employee is married and 0 if 
otherwise. Availability on the number of children in the family 
is only in the public sector data set. Information on marital 
status and number of children, usually referred to as "family
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responsibility" variables in the literature, will enable us 
initially to calculate the impact of those variables on earnings 
and test whether the Greek setting is in accordance with the 
theory, that is a positive effect on earnings. As presented by 
Sloane (1985, p. 134), the positive wage effects of marriage 
could be interpreted, first, that "married men are more work- 
motivated than single men because of their additional family 
responsibilities" and, second, because employers decisions "are 
based upon paternalistic attitudes which lead them to reward 
those with greater financial responsibilities with higher wages" 
(see also Hill, 1979 and Osterman, 1979).
4.1.1.5 Age of First Emolovment 
Finally, this is not a human capital variable useful for earnings 
functions. It was constructed simply to show the approximate two 
year labour market advantage at an early stage for females, as 
opposed to their male counterparts who have to spend two years in 
National Service.
4.1.2 The Data Sets
The data utilised for this study came from:
(1) the "1977 Employee Survey", conducted by the National
Statistical Service of Greece (NSSG);
(2) the Institute of Economic and Industrial Research (lEIR),
referring to 1975, 1981 and, 1985; and
(3) the Public Sector, referring to 1986 and 1987.
Figure 4.3 provides summary information of the data sets to 
be analysed by date, source, coverage, human capital variables, 
sample size, and section of thesis where discussed.
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Figure 4.3. Summary of Data Sets Analysed in the Thesis, by 
Date, Source, Coverage, Human Capital Variables, 
Sample Size, and Sections where discussed
Sample
Characteristics
NSSG
a/
lEIR
b/
Public Sector
Finance Education 
Ministry Ministry
HIDB
Bank
c/
Date of Sample: 1977 1975
1981
1985
1986 1987 1987
Coverage: All
Sectors
Public-
Private
Public Public Public
Human Capital Variables:
Earni ngs + + + + +
Schooling + + + + +
Age + - - ♦ +
Real Experience - + - + +
Gender + + - + +
Marital Status + + + + +
Nunber of Children - - + + +
Training - + - - -
Sections where Discussed: 4.1.2.1 4.1.2.2 4.1.2.3 4.1.2.3 4.1.2.3
Number of Observations 7,058 1,917 18,337 632 786
Note; (+) indicates availability
(-) indicates non-availability 
a/National Statistical Service of Greece 
b/Institute of Economic and Industrial Research 
c/Hellenic Industrial Development Bank
4.1.2.1 The NSSG Emolovee Survev. 1977 
A specially designed questionnaire was administered in 1977 by 
the National Statistical Service of Greece (NSSG) to a national 
random stratified sample of 8,756 manual and non-manual workers 
involved in non-agricultural activities in major urban areas of 
the country. The whole project was under the supervision of Dr. 
George Psacharopoulos and Dr. Andreas Kazamias in the context of 
the elaboration of the third Greek educational plan. The
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stratification was made in such a way as to give 50 per cent 
greater representation to higher education graduates, for a study 
of post-secondary education in Greece (see Psacharopoulos and 
Kazamias, 1985).
Although the original sample contained 8,756 workers, the 
data set provided for the current study included the 7,058 salary 
earners (non-manual employees), that is it excluded 1,698 wage 
earners. This, as we will see, is in accordance with the rest of 
the data sets actually restricted to earnings information from 
salaried employment. In detail, out of the 7,058 salary earners, 
30 per cent were female employees. A further distinction of the 
salary earners data set was also possible so as to isolate 
specific subgroups of employees. That is, employees in the 
Private sector (employees in all branches of Manufacturing) and 
the Public sector (employees in Public Administration and the 
Social Services) of economic activity, accounting for 19 and 21 
per cent, respectively, of the data set provided. Out of the 
1,319 private and the 1,462 public sector employees 22 and 20 per 
cent were females, respectively.
The human capital related variables available were net 
monthly salary, age and, schooling of employees, as well as 
gender and marital status. Because of the lack of real labour 
market experience in the data set, it was calculated in the 
Mincerian way, as has been already presented in Section 4.1.1.3.
In addition, it should be noted that the original NSSG 
sample was analysed by Psacharopoulos and Kazamias (1985). 
Papers published utilising the principal data base are
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Psacharopoulos (1982a, 1983a and, 1983b). The public sector sub­
sample of the original data base was re-analysed by Pilavios 
(1980) in the context of a Ph.D thesis that has never been 
published. Therefore, the salary earners data set will be 
analysed here for the first time. Finally, mean sample 
characteristics by gender and type of employment are presented in 
Appendix Table B-1.
4.1.2.2 The lEIR Data Set. 1975. 1981 and 1985 
The Institute of Economic and Industrial Research (lEIR) data 
set consists of three distinct samples covering a ten-year span. 
The data were collected retrospectively in 1985, under the 
supervision of Dr. Kyriakos Kioulafas of the University of Athens 
and the lEIR, through a questionnaire from the payroll 
departments of the various public and private firms covered in 
the samples. The samples contain 587, 637 and 693 observations
(1,917 in total), of which 45 per cent were females, for the 
years 1975, 1981 and 1985, respectively. In detail, these data 
refer to six firms in the Public sector and four branches of 
manufacturing in the Private sector. In detail, the Public 
sector refers to a Ministry, a State-controlled Bank, the 
Hellenic Telecommunications Organisation (GTE), the Public Power 
Corporation (DEH), the Electrical Buses Company (HLPAP) and, 
Olympic Airways (OA) , accounting for 74 to 80 per cent of the 
entire sample, the rest belonging to the private sector. In the 
context of the Private sector, the manufacturing branches covered 
were Drinks, Chemicals, Metallic and Non-metallic products.
The human capital related variables available were net 
monthly salary, years of real experience on the job, and
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educational level, as well as gender and marital status of 
employees. The original experience variable in this sample has 
been in a grouped form (see Section 4.1.1.3), hence the high R- 
squares in the earnings functions using this sample. In 
addition, a variable named "specialised training" is included in 
this sample, permitting us to test the effect of "informal" 
education on earnings (as discussed in Section 4.1.1.2). 
Employees with primary education were considered as specialised 
if they were drivers, electricians, pressmen and roasters. 
Likewise, employees with secondary education in clerical jobs 
were considered as non-specialised and those holding an 
engineering or economics university degree were classified as 
specialised. In addition, these data were utilised by Kioulafas 
(1987) to study the effects of incomes policies on the earnings 
of employees through time, and published only in Greek. Finally, 
mean sample characteristics by gender and type of employment 
appear in the Appendix Tables B-2, B-3 and, B-4 for the
respective years, while the human capital related results are 
reported here for the first time.
4.1.2.3 The Public Sector Data Set. 1986 and 1987 
This is in fact a set of three distinct data bases, one for 1986 
[Ministry of Finance] and two for 1987 [(i) Hellenic Industrial
Development Bank and, (ii) Ministry of Education and Religious 
Affairs]. The data were collected personally from the payroll 
departments of the respective institutions. In detail:
(a) The Ministry of Finance payroll data refer to September 1986 
pay and covers, effectively, all of the 18,337 employees of this
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Ministry throughout Greece, involved in all areas of relative 
activity; that is, Administration, Inland Revenue and Customs 
Services. The available information was limited to earnings, 
schooling and family related characteristics. Although 
experience was not readily available in terms of years in the 
data base, it was estimated indirectly through a related 
variable, namely the "Time Allowance in per cent" (see Section 
4.1.1.3). This refers to an allowance automatically given to 
employees after completing years in-service and includes any 
previous recognised experience. A certain disadvantage of this 
data base is that it does not provide information on the 
gender of the employees.
(b) A more qualitative data set in terms of variables available, 
as compared to the Ministry of Finance data set, was provided by 
the Ministry of Education and Religious Affairs. The data base 
refers to September 1987 pay and consists of 632 employees 
involved in the central administration and the National 
Scholarships Foundation (IKY), 60 per cent being female. 
Detailed information on earnings, schooling and, real 
experience of the employees were readily available, as well as 
a number of other variables such as age, gender, marital status, 
and number of children in the family.
(c) A very similar data base was provided by the Hellenic 
Industrial Development Bank (HIDB) for September 1987. This data 
base covers the total of the Bank's employees throughout the 
country, amounting to 786, 38 per cent being female.
This data set has been compiled and reported here for the 
first time. Finally, mean sample characteristics by gender for
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the three payrolls, described above, are presented in Appendix 
Table B-5.
4.1.3 Why Public Sector Data?
Having described the data sets available, we need then to justify 
why we will utilise public sector payroll data for our earnings 
functions analyses. The rationale of including such data in the 
analyses is twofold. First, detailed earnings data in Greece, 
especially through Labour Force Surveys, continues to be 
extremely scanty. Second, the implementation of an extensive 
survey would be quite expensive, as well as time consuming.
Continuing, one should note that supportive evidence for 
the utilisation of payroll data, in general, and public sector 
data, in particular, for the Greek case has been given by Gedeon 
and Psacharopoulos (1982) , who elaborated on the fact of the 
excess demand for employment in the Public sector and the Banking 
services in Greece. More recently, Pesmazoglou (1987, p. 395) 
argued that the "dream" of a Greek graduate is to join the civil 
service. In the sociological context, Tsoucalas (1975) argued 
that the role of higher education institutions in Greece is
towards the reproduction of the state apparatus. Therefore, we 
can claim that the public sector is the most attractive 
employer in Greece, because it offers tenure and considerable 
social benefits package. This is justified on the grounds of 
solid evidence. For example, in 1977, nearly 18,000 people
applied for the 480 places —  that is 36 candidates per vacancy - 
- in the National Bank of Greece (Gedeon and Psacharopoulos,
1982, p. 82). Another sound recent example is that in 1989,
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140,000 applicants competed for 7,980 job openings in the Civil 
Service —  an analogy of 17.5 applicants per vacancy (Greek 
newspaper "ELEFTHEROTYPIA”, 8/5/89). Besides the above examples, 
when considering the employment of the university graduates for 
1982, it becomes evident from Table 4.1 that 88 per cent of their 
total stock is employed in the services sector. According to the 
same table, a significant proportion (that is 69%) out of those 
employed in the services sector, in general, falls within public 
sector employment.
Table 4.1. University Graduates Employed in the Services Sector, 
1982
Branch of Economic Activity
Percentage 
of University 
graduates
Trade - Restaurants - Hotels 8.6
Transport - Storage - Communications 3.7
Banks - Insurances 19.0
Public and other services 68.7
Total 100.0
Number of graduates in the Services sector 268,400
Number of graduates (All sectors) 306,200
Source: NSSG, 1984, Labour Force Survev of 1982
Additionally, it will be of interest to examine payroll data 
mainly from the public sector and derive results, so as to 
justify the utilisation of such data for human capital earnings 
functions in future analyses. Existing results from similar 
studies report no major objections in the consideration of public 
sector as contrasted to private sector earnings in human capital 
analyses (for the Iranian case, see Psacharopoulos and Williams,
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1973) . Further to the above, one could also claim that because 
public sector pay-scales are more accessible —  thus better known 
to the public —  prospective investors adjust their future 
expectations in conjunction with these scales than with the less- 
known private sector pay scales. Therefore, the Greek case will 
contribute additional evidence to this issue.
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4 . 2 NEW ESTIMATES
A series of new estimates related to the private rate of return 
analysis within the human capital framework discussed extensively 
so far, are presented below. The methodology followed has been 
already discussed in detail in Section 1.2 of the thesis. The 
new estimates are based on the analysis of: (a) the salary-
earners sub-sample of the 1977 NSSG employee survey; (b) the lEIR 
data set for 1975, 1981 and 1985, reporting rates of return to
education for the first time; and (c) the public sector data set 
—  referring to two ministries and a state-controlled bank —  for 
1986 and 1987 (for a description of these data sets see previous 
Section 4.1.3). The earnings regressions fitted to these data 
sets will be reported here for the first time.
4.2.1 Earnings Function Analysis
The basic Mincer model presented so far, in addition to some of 
its extensions, permits us to analyse earnings and, within the 
human capital methodology, derive rates of return to education 
(see Section 1.2). This model relates variations in earnings to 
variations in schooling and work experience. The regression 
derived rates of return to education could be either in general 
form, that is referring to the average rate of return to an extra 
year of schooling, or in education level specific form. The 
former is derived from the basic Mincerian model, where the rate 
of return is the regression coefficient of the years of schooling 
variable, and the latter is derived from variations of the basic 
model.
In this analysis, three different regression model
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specifications will be fitted to each group and sub-group of 
workers and will be presented in the next sections. That is, 
according to; (i) the basic Mincerian specification as described 
in Section 1.2.2 (equation 1.5), (ii) the non-linear in years of 
schooling specification as presented in Section 1.2.3 (equation 
1.6) and, (iii) the step specification of the same Section 1.2.3 
(equation 1.8). The first specification will give us average 
rates of return, while the other two give us education level 
specific yields.
These models have been extensively used in the literature 
and a general observation concerning the classic simple Mincerian 
specification is that the explanatory power of schooling and 
experience variable appears to be about a third in both the USA 
(Mincer, 1974) and England and Wales (Psacharopoulos and Layard, 
1979) estimates for 1959 and 1972, respectively. A higher result 
has been achieved by including weeks worked, giving 53 per cent, 
while the schooling coefficient remained unbiased in the USA 
data, but one could argue that this was not appropriate since 
weeks worked is endogenous. Siebert (1985, p. 43) argues that 
"if 30 per cent seems 'low* for the human capital model, thereby 
implying a large amount of play for factors such as luck, 
nepotism and discrimination, it should be remembered that we are 
dealing with the very simplest model which, in particular, omits 
ability and non-pecuniary differences in individuals' jobs". And 
he concludes that it should be more sensible to judge the 
contribution of human capital factors to earnings by looking at 
the size, sign and significance of coefficients than by looking 
at the R-squared value which, it is reminded, is very sensitive
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to the number of right-hand-side variables included.
In the following Sections we are going to discuss in detail 
the three specifications of the fitted earnings functions for 
each sample separately, complying with the previous comments. At 
first, we are going to present those referring to entire samples, 
and then for each sector (that is private and public) by the 
gender of employees. Given the possible combinations of sub­
groups of employees to be examined, that is by sector of 
employment and by gender, as well as the three specifications 
considered, we will end up with a significant number of earnings 
functions tables. However, in the text we are going to present 
only those referring to entire samples and both sexes, while the 
rest will be referred to as Appendix tables.
4.2.1.1 The NSSG Emolovee Survev. 1977 
According to Table 4.2, the two basic human capital (HC) 
variables, namely years of schooling and years of experience, 
explain some 37% (that is adjusted R-squared=0.365) —  which is 
good for cross-section estimates as it has been argued above —  
of the earnings of workers in salaried employment involved in all 
sectors of economic activity. The schooling coefficient is 
highly significant and is indicating an average rate of return of 
about 5.2% (that is 8=0.052). It should also be noted that the 
schooling and experience variables are negatively related in the 
sense that the higher the level of schooling, the less the 
individual has had time to work. The negative significant 
coefficient of experience-squared indicates that graduate 
earnings rise but level off as experience increases.
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Table 4.2. Earnings Functions by Economic Sector, Both Sexes: 
NSSG Sample, 1977
All Sectors Private Sector Public Sector
Independent Variable Mincerian Step Mincerian Step Mincerian Step
Years of Schooling, S 0.052 * 
(38.51)
0.075 * 
(26.37)
0.075 * 
(27.74)
Years of Experience, EX 0.060 * 
(41.01)
0.061 * 
(41.66)
0.063 * 
(18.63)
0.062 * 
(18.45)
0.048 * 
(18.17)
0.050 * 
(18.85)
Experi ence-squared -0.00098 * 
(28.72)
-0.00102 * 
(29.92)
-0.00109 * 
(14.20)
-0.00109 * 
(14.47)
-0.00058 * 
(9.37)
-0.00064 * 
(10.46)
Educational Level
- Secondary Incomplete 0.264 * 
(9.65)
0.166 * 
(3.56)
0.219 * 
(4.22)
- Secondary 0.329 * 
(17.94)
0.273 * 
(8.22)
0.282 * 
(7.45)
- University Incomplete 0.340 * 
(8.77)
0.303 * 
(4.30)
0.369 * 
(4.88)
- University 0.545 * 
(35.17)
0.767 * 
(25.96)
0.690 * 
(20.19)
Constant Term 
R-squared (adjusted) 
N
8.172
0.365
7,058
8.456
0.359
7,058
7.964
0.433
1,319
8.480
0.458
1,319
7.943
0.541
1,462
8.469
0.546
1,462
Source; Based on the NSSG data set, see Section 4.1.2.1 
Notes: Absolute t-values in parentheses
Dependent variable: natural logarithm of monthly earnings 
"Primary-education-or-less” is the omitted education dummy 
* and ** indicate statistical significance at the 1% and 5% 
level, respectively
Moving to the male employees of the entire data set (Appendix 
Table B-6) , we observe that all the variables have the expected 
signs. Here, the two HC variables explain almost one third of 
the male earnings, while the rate of return is by one-half per 
cent less than the one referring to the total (4.8%). Moving to
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the female earnings structure (Table B-7) , we note that the 
explanatory power of the two variables is now significantly 
higher. Schooling and work experience alone explain more than 
half of the personal earnings of female employees. It is also of 
interest that the rate of return is now higher, levelling at 6.8 
per cent. What should be noted though, is that males ceteris 
paribus earn on average more than females, reflected in constant 
terms of 8.406 for males versus 7.810 for females.
An identical pattern is observed when examining separately 
employees in the private and the public sectors of the economy by 
gender. Table 4.2 presents results for both sexes, and Table B-6 
and B-7 for males and females, respectively. What is noteworthy, 
however, is the equality of the magnitude of the rate of return 
for the two sectors, referring to both genders, and the relative 
advantage of the returns referring to the public sector, when 
examined separately for each gender. In addition, another 
general comment can be made about the levels of the explanatory 
coefficients, where it is obvious that institutionalised pay in 
the public sector accounts for the higher R-squared terms as 
compared to the private sector, where productivity related 
characteristics are valued more. Also of interest is the fact 
that the private sector pays, on average, higher wages than the 
public sector of the economy.
If a non-linear term, when referring to years of schooling, 
is entered into the regression (that is, a schooling-squared 
term) it is possible to estimate educational level specific 
returns to education. The theory suggests (see Section 1.2.3) 
that the return to education at a specific educational level is
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estimated on the basis of the following formula:
r = b + 2es,
where r is the rate of return to education,
b is the schooling coefficient,
e is the schooling-squared coefficient, and
s refers to the years of schooling of the particular
educational level.
Table 4.3. Mincerian Earnings Functions. Non-linear in •S',
by Economic Sector, Both Sexes: NSSG Sample, 1977
All Private Public
Independent Variable Sectors Sector Sector
Years of Schooling, S 0.075 * -0.049 * 0.009
(8.82) (2.68) (0.53)
Years of Experience, EX 0.059 * 0.063 * 0.049 *
(40.63) (18.87) (18.55)
Experience-squared 0.00096 * -0.00112 * -0.00062 *
(27.95) (14.74) (9.91)
Schooling-squared -0.001 * 0.006 * 0.003 *
(2.77) (6.87) (3.94)
Constant Term 8.063 8.544 8.279
R-squared (adjusted) 0.365 0.453 0.545
N 7,058 1,319 1,462
Source: Based on the NSSG data set, see Section 4.1.2.1 
Notes: Absolute t-values in parentheses
Dependent variable: natural logarithm of monthly earnings 
* and ** indicate statistical significance at the 1% and 5% 
level, respectively
Table 4.3, and Appendix Tables B-8 and B-9, report the results of 
regressions fitted according to this specification, by economic 
sector and gender. As shown in Table 4.3 above, the coefficients 
of the regressions are highly significant when referring to all 
sectors of the economy, irrespective of gender, and are of the 
expected signs. That is, the schooling-squared coefficient is of 
a negative value (i.e. -0.001), acting as a downward bias for the
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incremental levels of education. Contrarily, when disaggregating 
for the two economic sectors in question, the pattern appears to 
be of an ascending order, irrespective of gender, and in most 
instances statistically insignificant (see Tables 4.3, B-8 and,
B-9) .
The step specification of the Mincerian earnings function 
permits the calculation of education level specific rates of 
return, as well, in relation to a comparison group (for more 
details see Section 1.2.3). This method is more accurate than 
the non-linear in *S' method, because the years of schooling 
variable is now defined in the respective educational levels with 
the use of dummy variables having the value of 1 if the 
observation has the prescribed educational level, or 0 if 
otherwise. In this specification, the omitted education dummy —  
acting as the control group —  is primary education or less. The 
results for both sexes appear in Table 4.2 (already presented for 
the basic model), and for male and female employees in Appendix 
Tables B-6 and B-7, respectively. A general remark is that the 
comments are fairly the same as those for the basic model. A 
couple of additional general comments, though, are that, first, 
the adjusted R-squared term, denoting the explanatory power of 
the model, is slightly higher as compared to the basic model, 
and, second, possession of a university degree is associated with 
a sizeable and statistically significant earnings premium over 
the other levels of education.
Finally, the estimated returns to on-the-job training 
(experience) reveal an increasing pattern of the estimated
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coefficients, being 6.0, 5.3 and, 5.1 per cent for an additional 
year of experience, referring to both genders, males and, females 
respectively employed at all economic sectors (see Tables 4.2, B- 
6 and, B-7). Concerning employment in the competitive sector of 
the economy, the respective figures are 6.3, 5.7 and, 4.3 per
cent, while employment in the non-competitive sector yield a rate 
of return to an extra year of experience of the order of 4.8, 4.3 
and, 4.2 per cent (see also Tables 4.2, B-6 and, B-7).
4.2.1.2 The lEIR Data Set. 1975. 1981 and 1985 
The analysis of the lEIR data, although significantly smaller in 
terms of size as compared to the NSSG sample, gave highly 
significant regression results for all three years covered, as 
shown in Table 4.4 below for the basic model, referring to both 
sexes.
Table 4.4. Mincerian Earnings Functions, All Sectors, Both Sexes: 
lEIR saunple, 1975, 1981 and 1985
Independent Variable 1975 1981 1985
Years of Schooling, S 0.058 * 
(14.05)
0.041 * 
(12.95)
0.034 * 
(14.64)
Years of Experience, EX 0.064 * 
(6.50)
0.048 * 
(6.45)
0.042 * 
(7.60)
Experience-squared -0.00102 * 
(2.96)
-0.00054 ** 
(2.07)
-0.00058 * 
(3.01)
Constant Term 8.305 9.548 10.507
R-squared (adjusted) 0.437 0.460 0.482
N 587 637 693
Source; Based on the lEIR data set, see Section 4.1.2.2 
Notes: Absolute t-values in parentheses
Dependent variable: natural logarithm of monthly earnings 
* and ** indicate statistical significance at the 1% and 5% 
level, respectively
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Again, the coefficients are of the expected signs and the two HC 
variables explain more than 40% of the variations in earnings of 
individual employees, mainly because of the grouped nature of 
experience variable (see Section 4.1.3.3). As also suggested by 
the same table (4.4), the schooling coefficients indicate rates 
of return to a typical year of schooling of 5.8%, 4.1% and, 3.4%, 
referring to all employees in all economic sectors, for the 
years 1975, 1981 and, 1985. When examining separately male and 
female earnings, it is noted that the experience-squared 
coefficient is becoming less important in the earnings 
determination in terms of statistical significance. The above is 
denoting the trend towards non-strictly parabolic experience-
earnings profiles (see Appendix Tables B-10 and, B-11). We also 
note that while males appear to earn on average more than females 
(constant term comparison) for 1975 and 1981, the effect of the 
equalisation policies of the Socialist administration of the 
1980s is clear for the year 1985.
As suggested by Table 4.5, if we disaggregate further into 
the private and the public sector of the economy for the years 
1975, 1981 and, 1985, we observe that HC theory explains somehow 
little of the earnings variation, that is 22% to 25%, despite the 
grouped nature of the experience variable. Given the previously 
mentioned feature of the sample, concerning the experience 
variable, it is clear from the same table (4.5) that human
capital modelling explains more than 50% for the public sector. 
The most telling statistic though, is the one for 1985, where 
education and years of experience appear to explain 63% of the
earnings of civil servants. This is so, because of the
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introduction of the highly institutionalised "Integrated 
Payroll", valuing exceedingly such characteristics irrespective 
of productivity considerations (see also Section 3.2.2).
Table 4.5. Mincerian Earnings Functions by Economic Sector,
Both Sexes: lEIR Sample, 1975, 1981 and 1985
Independent Variable
1975 1981 1985
Private Public Private Public Private Public
Years of Schooling, S 0.031 * 0.063 * 0.034 * 0.044 * 0.030 * 0.035 *
(3.88) (14.00) (4.73) (13.47) (5.74) (16.53)
Years of Experience, EX 0.041 ** 0.070 * 0.037 ** 0.055 * 0.037 * 0.046 *
(2.27) (6.39) (2.20) (7.03) (3.12) (8.89)
Experience-squared -0.00082 -0.00116 * -0.00060 -0.00067 ** -01.00081 -0.00062 *
(1.26) (3.07) (0.99) (2.50) (1.90) (3.52)
Constant Term 8.591 8.261 9.631 9.508 10.460 10.525
R-squared (adjusted) 0.218 0.478 0.223 0.559 0.263 0.631
N 116 471 165 472 181 512
Source: Based on the lEIR data set, see Section 4.1.2.2
Notes; Absolute t-values in parentheses
Dependent variable: natural logarithm of monthly earnings 
* and ** indicate statistical significance at the 1% and 5% 
level, respectively
The same observation, as above, is applicable for each gender 
separately (see Appendix Tables B-11 and, B-13). Furthermore, 
the years of schooling coefficient, referring to both sexes, 
appears to be higher in the public than the private sector of the 
economy (see Table 4.5). This is an interesting observation with 
screening implications, but it is mainly due to sampling biases 
in favour of the public sector, as well as including a 
significant number of employees in some highly paid parastatal 
enterprises (see Section 4.1.2.2). An anti-screening pattern
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though, emerges from Appendix Table B-11 when only male 
employees* earnings are analysed. The analysis for female 
employees in the private sector gave completely insignificant 
coefficients, while more educated women in the public sector 
appear to enjoy partly higher yields to their educational 
investment, although earning comparatively less than their male 
counterparts (see Appendix Table B-13).
The analysis of the lEIR sample data according to the 
schooling-squared specification by gender and by economic sector 
—  appearing in Tables 4.6 and 4.7, as well as Appendix Tables B- 
14, B-15, B-16 and, B-17 —  yielded statistically significant
results (except for females in the private sector, appearing in 
Appendix Table B-17).
Table 4.6. Mincerian Earnings Functions, Non-linear in 'S',
All Sectors, Both Sexes: lEIR Sample, 1975, 1981, 1985
Independent Variable 1975 1981 1985
Years of Schooling, S -0.280 * -0.198 * -0.123 *
(7.30) (6.64) (5.34)
Years of Experience, EX 0.064 * 0.047 * 0.042 *
(6.90) (6.63) (7.83)
Experience-squared -0.00101 * -0.00051 ** -0.00058 *
(3.14) (2.07) (3.11)
Schooling-squared 0.016 * 0.011 * 0.007 *
(8.87) (8.04) (6.83)
Constant Term 9.831 10.629 11.210
R-squared (adjusted) 0.504 0.509 0.514
N 587 637 693
Source; Based on the lEIR data set, see Section 4.1.2.2 
Notes: Absolute t-values in parentheses
Dependent variable: natural logarithm of monthly earnings 
* and ** indicate statistical significance at the 1% and 5% 
level, respectively
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Table 4.7. Mincerian Earnings Functions, Non-linear in 'S',
by Economic Sector, Both Sexes: lEiR Sample, 1975-1985
Independent Variable
1975 1981 1985
Private Public Private Public Private Public
Years of Schooling, 8 -0.227 * -0.268 * -0.242 * -0.180 * -0.130 * -0.106 *
(3.49) (6.17) (3.70) (5.75) (2.67) (4.94)
Years of Experience, EX 0.041 * 0.070 * 0.033 ** 0.055 * 0.037 * 0.046 *
(2.44) (6.77) (2.08) (7.39) (3.13) (9.29)
Experi ence-squared -0.00083 ■0.00116 * -0.00050 -0.00067 * -0.00080 ** ■0.00063 *
(1.35) (3.25) (0.88) (2.63) (1.92) (3.69)
Schooling-squared 0.012 * 0.015 * 0.013 * 0.010 * 0.007 * 0.007 *
(4.00) (7.66) (4.24) (7.18) (3.30) (6.59)
Constant Term 9.754 9.753 10.903 10.508 11.186 11.156
R-squared (adjusted) 0.310 0.535 0.297 0.602 0.302 0.659
N 116 471 165 472 181 512
Source: Based on the lEIR data set, see Section 4.1.2.2 
Notes: Absolute t-values in parentheses
Dependent variable: natural logarithm of monthly earnings 
* and ** indicate statistical significance at the 1% and 5% 
level, respectively
However, the sign of the schooling-squared coefficient in all 
regressions is of the opposite sign than expected. That is, 
positive, denoting an ascending rate of return pattern to the 
increased order educational levels.
Tables 4.8 and 4.9, as well as Appendix Tables B-18, B-19, 
B-20, and B-21, present results according to the step 
specification by gender and by economic sector for all the three 
time periods available, that is 1975, 1981 and, 1985. Based on 
these estimates it will be possible to calculate comparison rates 
of return to specific levels of education, as opposed to the 
average rate of return concept implicit in the basic Mincerian 
model. In this case, primary education is the omitted category.
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because this particular sample does not contain any employees 
with less than primary education. The results of the fitted step 
earnings functions appearing in Tables 4.8 and 4.9 indicate that 
secondary education has lost its importance in determining 
earnings, obviously due near universalisation. University 
education, however, is consistently, as well as significantly, 
associated with a considerable earnings premium over the other 
levels of education.
Table 4.8. Step Earnings Functions, All Sectors, Both Sexes: 
lEIR Sample, 1975, 1981 and 1985
Independent Variable 1975 1981 1985
Years of Experience, EX 0.064 * 
(6.90)
0.047 * 
(6.63)
0.042 * 
(7.83)
Experience-squared -0.00101 * 
(3.14)
-0.00051 * 
(2.07)
-0.00058 * 
(3.11)
Educational Level
- Secondary 0.007
(0.16)
0.004
(0.10)
0.043
(1.61)
- University 0.636 * 
(16.13)
0.448 * 
(14.75)
0.361 * 
(16.03)
Constant Term 8.715 9.836 10.732
R-squared (adjusted) 0.504 0.509 0.514
N 587 637 693
Source: Based on the lEIR data set, see Section 4.1.2 .2
Notes; Absolute t-values in parentheses
Dependent variable: natural logarithm of monthly earnings 
"Primary-education-or-less" is the omitted education dummy 
* and ** indicate statistical significance at the 1% and 5% 
level, respectively
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Table 4.9. Step Earnings Functions by Economic Sector, Both Sexes:
lEIR Sample, 1975, 1981 and 1985
Independent Variable
1975 1981 1985
Private Public Private Public Private Public
Years of Experience, EX 0.041 ** 0.070 * 0.033 ** 0.055 * 0.037 * 0.046 *
(2.44) (6.77) (2.08) (7.39) (3.13) (9.29)
Experi ence-squared -0.00083 -0.00116 * -0.00050 -0.00067 * -0.00079 -0.00063 *
(1.35) (3.25) (0.88) (2.63) (1.91) (3.69)
Educational Level
- Secondary -0.061 0.040 -0.071 0.036 0.020 0.065 *
(0.79) (0.79) (0.92) (1.00) (0.36) (2.59)
- University 0.381 * 0.678 * 0.393 * 0.473 * 0.331 * 0.368 *
(4.93) (15.75) (5.62) (15.19) (6.43) (18.01)
Constant Term 8.825 8.694 9.910 9.802 10.671 10.751
R-squared (adjusted) 0.310 0.535 0.297 0.602 0.302 0.659
N 116 471 165 472 181 512
Source: Based on the lEIR data set, see Section 4.1.2.2 
Notes: Absolute t-values in parentheses
Dependent variable: natural logarithm of monthly earnings 
"Primary-education-or-less” is the omitted education dummy 
* and ** indicate statistical significance at the 1% and 5% 
level, respectively
A few remarks should also be made concerning the coefficient 
on the years of labour market experience in the simple Mincerian 
earnings functions. First, it should be noted that these 
coefficients follow a declining pattern, complying with the trend 
in the observed schooling coefficient and, second, they are 
highly significant, irrespective of sector of employment and 
gender. Indicative is, as shown in Table 4.4, the rate of return 
to an additional year of labour market experience, applying to 
both genders, ranging from 6.4% in 1975, to 4.8% in 1981 and, to 
4.2% in 1985. Also, the respective figures for private sector
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employment, as suggested by Table 4.5, range between 4.1% (for 
1975) and 3.7% (for 1981 and 1985). In addition. Table 4.5 shows 
that public sector yields higher pay increases for an extra year 
of experience, i.e. 7.0%, 5.5% and, 4.6% for the respective time 
periods. This is opposite to what was found for 1977 in the 
previous Section and it could be attributed to the data 
deficiencies described earlier.
4.2.1.3 The Public Sector Data Set. 1986 and 1987 
Basic Mincerian HC earnings functions fitted in the three public 
sector payrolls for the years 1986 and 1987 appear in Table 4.10. 
They gave highly significant coefficients of the expected signs - 
- referring to both genders —  with the exception of the Ministry 
of Education Employees. The first observation in order here, 
according to Table 4.10, concerns the high explanatory power of 
the model, i.e. R-squared of about 65%. Institutionalised pay is 
the most plausible explanation for such a case. The second 
observation is about the declining nature of the schooling 
coefficients, as compared to those of the previous years, being 
2.3% (Ministry of Finance) in 1986 and, 3.1% (Ministry of 
Education) and 4.0% (Hellenic Industrial Development Bank) in 
1987. The negative but relatively small coefficient of 
experience-squared variable, referring to the Ministry of Finance 
employees, accounts to a degree for the concave nature of the 
experience-earnings profile but also indicates that the majority 
of graduates are still experiencing rising earnings. Moving to 
the Ministry of Education payroll data analysis, even if the 
coefficient of the experience-squared variable is not 
statistically significant, it is not of the expected sign.
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Table 4.10. Earnings Functions, Both Sexes: Public Sector Sample,
1986 and 1987
1986 a/ 1987 b/ 1987 c/
Independent Variable Mincerian Step Mincerian Step Mincerian Step
Years of Schooling, S 0.023 * 
(67.64)
0.031 * 
(21.78)
0.040 * 
(22.82)
Years of Experience, EX 0.023 * 
(59.51)
0.023 * 
(59.42)
0.010 * 
(4.03)
0.008 * 
(3.55)
0.036 * 
(17.19)
0.037 * 
(18.59)
Experience-squared -0.00023 * 
(17.17)
•0.00023 * 
(17.06)
0.00011
(1.56)
0.00015 ** 
(2.14)
-0.00053 * 
(11.59)
-0.00056 * 
(12.23)
Educational Level
- Secondary 0.063 * 
(16.90)
0.099 * 
(5.93)
0.175 * 
(9.73)
- Non-Univ., Post-Sec. 0.117 * 
(3.05)
0.187 * 
(8.80)
—
- University 0.186 * 
(49.06)
0.256 * 
(15.22)
0.375 * 
(21.11)
- Post-Graduate 0.207 * 
(18.35)
0.293 * 
(10.45)
—
Constant Term 
R-squared (adjusted) 
N
10.489
0.633
18,337
10.837
0.644
18,337
10.572
0.661
548
10.832
0.682
548
10.408
0.629
735
10.672
0.637
735
Source: Based on the Public Sector data set, see Section 4.1.2.3 
Notes: Absolute t-values in parentheses
Dependent variable: natural logarithm of monthly earnings 
"Primary-education-or-less" is the omitted education dummy 
* and ** indicate statistical significance at the 1% and 5% 
level, respectively
(-- ) not applicable
a/Ministry of Finance 
b/Ministry of Education 
c/State-controlled Bank (HIDB)
It is positive and quite small, disclosing rapidly rising 
earnings as experience increases for the majority of graduates at 
an almost linear way, denoting the irrationality in pay of the 
public sector according to non-productivity criteria. According
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to Table 4.10, the same coefficient for the HIDB payroll data 
shows the opposite effect on the experience-earnings profiles of 
the Bank employees. The pattern suggested is a typical HC one, 
familiar to private sector data analyses, suggesting a quite 
parabolic earnings profile levelling off as experience increases. 
Another noteworthy comment relative to the productivity unrelated 
rationale in the public sector pay stems from the comparison of 
the constant terms between the Ministry of Education and the HIDB 
basic Mincerian earnings functions, both referring to the same 
month's pay in 1987. It is clear that a person with no schooling 
and zero experience will be getting more pay in the civil service 
than the state-controlled banking sector (reflected in constant 
terms of 10.572 versus 10.408). Similar remarks apply to both 
males and females when examined separately (see Appendix Tables 
B-22 and, B-23).
The non-linear in 'S' specification gave the opposite than 
expected sign in the schooling-squared coefficient in all 
payrolls and for both and each gender separately, while most of 
the analyses reported statistically insignificant coefficients. 
For an elaboration of the above comments see Table 4.11 referring 
to both sexes, and for each gender separately see Appendix Tables 
B-24 and B-25 referring to males and females respectively).
Lastly, the step specification of the fitted earnings 
functions for both sexes appears in Table 4.10 already presented 
for the basic model (see Appendix Table B-22 for males, and B-23 
for females). This specification produced statistically 
significant coefficients, in general, on the included variables
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and the commentary associated with these analyses is quite 
similar to the one on the basic model, discussed earlier. A 
further point, though, is that two of the data sets —  Ministry 
of Finance and Ministry of Education —  allow the distinction 
between non-university, post-secondary graduates (TEI) and those 
holding postgraduate degrees (M.A. and Ph.D.). Hence, these 
categories have been included as additional dummy variables in 
the step earnings function. Possession of a university degree 
is, of course, again associated with a sizeable and statistically 
significant earnings premium as contrasted to the rest of the 
educational levels.
Table 4.11. Mincerian Earnings Functions, Non-linear in 'S', 
Both Sexes: Public Sector Sample, 1986 and 1987
Independent Variable 1986 a/ 1987 b/ 1987 c/
Years of Schooling, S -0.024 * 
(11.50)
-0.018 ** 
(2.03)
0.009
(0.76)
Years of Experience, EX 0.023 * 
(59.52)
0.009 * 
(3.82)
0.037 * 
(18.56)
Experience-squared -0.00023 * 
(17.17)
0.00013
(1.87)
-0.00056 * 
(12.23)
Schooling-squared 0.002 * 
(22.78)
0.002 * 
(5.60)
0.002 * 
(4.25)
Constant Term 
R-squared (adjusted) 
N
10.755
0.643
18,337
10.861
0.678
548
10.649
0.637
735
Source; Based on the Public Sector data set, see Section 4.1.2.3 
Notes: Absolute t-values in parentheses
Dependent variable: natural logarithm of monthly earnings 
* and ** indicate statistical significance at the 1% and 5% 
level, respectively 
a/Ministry of Finance 
b/Ministry of Education 
c/State-controlled Bank (HIDB)
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À final remark concerns the returns to an additional year of 
on-the-job experience. There are quite mixed patterns when 
examining employment in the two Ministries, regarding both 
genders. In detail, according to the basic human capital model 
specification of Table 4.10, experience appears to yield an 
average rate of return of about 2.3 per cent in the Ministry of 
Finance, being equal to the average rate of return to schooling. 
The same rate for the Ministry of education is only 1.0 per cent, 
being slightly less than one third of the typical year of 
schooling yield. Finally, the average rate of increase of the 
earnings of the HIDB employees after completing an extra year of 
experience is 3.6 per cent and is about the same with the one 
attributed to schooling alone.
4.2.1.4 Extended Earnings Functions 
As shown in Figure 4.3 (in Section 4.1.2) our data sets allow for 
additional variables on the personal characteristics of 
employees. The inclusion of such variables in the right-hand 
side of the basic human capital earnings functions, as argued in 
Section 1.2.5, will enable us to examine their effect on the 
model itself, as well as on the earnings of employees. The 
additional independent variables are gender, marital status, 
number of children, as well as whether the employee has had 
specific training for the current position held. These variables 
have been entered in a dummy variable specification, that is 
having the value of 1 if the employee belonged to the specified 
group and 0 otherwise, except for the one referring to the number 
of children in the family which was entered in absolute figures.
Table 4.12 presents extended earnings functions on six out
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of the seven available data sets (the seventh being the Ministry 
of Finance payroll).
Table 4.12. Extended Earnings Functions: Greece, 1975-1987
Independent Variable
lEIR
1975
NSSG
1977
lEIR
1981
lEIR
1985
Public Sector 
1987 d/
Public Sector 
1987 e/
Years of Schooling, S 0.046 * 0.054 * 0.030 * 0.026 * 0.029 * 0.039 *
(11.79) (41.92) (10.04) (11.79) (23.39) (22.74)
Years of Experience, EX 0.063 * 0.049 * 0.047 * 0.041 * 0.012 * 0.032 *
(7.08) (34.80) (6.99) (8.15) (5.56) (15.44)
Experience-squared -0.00099 * -0.00082 * -01.00052 ** -0.00055 * +0.00002 0.00048 *
(3.19) (25.52) (2.21) (3.17) (0.35) (10.57)
Male a/ 0.056 *** 0.316 * 0.064 * 0.038 ** 0.036 * 0.043 *
(1.67) (33.53) (2.53) (2.02) (4.92) (3.32)
Married b/ 0.055 *** 0.088 * 0.080 * 0.103 * 0.047 * 0.055 *
(1.65) (8.06) (3.18) (5.46) (5.09) (3.43)
Number of Children “ - - - - - - - - - - - 0.017 * 0.025 *
(3.48) (3.88)
Trained c/ 0.392 * - - — 0.308 * 0.205 * — — — — — —
(11.14) (11.50) (10.15)
Constant Term 8.161 7.969 9.421 10.396 10.537 10.382
R-squared (adjusted) 0.540 0.470 0.562 0.566 0.743 0.663
N 587 7,058 637 693 548 735
Source: Based on the respective data sets, see Section 4.1.2
Notes; Absolute t-values in parentheses
Dependent variable: natural logarithm of monthly earnings 
*, ** and, *** indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 
5% and, 10% level, respectively
(--) not applicable
a/ l=male, 0=female 
b/ l=married, 0=single
c/ l=trained for current position, O=not trained 
d/ Ministry of Education 
e/ State-controlled Bank (HIDB)
The results indicate that the explanatory power of the human 
capital model has increased substantially as a result of the
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inclusion of these variables in the earnings functions. The 
increase has been more than 10 per cent for the majority of the 
data sets, while it levelled at about eight and three per cent 
for the Ministry of Education and the HIDB payroll data 
respectively (the comparison was made with the adjusted R- 
squared coefficients of the basic human capital model of the 
respective data sets, referring to both sexes). Therefore, we 
could summarise that the relative strength of these variables in 
explaining the variance of earnings has been in most cases 
significant, but not impressive.
Another important finding is associated with the effect the 
additional variables have on the model itself. By including 
these variables we expect that the bias in the schooling 
coefficient is removed, if these variables are correlated with 
schooling. As we have already argued in Section 4.1.1.2, 
variable training is by definition correlated with schooling. 
This variable is available in the lEIR data set only (see Figure 
4.3). In such case, the inclusion of training in explaining 
earnings has resulted in a downward correction of the schooling 
coefficient. That is, if we compare the coefficients of schooling 
of the lEIR data set (for 1975, 1981, and 1985) appearing on 
Table 4.12 with the respective ones of the basic Mincerian 
earnings functions appearing on Table 4.4, we observe that they 
are now levelling at about 0.010 (or 1%), lower than in the basic 
model, for all three years. Contrarily, the rest of the data 
sets analysed, that is the NSSG sample referring to 1977 and the 
Ministry of Education and HIDB payrolls referring to 1987, gave
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biased-free schooling coefficients, when compared to results of 
the basic model appearing in Tables 4.2 and 4.10, respectively. 
This is also implying that the inclusion of gender, marital 
status, and number of children has no effect whatsoever on 
schooling since these variables are exogenous.
It has also been confirmed here that being male ceteris 
paribus is associated with higher earnings on average than 
females. In detail. Table 4.12 suggests that males appeared to 
earn on average a massive 32 per cent more than females in 1977. 
The effect of the equalisation policies of the Socialist 
administration of the 1980s is evident for the post-1981 period. 
The pay superiority of the males has decreased substantially and 
the analyses for 1987 suggest that males get on average 4 per 
cent more than females.
The case of higher pay among employees with increased family 
responsibilities, as this was argued in Section 4.1.1.4, is also 
demonstrated in the extended earnings functions of Table 4.12. 
Being married is associated with a premium of about 10 per cent 
on average until the mid-1980s. For 1987, this premium has been 
found to be almost half than before but still significant, at 
about five per cent. In addition, each child in the family was 
found to be related with a premium of about 2 per cent on the 
personal earnings for 1987.
The effect of the training variable on the earnings of 
employees was found to be quite significant and sizeable, when 
available. In detail, as we have already stated earlier, the 
availability of this variable was only in the lEIR data set, 
referring to 1975, 1981, and 1985. Table 4.12 indicates that.
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being specifically trained for the current position held, is 
associated with an impressive 40 per cent earnings premium as 
compared to those without specific training for 1975, other 
things being equal. A deterioration on the size of the 
coefficient is also observed over time, suggesting 31% and 21% 
higher earnings for 1981 and 1985 respectively.
A final comment is about the labour market experience of 
employees. This concerns the extreme points of labour market 
experience where employees realise the peak of their earnings in 
the experience-earnings profiles. We are able to estimate such 
points from the fitted earnings function. This point is given 
where the first derivative of the experience variable in the 
quadratic human capital equation is zero. In earnings functions 
this extreme point corresponds to a maximum (not minimum). In 
detail. Table 4.12 implies that maximum earnings are reached when 
experience becomes 31.9 years in 1975 (lEIR), 29.9 years in 1977 
(NSSG), 43.5 years in 1981 (lEIR), 35.3 years in 1985 (lEIR), and 
33.3 years in 1987 (State-controlled Bank —  HIDB). In the case 
of the Ministry of Education data, referring to 1987, it was 
found that such a point never exists (linear increase), because 
the EX-squared coefficient is statistically insignificant. Our 
findings are in line with other studies, such as Mincer's (1974) 
estimate of 34 years using U.S.A. data, and Psacharopoulos' and 
Layard's (1979, p. 492) estimate of 30 years when experimenting 
with British data.
4.2.1.5 Potential Versus Real Experience 
The potential versus real experience debate has not been given
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much attention in the human capital analyses literature. This is 
because, in most cases, researchers found the Mincerian 
classification of experience (see Section 4.1.1.3) the most 
convenient and, of course, accepted way to define it, in the 
absence of real labour market experience. Occupational mobility, 
as well as job search issues lead to the deterioration of the 
importance of the experience variable in determining earnings, 
and tenure was included on top in the earnings functions. This 
is of significant importance for the firm because the most 
telling seniority variable should be years of experience within 
the firm (i.e. tenure) rather than, generally speaking, years of 
labour market experience. Furthermore, when actual years of 
labour market experience are available, there is no issue of 
calculating potential experience for all those reasons associated 
with the above explanation. Unquestionably, it is the 
availability or not of the variable in determining whether 
potential (or Mincerian type) or actual experience would be 
included in the HC analyses. It should also be added here, that 
the basic criterion of some of the authors when selecting between 
alternative potential experience definitions has been the 
comparison of the adjusted R-squared terms of the earnings 
functions using alternative specifications of the variable in 
question (see for example Arabsheibani, 1983, p. 51).
Having said that, it is also of importance to comment on the 
Greek evidence in our possession before proceeding to the 
comparison. As suggested by Figure 4.3, cited earlier in the 
Chapter, there are two data sets permitting such analysis. The 
Ministry of Education and the HIDB payroll data sets, both
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belonging to the Public Sector sample, referring to 1987. The 
availability of the variable "Age of Employee” in both data sets 
allows for estimating potential experience (P__EXP) according to 
the Mincerian way, that is: P EXP = AGE-Schooling-6, where 6
years is the legal schooling starting age in Greece. However, 
because both samples refer to public sector, it should be 
reminded that job security is the main feature of these jobs, 
thus one should not expect sound variations in the comparison. 
Also, the nature of these jobs and the main reason in driving 
people demanding them (see for example Gedeon and Psacharopoulos, 
1982), is leading us to assume that there is minimal occupational 
and job search mobility. The previous statement is also leading 
us to assume in advance that, the use of the real experience 
variable in the human capital earnings functions analyses —  even 
if this could be treated as tenure as well —  should be the most 
appropriate.
The methodology in testing for the above contentions will be 
the comparison of classic Mincerian specifications (basic 
Mincerian earnings functions) using (i) real and (ii) potential 
experience for both data sets.
Tables 4.13 and 4.14 present the results of the basic 
Mincerian earnings functions fitted in the Ministry of Education 
and the HIDB data sets respectively. It is of particular 
interest to note that the two analyses suggest somewhat 
controversial results as far as the explanatory power of the 
model is concerned. In detail, the Ministry data, appearing in 
Table 4.13, suggest that the use of the variable potential
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instead of real experience weakens the explanatory power of the 
Mincerian model by about four per cent, while the Bank data of 
Table 4.14 gave a slightly better fit of one per cent.
Table 4.13. Mincerian Earnings Functions, with Alternative 
Experience Variables, Both Sexes: Ministry of 
Education Data Set, 1987
Independent Variable
Real
Experience
Specification
Potential
Experience
Specification
Years of Schooling, S 0.031 * 0.042 *
(21.78) (26.39)
Years of Experience, EX 0.010 * 0.013 *
(4.03) (4.96)
Experience-squared 0.00011 -0.00002
(1.56) (0.30)
Constant Term 10.572 10.321
R-squared (adjusted) 0.661 0.624
N 548 548
Source; Real experience specification: from Table 4.10
Potential experience specification: based on Ministry 
of Education payroll (see Section 4.1.2.3) estimates 
Notes: Absolute t-values in parentheses
Dependent variable: natural logarithm of monthly earnings 
*/ indicates statistical significance at the 1% level
An interesting finding, though, arising from Table 4.13 is 
that the inclusion of potential experience in explaining earnings 
variations among the Ministry employees complies better with the 
HC "laws". That is, although statistically insignificant, the 
experience-squared coefficient has now a negative sign, meaning 
that graduate earnings rise but tend to level off as experience 
increases. However, in the case of the State-controlled Bank 
data of Table 4.14, we note that the respective coefficient is 
still highly significant, but slightly smaller.
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Table 4.14. Mincerian Earnings Functions, with Alternative
Experience Variables, Both Sexes: HIDE Data Set, 1987
Independent Variable
Real
Experience
Specification
Potential
Experience
Specification
Years of Schooling, S 0.040 * 
(22.82)
0.051 * 
(26.96)
Years of Experience, EX 0.036 * 
(17.19)
0.038 * 
(22.15)
Experience-squared -0.00053 * 
(11.59)
-0.00047 * 
(15.21)
Constant Term 10.408 10.091
R-squared (adjusted) 0.629 0.639
N 735 783
Source; Real experience specification: from Table 4.10
Potential experience specification: based on HIDE 
payroll (see Section 4.1.2.3) estimates 
Notes: Absolute t-values in parentheses
Dependent variable: natural logarithm of monthly earnings 
*/ indicates statistical significance at the 1% level
Moving to the examination of the linear experience 
coefficient, it is clear from both Tables (4.13 and 4.14) that is 
still highly significant, as well as somewhat higher in the 
potential experience specification. Such finding means that 
earnings increase at a slightly higher rate after each year on- 
the-job had the potential experience being considered than the 
real one.
Lastly, the schooling coefficient is levelling higher in the 
potential experience than the actual experience specification, 
suggesting a very interesting finding, common to both data sets. 
The schooling coefficient was found to be overestimated by 1.1 
units (see schooling coefficients of Tables 4.13 and 4.14). 
Although the figure seems to be very small, in absolute terms.
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it is of particular importance in rate of return to education 
estimates of the order of the Greek setting. That is, an upward 
aggregation bias of about 30 per cent (36% in the case of the 
Ministry of Education and 28% in the HIDE case) in the statistic 
is suggested, in relative terms. A possible explanation could be 
the gradual diminishing importance of the potential experience 
variable —  given its implicit unemployment risks —  in earnings 
determination, and the rapid overweight put on education related 
characteristics.
In conclusion, based on the public sector Greek data for 
1987, we could argue that the magnitude of the fit of the classic 
Mincerian model does not point to the "correct” direction in 
selecting between the two experience specifications. There are 
other factors to be taken seriously into account. However, one 
could summarise that in the absence of real labour market 
experience, the potential specification could be used instead and 
is pointing to the "correct" direction, although it is 
intuitively assuming no periods of unemployment. But in view of 
the fact that both experience specifications are available, one 
should be very cautious in treating potential rather than actual 
experience because of the aggregation bias highlighted for the 
former above.
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4.3 SUMMARY
In this Chapter we have examined the earnings of employees in 
Greece through a variety of data sets covering a time span of 
thirteen years, that is from 1975 to 1987 (for an illustration 
and summary information of the data sets see Figure 4.3). 
Although the data sets were not strictly comparable, they enabled 
us to form an aggregate picture on the decomposition of earnings 
from salaried employment in Greece by fitting human capital 
earnings functions in Section 4.2. These functions have been 
fitted separately for males and females in the private and the 
public sectors of the economy.
The overall conclusion from these earnings functions 
analyses is that there is a strong and positive relationship 
between the earnings of employees and their educational level. 
Our figures show that the two basic human capital characteristics 
of employees, that is, schooling and labour market experience,
vaLfiation
accounted for more than one third of personal earnings/(ranging 
from 37% in the case of 1977 NSSG data to 66% in the case of the 
1987 Ministry of Education data, referring to entire data sets, 
irrespective of gender). This is high for cross-section 
estimates, and compares well with the respective from the 
international literature. When we disaggregated for the two 
economic sectors, that is private and public, the superiority of 
the explanatory power of the basic human capital model in the 
public sector became clear . That was expected and was mainly 
due to the fact of the highly institutionalised pay of that 
sector, as opposed to the private sector where productivity
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related characteristics are valued more.
In addition to the above, it has been also found that the 
basic human capital model has behaved quite well. That is, the 
schooling and experience variables were found, in the majority of 
the analyses, to be highly significant and negatively related, as 
expected, in the sense the more the schooling the less the 
individual has had time to work. The negative significant 
coefficient of the experience-squared variable indicated that 
earnings rise but level off as experience increased (except in 
the Ministry of Education data set where it was found to be 
positive denoting non-strictly parabolic experience-earnings 
profiles —  see Table 4.10). The step specification of the 
fitted earnings functions produced results indicating that 
secondary education has lost its importance in determining 
earnings over time, mainly because to its near universalisation. 
University education though, was found to be significantly and 
consistently associated with a considerable earnings premium over 
the other levels of education. However, the non-linear in years 
of schooling specification did not give a clear consensus 
concerning the signs of the coefficients.
Another finding, stemming from the earnings functions 
analyses, is that males ceteris paribus earn on average more than 
females, while the effect of the equalisation policies of the 
Socialist administration of the 1980s is evident for the mid- 
1980s.
When other personal characteristics of employees were 
entered in the analyses the explanatory power of the model was 
increased substantially (that is by more than 10%, except for the
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case of the public sector payrolls where the increase varied from 
3-8%) . The inclusion of those characteristics in the human 
capital earnings functions of Section 4.2.1.4 pointed towards 
bias-free results, by leaving the schooling coefficient virtually 
unaffected. The extended earnings functions have also confirmed 
that: (a) being male is automatically associated with higher pay, 
(b) married employees earn on average more than their 
counterparts with no family responsibilities, (c) an additional 
child in the family implies higher earnings, and (d) specialised 
training is associated with a substantial earnings premium, 
levelling significantly higher than the respective for an 
additional year of schooling.
Finally, the issue on the use of potential, in the absence 
of real, labour market experience variable in earnings functions 
were tested in Section 4.2.1.5. The analysis indicated that the 
potential specification of the experience variable could be used 
and it is pointing to the "correct" direction, although it is 
intuitively assuming no periods of unemployment.
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CHAPTER 5
THE RETURNS TO EDUCATION
In this Chapter we are going to present the returns to education 
estimated on the basis of the earnings functions which were 
fitted and discussed in Section 4.2 of the previous Chapter. 
These returns will be presented and discussed separately from the 
poit of view both of the individual and society.
This thesis has shown that there is apparently a strong 
excess social demand for higher education in Greece. The rate- 
of-return approach has been considered as being able to offer a 
plausible explanation of the phenomenon. In detail, the study of 
the ratios of rates of return to investment in education over 
time, rather than their levels, will provide valuable indications 
as to where are we heading to, or say, evaluate the economic 
efficiency of education. The comparison of their levels, 
however, among different periods of time may provide significant 
insight to the changing importance of education as an economic 
productivity augmenting factor in the Greek economy. The study 
of the comparative position of these rates with the respective 
ones for other countries, for which data are readily available, 
would mask Greece's international standing. The levelling of 
rates of return over time in conjunction with distinct changes in 
the quality of the population and the labour force, would adhere 
further evidence on the functioning of the labour market in the 
small open economy of Greece. In addition, by contrasting the 
calculated (ex post) to the expected (ex ante) rates of return.
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we could rationalise the issue of the increased social demand for 
education from a different perspective. Finally, by calculating 
the social rates of return we will be able to estimate the level 
of the public subsidisation of higher education and form an 
overall picture with educational finance implications.
5.1 PRIVATE RATES OF RETURN
The private rates of return which are going to be presented here 
have been estimated on the basis of human capital earnings 
functions fitted in Section 4.2. As we have already argued in 
Section 4.2.1, three earnings functions types have been fitted, 
resulting to an equal number of calculated returns to education. 
First, the rate of return stemming from a classic Mincerian 
specification is defined as being simply the coefficient of the 
years of schooling variable, referring to as the average rate of 
return, meaning the percentage increase in the earnings of an 
individual having completed an extra year of schooling (see 
Section 1.2.2). Second, as summarised in Section 1.2.3, the need 
to add a specific education dimension in the average rate of 
return concept, has been possible in two distinct ways. The one 
being through the "crude way", that is by including a years-of- 
schooling-squared term in the previous function. Having done so, 
the rate of return is defined as the outcome of a summation, 
involving on the one hand the coefficient of the years of 
schooling variable, and on the other hand the schooling-squared 
coefficient times twice the years of schooling corresponding at 
the educational level under consideration. The other practice is
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through the "refined way”, being the step specification of the 
Mincerian earnings function. This specification involves a 
higher degree of sensitivity in the estimation of education level 
specific rates of return as opposed to the previous one. The 
rate of return according to this specification is defined as the 
difference between the coefficients of two successive education 
dummy variables divided by the difference in the number of years 
of schooling between the two educational levels under comparison.
A first comment, with reference to these rates of return to
investment in education, is that they are void of adjustments for
ability, non-pecuniary benefits and disbenefits of jobs, quality
of schooling, and so on. This was not permitted by the data
available which, amongst some other problems discussed throughout
rather
the analysis, were mostly quantitative than qualitative variable- 
wise. Therefore, in that sense, the calculation of biased-free 
rates of return has not been possible. Even though, given that 
the purpose was not to calculate the effect of these adjustments 
on the statistic but rather the statistic itself, the fact of the 
fairly low returns —  especially for the most recent years —  
should be considered. Thus, a downward adjustment, so as to 
incorporate for these factors, would have resulted to even lower 
rates of return of perhaps unobservable size.
5.1.1 Overall Returns to Education
Here we are going to present the overall or Mincerian rates of 
return to an additional year of schooling, stemming from the 
simple Mincerian model. These returns will be examined 
separately according to the sector of competitiveness and the
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gender of employees.
Table 5.1 gives Mincerian rates of return to schooling for 
both sexes and entire samples. It shows that the average rate of 
return to investment in education in 1975, was of the order of 
5.8 per cent. By 1985 it was 3.4 per cent. The same declining 
pattern is observed for both genders (see Appendix Tables C-1 
and, C-2) , while one could say that the returns to males have 
been higher, in general, than those of females.
Table 5.1. Mincerian Rates of Return to Schooling,
Both Sexes, Entire Samples, 1975-85
Sample Year
Rate Number 
of of 
Return Observations Adjusted 
(%) (N) R-squared
lEIR 1975 5.8 587 0.44
NSSG 1977 5.2 7,058 0.37
lEIR 1981 4.1 637 0.46
lEIR 1985 3.4 693 0.48
Source: lEIR: from Table 4.4 
NSSG: from Table 4.2
An identical declining pattern is observed in Table 5.2, 
when examining the private sector alone. The rate is ranging 
between 7.5 (1977) and 3.0 per cent (1985) —  note the
discrepancy between the 1975 and the 1977 figure, mainly due to 
the quality of the available data. The table also indicates a 
further erosion of the earnings advantage of those employed in 
the public sector for 1986 and 1987. As far as the levels of the 
rates of returns between the two sectors are concerned, it is 
shown that the public sector yields constantly higher rates of 
return —  with the exception of the 1977 estimates showing an
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equal yield —  building up in favour of the certification 
argument. Though, one should remain cautious in deriving 
conclusions, given again the heterogeneity of the data utilised 
for such analyses. Male earnings could be more appropriate in 
determining such a proposition (see below).
Table 5.2. Mincerian Rates of Return to Schooling by Economic 
Sector, Both Sexes, 1975-87 (percent)
Sample Year
Economic
Private
Sector
Public
lEIR 1975 3.1 6.3
NSSG 1977 7.5 7.5
lEIR 1981 3.4 4.4
lEIR 1985 3.0 3.5
Public Sector a/ 1986 ... 2.3
Public Sector b/ 1987 ... 3.1
Public Sector c/ 1987 4.0
Source: lEIR: from Table 4.5 
NSSG: from Table 4.2 
Public Sector: from Table 4.10 
Notes: a/ Ministry of Finance
b/ Ministry of Education 
c/ State-controlled Bank (HIDE)
The respective analysis for the male population appearing in 
Appendix Table C-3 shows a clear-cut pattern towards a gradual 
deterioration of the years of schooling coefficient during the 
25-year period. That is, the rate of return has fallen to less 
than half of its size, i.e. from 9.2% to 3.9%, between the early 
1960s and the mid-1980s. It is also obvious from this table (C- 
3) that the returns have shifted quicker towards very low levels
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(i.e. from 6.4% and 7.3% in the mid-1970s, became 2.6% —  or 4.3% 
—  in 1987) , with respect to the non-competitive sector of the 
Greek economy. This is principally attributed to the post-1981 
egalitarian pay policies in the public sector and the increased 
government intervention in determining wages. With respect to 
the screening or certification argument, pre-1980 figures support 
its existence, while post-1980 evidence suggests otherwise (see 
also Section 6.1 on the topic).
Lastly, the female earnings function analyses for the 
competitive sector of the economy produced, in their majority, 
statistically insignificant results (see Appendix Table C-4). It 
is clear, however, that although public sector employment may 
offer job-security, tenure and other non-pecuniary benefits, it 
yields very low rates of return, lessening during the years (i.e. 
from 6.2% and 8.6% in the mid-1970s to around 3.0% in 1987).
5.1.2 Education Level Specific Returns
In this Section we will present education level specific rates of 
return to investment in education. As we have already argued in 
the beginning of the Chapter, there are two distinct ways in 
doing so. The first is through what we have defined as the non­
linear in years of schooling earnings function specification and 
the second is through the step specification.
The *Non-linear in Years of Schooling* Specification 
Table 5.3 depicts rates of return to the various educational 
levels according to the * non-linear in S* specification for both 
sexes, based on entire sample estimates.
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Table 5.3. Mincerian Rates of Return to Schooling by Level of 
Education, Both Sexes, Entire Szunples, 1975-85 (%)
Sample Year
Level of Education
Primary Secondary Higher
lEIR 1975 -8.8 10.4 23.2
NSSG 1977 6.3 5.1 4.3
lEIR 1981 —6.6 6.6 15.4
lEIR 1985 -3.9 4.5 10.1
Source: lEIR: from Table 4.6 
NSSG: from Table 4.3
A first examination of this table points to a direction of 
mixed views. The quality and comparability differences of the 
data sets in our disposal is again to be blamed for the observed 
inconsistencies in the pattern of the calculated rates of return. 
In detail, contrary to the Human Capital "rules", the Greek 
experience suggests that rates of return increase —  rather than 
decrease —  as one completes more years of education. This is, 
of course, not applicable in the case of the examination of the 
1977 rates, referring to the NSSG nationally representative 
survey, which comply with the (not-necessarily-not-to-be-broken) 
Human Capital "law". The same commentary applies when studying 
the returns by gender (see Appendix Tables C-5, and C-6).
A second look at the same table (5.3) reveals that primary 
education, irrespective of gender (see Appendix Tables C-5, and 
C-6), yields negative returns on investment, ranging from a 
meaningful -9.0 per cent in 1975 to about -7.0 per cent six years 
later and becoming -4.0 per cent in 1985. The exception to the 
rule of the negatively signed rates is again the 1977 figure, 
suggesting a moderate positive rate of 6.3%. Nevertheless, if we
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overlook this inconsistency, it is clear that the pattern is 
ascending during the 1975-1985 decade, and constantly points 
through at the non-profitability of this level. If the previous 
statement is accepted, one could put as an explanation of the 
phenomenon the near universalisation of this level of education, 
as well as that of the secondary level, therefore, the observed 
negative returns.
Coming to the secondary education profitability rates, 
depicted in Table 5.3, the ascending pattern of the rates during 
the years, evident in the primary education estimates, is 
reversed to the familiar from the average rate of return trend, 
implying a diminishing path. That is, the rate is less than 
halved during the ten-year period, applying to both genders (see 
Appendix Tables C-5, and C-6).
Additionally, when investigating the rates of return of the 
successive educational level, it is obvious that they follow an 
analogous —  to the secondary level —  declining trend, but they 
level significantly higher (applicable for both and each of the 
genders separately), pointing at the comparatively high position 
the Greeks put on University education.
If we distinguish by economic sector, ascending patterns on 
the magnitude of the rates of return as one completes more years 
of education are presented for both sectors under consideration 
by gender. This, somehow, contradicts the human capital 
experience, while, in this case, the 1977 figures abide with the 
pattern and there are many insignificant observations.
In detail, as far as the public sector of the Greek economy 
is concerned, it is apparent the ascending, but negative, pattern
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of the returns to primary education until the year 1985, where it 
reverts to positive by 1986 having a zero value and just over 
half per cent in 1987 (see Appendix Tables C-7, C-8, and C-9,
referring to both sexes, males, and females respectively). 
Secondary education yields rates below ten per cent, and here we 
have again the law of the diminishing rates of return through 
time. Post-secondary, non-university education presents poor 
returns of about 4.0 per cent (1986 and 1987), which are slightly 
larger than the respective for secondary education. In the case 
of university education, the diminishing rates of return "law" is 
again evident, suggesting that the importance of this level of 
education in public employment has lessen over time. In detail, 
the sizeable 21.0% of 1975, has stabilised to a modest 5.0% in 
1986-87. Finally, post-graduate studies in the mid-1980s, yield 
just less than one per cent above university education, 
emphasising the relative non-profitability of this level.
In the competitive sector, things are very much the same, in 
both trends and levels of the observed rates of return, with the 
non-competitive sector of the economy. A comparison among the 
returns for males in the two sectors, withholds the screening 
argument and directs towards the proper functioning of the market 
(see Appendix Tables C-10, C-11, and C-12, referring to both
genders, males, and females, respectively).
The Step Specification
Next, we are going to discuss comparison rates of return to 
secondary and higher education —  primary education is not 
available because is acting as the control group —  according to
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the step specification. In is evident from Table 5.4, that a 
variability of patterns exists in this case as well, for both the 
levels and the trends of the rates of return over time.
Table 5.4. Rates of Return to Schooling by Level of Education, 
Both Sexes, Entire Samples, 1975-85 (percent)
Sample Year
Secondary 
(vs. Primary)
Higher 
(vs. Secondary)
lElR 1975 0.1 15.7
NSSG 1977 5.5 5.4
lElR 1981 0.1 11.1
lElR 1985 1.0 8.0
Source: lElR: from Table 4.8 
NSSG: from Table 4.2
Specifically, the returns to secondary, as compared to primary, 
education do not appear to be significantly higher than zero 
throughout the decade into consideration. This is so, but with 
the exception of the 1977 figures which fare to about 5.0 per 
cent when looking at both genders and males, while the rate is 
double than that (10.0%) for females (see Appendix Tables C-13 
and C-14, referring to males, and females, respectively).
Significant changes evolve in the higher versus secondary 
education category of Table 5.4, with respect to the size of the 
statistic, being about 16.0% for 1975, 11.0% for 1981, and
finally around 8.0% for 1985. In this case, the 1977 figure 
differs significantly to the one reported for 1975, suggesting a 
rate of return of about one third of the size of the latter, that 
is, levelling around 5.0%. It is of interest, that for the 1977 
case, there is no significant difference between the rates of the 
two successive educational levels, with the exception of women
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who seem to yield higher returns being educated at the secondary 
rather than the higher level of education (i.e. 9.7% vs. 4.9%,
see Appendix Table C-14). A conclusive note to the above, should 
be the trend on the diminishing importance of higher education 
through time, pointing at the comparative deterioration of this 
level of education at the labour market during the time span into 
consideration.
A further disaggregation of the presentation of these 
comparison rates of return into the competitive and non­
competitive sectors of the economy, which is presented in Table 
5.5, will add more information and sensitivity in their study.
Table 5.5. Rates of Return to Schooling by Level of Education, 
Both Sexes, Public Sector, 1975-87 (percent)
Sample Year
Secondary
vs.
Primary
TEI d/ University Postgraduate 
vs. vs. vs. 
Secondary Secondary University
lEIR 1975 */ • ■ • 16.0 ...
NSSG 1977 4.7 10.2 ...
lEIR 1981 */ 10.9
lEIR 1985 */ ... 7.6
Public Sector a/ 1986 1.1 1.8 3.1 1.1
Public Sector b/ 1987 1.7 2.9 3.9 1.9
Public Sector c/ 1987 2.9 ... 5.0 ...
Source; lEIR: from Table 4.9 
NSSG: from Table 4.2 
Public Sector: from Table 4.10 
Notes: (...) not available
*/ not statistically significant 
a/ Ministry of Finance 
b/ Ministry of Education 
c/ State-controlled Bank (HIDE) 
d/ Non-university, Post-secondary
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Exploring firstly the public sector results of Table 5.5, it is 
of interest to note the changing pattern of the vertical 
relationship of the returns to investment in education at the 
secondary level. There is a declining pattern over time, 
shifting the rate of return from about 5.0 per cent (5.% also in 
the case of males, and 14.0% in the case of females —  see 
Appendix Tables C-15 and C-16 respectively) in 1977, to between 
1.0 and 2.0 per cent in the late 1980s (note that the statistic 
is about 4.0% referring to the male employees of HIDE, appearing 
in Appendix Table C-15).
As also shown in Table 5.5, the TEI (post-secondary, non­
university) rates of return estimates have, once again, delivered 
poor estimates of about 2.0 per cent. The data referring to 
both genders suggest that a TEI graduate enjoys almost twice the 
size of a rate of return compared with the respective for his/her 
colleague with secondary education, but the male and female 
estimates, separately, suggest that one should remain indifferent 
for TEI studies (see Appendix Tables C-15 and C-16).
The story behind the university (versus secondary) rates of 
return estimates, depicts a vertical relationship of rapidly 
diminishing rates, suggesting, once again, overinvestment in this 
level of education. In particular. Table 5.5 demonstrates that 
its size ranges from about 16.0 per cent for 1975, to between 4.0 
and 5.0 per cent for the post-1985 period. Compared to the 
respective secondary education rates, it is evident that 
university studies provide twice the yield, with the exception of 
the 1977 female rate (see Table C-16) . In addition, when 
contrasted to the post-secondary, non-university rates, they also
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appear to be almost double, despite the negligible/short 
difference in the length of study (that is, TEI=3 years, 
University=4+ years).
Rates of return to post-graduate qualifications (Masters and 
Ph.D.) are available for only 1986 and 1987. These rates, which 
also appear in Table 5.5, suggest that post-graduate diplomas 
holders enjoy significantly low yields on their investment, of 
the order of 1.0 to 2.0 per cent or half the size of the 
respective university rates. This is puzzling, given the 
complete lack of such organised programmes in the Greek setting.
Finally, the rate of return analyses for the competitive 
sector, propose that employment in this sector yields higher 
returns on educational investment than the public sector. This 
is so when comparing rates referring to both genders of Tables 
5.6 below and Table 5.5 presented earlier.
Table 5.6, Rates of Return to Schooling by Level of Education, 
Both Sexes, Private Sector, 1975-85 (percent)
Sample Year
Secondary 
(vs. Primary)
Higher 
(vs. Secondary)
lEIR 1975 */ 11.1
NSSG 1977 4.6 12.4
lEIR 1981 */ 11.6
lEIR 1985 */ 7.8
Source: lEIR: from Table 4.9 
NSSG: from Table 4.2 
Note: */ not statistically significant
That is, the rate of return is constantly and significantly 
higher than the respective for secondary —  where applicable —  
and higher education in the private than the public sector
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(horizontal relationship). This is more evident especially when 
the comparison is made between males (see Tables C-15 and C-17). 
Finally, the vertical relationship conforms with the declining 
pattern (diminishing rates of return "law") observed elsewhere.
Chapter 5, p. 217
5.2 SOCIAL RATES OF RETURN
There are various objections —  focusing on a possible 
aggregation bias -- associated with the utilisation of the 
"Short-Cut Method" in deriving social rates of return to 
education, in comparison to the so-called "Elaborate Method" (see 
Section 1.2.3 and Psacharopoulos, 1981). However, it is also 
argued (op. cit.) that this approach is ideally ingenious in 
calculating social rates of return to investment in education, 
initially because it is stemming from the human capital earnings 
function methodology, and secondly due to its simplistic nature 
in that it is requiring only mean earnings by level of education,
as well as the resource cost of schooling.
Specifically, the formula in deriving the social rate of 
return to a particular educational level —  compared with the 
directly preceding one -- is a ratio, involving the gross
earnings difference between the two adjacent educational levels 
in the numerator, whereas the gross earnings of the comparison 
education level prolonged by the resource cost of schooling of 
the desired educational level times their difference in years of 
schooling conforms the denominator (for a detailed description on 
the derivation of this formula see Section 1.2.3). This formula 
can be also interpreted as the yield of a permanent constant
stream of benefits over a lump sum cost of projected earnings 
plus direct outlays. Mean post-tax earnings have been utilised - 
- due to the unavailability of pre-tax earnings —  for its 
calculation, based on the respective samples (see Appendix Table 
C-19) and cost figures have been taken from Table 2.8.
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Despite the methodological drawbacks and objections, the 
short-cut method was considered as the most appropriate approach 
in calculating social rates of return for the Greek setting. The 
previous decision is justified on technical grounds rather than 
methodological considerations, while one should remain more 
sceptical in its utilisation for private rates of return 
estimates (see for example Table 5.7). In detail, it is 
considered that the possibility of an aggregation bias is 
minimal, because the resource cost of schooling will be added in 
the denominator (and this cost is sizeable). In other words, 
neither the implicit permanent benefits assumption, nor the 
lumping together costs are critical for the calculation, since 
the latter occur within a limited number of years and the former 
extend over several decades. Also, given the purposes of the 
study, it has not been possible for the resource cost of 
education to be compiled and refined according to what the theory 
would expect, but it was taken from official Ministry of 
Education estimates. Finally, the purpose is to detect trends 
over time rather than absolute levels of the statistic, although 
within year comparisons among the various educational levels 
would point on economic efficiency considerations of the 
educational system and determine, to a degree, investment 
priorities.
Having commented the above, it is now time to present the 
estimates of social rates of return to higher education for the 
Greek setting. Table 5.7 demonstrates the familiar, from the 
private rates of return estimates, diminishing pattern of the 
statistic during the 27-year period under consideration.
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Table 5.7. Approximate Social and Private Rates of Return to 
Investment in Higher Education, 1960-1987 */
Year
Social Rate of 
Return 
(%)
Private Rate of 
Return 
(%)
1960/64 13.7 20.7
1975 20.3 25.2
1977 4.5 5.9
1981 12.2 15.5
1985 7.9 9.6
1987 University 2.6 3.6
Non-univ./post-sec. 0.6 0.8
Post-graduate 3.2 a/ 
4.1 b/
5.4
Source; Unless otherwise stated based on mean earnings from 
Appendix Table C-19; cost figures from Table 2.8 
1960/64 (Social): Psacharopoulos, 1982a, Table 8, p.341 
Note: 1987 estimates refer to the Ministry of Education data 
1960/64 rates refer to the private sector 
*/ based on the "short-cut" estimation method 
a/ estimate assuming one year direct private cost abroad 
b/ based on the social domestic cost for higher education
Inconsistencies on the level of the statistic during the years 
are mainly due to sample differences (that is why, for example, 
the statistic appears to be 20% for 1975 and just 5% for 1977) . 
Given that three of the data sets are homogeneous, referring to 
the years 1975, 1981 and 1985, the previously mentioned declining 
pattern becomes clear. Thus, whilst investing in university 
education has been a highly profitable investment to the society 
during the 1960s, yielding around 14.0 per cent, a sudden drop by 
more than three times is observed for the mid-1970s. Likewise, a 
sharp decline of the social profitability level is also apparent 
during the decade 1975-1985. The statistic escalated from 20.3%
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to about 12.2% in 1981, and has finally dropped to almost 7.9% in 
1985. Moreover, the most recent data suggest an altogether poor 
social rate of return to higher education. University education 
yields some 2.6 per cent, while post-graduate studies appear to 
be relatively more profitable to the society, yielding 3.2 per 
cent. It is of interest to add here, that post-graduate studies 
are contrasted to first university degrees, as well as that the 
resource cost taken in the estimation has been the significantly 
high cost of studying abroad borne by the individual and not by 
the society (see Table 2.8). This is so, because there are no 
organised studies at this level in Greece yet and those willing 
to further their education have to study at foreign universities 
(for a comprehensive presentation on the issue of foreign study 
see Chapter 7). In addition, the social rate of return to post­
graduate studies has also been calculated based on the hypothesis 
that such programmes were offered by the Greek universities. 
Therefore, the social cost underlying in such a hypothesis, has 
been taken to be the domestic one for higher education as a 
whole. The result pointed to a significantly higher —  by almost 
60% —  social rate of return, that is, 4.1 per cent, compared 
with the one referring to first degree university studies.
It is also noteworthy the negligible size of the social 
yield on investment at the 3-year duration TEI institutes (post­
secondary, but non-university status), being almost zero. This 
statistic, that is, 0.6 per cent, is conveying considerable 
policy implication messages and adds further to the recent debate 
on the status of these institutions.
If one wants to compare these approximate social rates of
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return to the respective private ones it would be possible to 
assess whether educational investments differ in profitability 
when considered from those two distinct angles, that is the 
individual and the societal. In order to do that, private rates 
of return have been recalculated based on the "short-cut" method 
as well. The reason for calculating additional private rates of 
return has been to overcome the previously mentioned possible 
aggregation biases among the various estimation methods. The 
results, appearing in Table 5.7, show that both rates of return 
series portray an analogous declining pattern. Private rates of 
return to university education are consistently and considerably 
higher than the social rates throughout the time span under 
consideration. This is clearly demonstrated in Table 5.8, where 
the comparative advantage of the private over the social rates of 
return, or the so-called public subsidisation of education, 
varies between 20% and 50%. The reason for the above observed 
excess is that education is publicly subsidised. The Greek 
pattern of the level of public subsidisation of higher education 
compares favourably with the respective referring to the average 
of a set of advanced countries, amounting to 44%, while it is 
surpassing considerably the 7% figure referring to intermediate 
countries (Psacharopoulos, 1985, Table 2) . In addition, the 69 
per cent degree of subsidisation for post-graduate degrees in 
1987 is, somehow, misleading because the cost of these studies 
refers to the individual and not the society. Had there been 
such studies in Greece, the index would have dropped to 32 per 
cent, leaving 37 per cent direct private contribution.
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Table 5.8. The Index of Public Subsidisation of Higher
Education, 1960-1987
Year
Private over Social 
Rate of Return Advantage 
(%)
1960/64 50.9
1975 24.1
1977 31.1
1981 27.0
1985 21.5
1987 University 38.5
Non-univ./post-sec. 33.3
Post-graduate 68.8 a/
31.7 b/
Source; Based on Table 5.7
Note; 1987 estimates refer to the Ministry of Education data
a/ estimate assuming one year direct private cost abroad 
b/ based on the social domestic cost for higher education
Finally, and further to the above, it seems that the 1987 
figure for post-graduate degrees, not only in absolute but also 
in relative terms, that is, in both within and across series 
comparisons, is consistently higher than the respective ones for 
university and non-university, post-secondary studies. That is, 
in both instances —  when either privately or socially considered 
—  the comparative investment advantage lies with the post­
graduate degree holders. Thus, in order of importance the 
pattern seems to be Post-graduate>University>TEI or 3.2>2.6>0.6. 
This is also applicable in the case where the figure under 
consideration is the one based on the domestic rather than the 
foreign cost for higher post-graduate education studies.
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5.3 DISCUSSION
A major question posed after the assessment of the profitability 
of the educational investment is whether the observed rates of 
return to schooling are similar and comparable to that on equally 
risky physical capital and the market interest rate. This is a 
point which enables to assess whether the returns are on the low 
or the high side. Whether the returns to education are much 
above or much below the reference rates, is a matter of testing 
the "validity", in a sense, of the human capital model in 
explaining various aspects of schooling. Though, one should 
remain sceptical, given the above, and pay extra attention to 
the fact that the rate of return to education is a relative 
concept. A rough comparison between the returns to human and 
physical capital appears in Table 5.9, suggesting two distinct 
paths, if differently considered.
Table 5.9. Returns to Human and Physical Capital, 1960-1985 (%)
Year
Human-1
Physical
Human-2
Overall
(Mincerian)
Higher
Education
1960 9.2 > 5.0 < 15.0
1964 8.6 > 5.0 < 14.4
1975 4.8 < 9.0 < 15.1
1977 6.8 < 7.5 < 10.5
1981 4.9 < 14.0 >= 13.7
1985 3.9 < 15.5 > 10.2
Source: Physical: Bank of Greece, 1986, Table 29 
Human-1: Appendix Table C-3 
Human-2: Appendix Table C-17
1960 and 1964: from Psacharopoulos, 1982a, p.340 
Notes: Returns to physical capital refer to the upper bound 
of interest rates on bank deposits (savings) with 
commercial banks (in drachmas)
Returns to human capital refer to males in the private 
sector
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Specifically, according to Table 5.9, if the overall rate of 
return to a typical year of schooling is considered, then the 
advantage during the 1960s lies with human capital, while since 
the mid-1970s the pattern is reversed. Though, if the returns to 
higher education are considered instead, it becomes obvious that 
human capital maintains an advantageous position throughout the 
two decades 1960-1981 —  following a diminishing manner —  and it 
is only after 1981 that started losing some ground.
Summarising, it could be argued that human capital as a 
whole suggests a very poor investment, whereas if the educational 
level is specified in the form of higher education conforms a 
competent investment and worthwhile activity and the returns are 
mostly on the "high” side. Furthermore, the post-1981 experience 
could be indicative of some form of development, given that 
international experience suggests that human capital is more 
profitable in developing countries, i.e. 15% versus 13%, while in 
advanced countries the gap is narrower, i.e. 9% versus 11%, for 
the 1970s respectively (see Table 8, Psacharopoulos, 1985).
So far, various aspects of the Greek context have been 
expounded and it is after the calculation of the yield on 
educational investment that will allow to be considered in a 
coherent manner. At first, we will attempt to summarise the 
rates of return results, we have presented in Sections 5.1 and 
5.2, over time.
Tables 5.10 and 5.11 endeavour to summarise the rate of 
return results over time by gender and sector of employment, 
referring to the rate of return to an extra year of schooling, 
and higher education, respectively.
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Table 5.10. Mincer-Type Returns to Education by Gender and Sector 
of Employment, 1975-1987 (percent)
Men Women
Year
All
Sectors
Private
Sector
Public
Sector
All
Sectors
Private
Sector
Public
Sector
1975 a/ 6.2 4.8 6.4 5.4 */ 6.2
1977 b/ 4.8 6.8 7.3 6.8 7.4 8.6
1981 a/ 4.3 4.9 4.0 3.8 */ 4.7
1985 a/ 3.7 3.9 3.3 3.0 */ 3.6
1987 c/ ... ... 2.6 ... ... 2.9
1987 d/ ... 4.3 ... 2.8
Source: All Sectors: Appendix Tables C-1 and, C-2
Private - Public Sector: Appendix Tables C-3 and, C-4 
Note: V  statistically insignificant 
a/ lEIR Sample 
b/ NSSG Sample
c/ Public Sector Sample: Ministry of Education 
d/ Public Sector Sample: State-controlled Bank (HIDE)
The underlying reason for such a refinement is twofold. 
Initially, it is well known that, for a variety of reasons, women 
in all countries earn on average less —  and in most cases 
substantially less —  than men. This does not automatically 
imply lower rates than those of men as it will be shown below, 
given that the rate of return is a relative concept and not a 
measure of underpayment. Secondly, rate-of-return estimates in 
recent years are increasingly based on the earnings of those 
employed in the competitive sector of the economy where the 
benefits of education better reflect the worker's productivity.
To elaborate on the former remark, both Tables 5.10 and 5.11 
are utilised. They indicate that regardless of economic sector 
considered it should not be surprising that the profitability of
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Table 5.11. The 
of :
Returns to 
Employment,
Higher Education by 
1975-1987 (percent)
Gender and Sector
Men Women
Year
All
Sectors
Private
Sector
Public
Sector
All
Sectors
Private
Sector
Public
Sector
1975 a/ 16.2 15.1 15.9 14.9 */ 15.9
1977 W 4.9 10.5 9.8 4.9 10.1 7.7
1981 a/ 11.6 13.7 10.7 10.4 */ 11.1
1985 a/ 8.3 10.2 7.4 7.5 */ 7.7
1987 c/ ... ... 3.4 ... ... 3.5
1987 d/ ... ... 4.8 ... ... 4.0
Source: All Sectors: Appendix Tables C-13 and, C-14
Private Sector: Appendix Tables C-17 and, C-18 
Public Sector: Appendix Tables C-15 and, C-16 
Note: */ statistically insignificant 
a/ lEIR Sample 
b/ NSSG Sample
c/ Public Sector Sample: Ministry of Education 
d/ Public Sector Sample: State-controlled Bank (HIDE)
investment in women's education is occasionally greater than that 
of men. On the contrary, this rate-of-return differential in 
favour of women may be an underestimate, because the rate of 
return to investment in women's education, as commonly 
calculated, does not take into account the increased probability 
of more educated women participating in the labour force. For 
example, according to the most recent data (NSSG, 1985) the 
labour force participation of working-age women aged over 14 
ranged from 22 per cent for those who had no schooling and 
attended at least one grade at the primary school, to 36 per cent 
for those who had primary education, and, to an impressive 78 per 
cent for those with a university education. For contrasting
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purposes, the participation rates for men were, 42%, 77% and 88% 
respectively. This is a valid point on which the decision to 
rely mostly on males' rates-of-return estimates in deriving 
conclusions and policy implications is justified.
According to Table 5.11, the private rate of return to 
higher education in 1975 was of the order of 15 per cent, and 
there was not much difference between the public and the private 
sectors of the economy. One could interpret such finding that, 
under a conservative Government, the labour market was more or 
less in equilibrium in the sense that the two sectors offered 
competing premiums to university graduates. Yet, by 1985, the 
earnings premium of those employed in the public sector had 
eroded, an obvious reflection of the pay equalisation policy of 
the socialist Government. Those employed in the private sector 
continued to enjoy a 3 percentage points premium relative to 
those in the public sector. It becomes obvious therefore, that 
if relied on the returns to education based on data referring in 
all sectors, the outcome might have been an underestimate (for an 
international perspective see Appendix Table C-20). This is 
mostly because the inclusion of public sector earnings and the 
equalisation policy of pay scales are, mainly, responsible in 
flattening mean earnings differentials, which, by extension, 
depress the returns to education. In addition, such a finding 
lends no support to the so-called screening or certification 
hypothesis (see also Section 6.1).
Beyond such private-public sector comparisons, the rate of 
return to investment in higher education has fallen in the 1975 
to 1985 period. As evidenced by both Tables 5.10 and 5.11, the
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fall has been spectacular during the period under consideration, 
mostly for the overall statistic and that which refers to higher 
education. The decline, though, has been more impressive and 
faster in the non-competitive sector than the competitive sector 
of the economy.
One should also consider two alternative rationalisations in 
relation to the rate of return concept. The first being the 
relationship between the rate of return and the level of economic 
development and the second the association of the statistic with 
the evolution in educational expansion. Table 5.12 depicts an 
inverse relationship between the overall rate-of-return to 
investment in education against the level of economic development 
of the country, as this is expressed in terms of GNP per capita.
Table 5.12. Overall Rates of Return and Per Capita Income, 
1960-1985
Year
GNP per capita 
(current US $)
Overall (Mincerian) 
Rate of Return 
(%)
1960 471 9.2 */
1964 619 8.6 V
1975 2,318 6.2
1977 2,810 4.8
1981 3,774 4.3
1985 3,294 3.7
Source: OECD, National Accounts of Greece, respective years 
Mincerian: Appendix Tables C-1 and C-3
1960 & 1964 from Psacharopoulos, 1982a, p. 340 
Notes: Returns refer to males, entire samples 
*/ refer to the private sector
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This negative relationship seems to be very strong from 1960 till 
1981, while it is immediately apparent that there is a 
discontinuity in the post-1981 period. In particular, although 
the per capita income appears to follow a reversible pattern in 
1985 the overall yield on the educational investment continued to 
drop further rather than increase or remain stagnant. The 
observed pattern, appearing in Table 5.12, of the declining 
returns to education by increasing level of economic development 
is consistent with what the theory expects, namely diminishing 
marginal returns to investment in human capital.
Secondly, one should seriously consider the case of the 
rapid educational expansion, which took place in the last decades 
in Greece and, the evolution of the rates-of-return to investment 
in education. This could be explored in two ways. Initially, by 
considering relative enrolments and, secondly through the 
development of the educational level of the population and the 
labour force. Table 5.13 suggests that there is indeed a polar 
relationship between the evolution of relative enrolments and the 
rate-of-return to investment in higher education, being either 
privately or socially taken. Relative enrolments in Table 5.13 
are expressed as the ratio of the total higher education over 
secondary education enrolment and, are taken as such because the 
rate-of-return itself is a relative concept as well. The 
comparative stability of the relative enrolments during the 1975- 
1981 period is also reflecting the returns for the same period, 
which fluctuated between 15 and 14 per cent, conforming also with 
the 1960s trends where enrolments were substantially less. The 
sound increase in relative enrolments for the mid-1980s, as well
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as, the accumulated fluctuations of the 1970s resulted to the 
decline of the higher education profitability yield. The same 
applies to the social rate of return, as this is studied relative 
to the index of public subsidisation, where it becomes obvious 
that the higher the rhythm of the evolution in enrolments, the 
less the degree of subsidy. Had the returns considered been the 
overall ones, rather than for higher education, the pattern would 
have been a clearly diminishing one.
Table 5.13. Rates of Return, the Index of Public Subsidisation
of Higher Education and Relative Enrolments, 1960-1985
Year
Private 
Rate of Return 
to Higher 
Education 
(%)
Index 
of Public 
Subsidisation 
of Higher 
Education
Enrolment 
in Higher 
relative to 
Secondary 
Level
1960 15.0 50.9 0.10
1964 14.4 50.9 0.15
1975 15.1 24.1 0.17
1977 10.5 31.1 0.18
1981 13.7 27.0 0.17
1985 10.2 21.5 0.22
Source: Private Rate of Return: Appendix Table C-17 
Public Subsidisation Index: Table 5.8 
1960 & 1964: from Psacharopoulos, 1982a, p. 340 
Relative Enrolment: NSSG, "Education Statistics" 
Notes: Returns to higher education refer to males in the 
private sector
At this point, the case of the ex ante versus the ex post 
rates of return should be also considered. The significance of 
this comparison lies in the study as to where these two distinct 
angle rates have evolved following a similar pattern over time
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and to what degree their levels are differing. There have been 
studies where expected rates of return to investment in education 
were calculated (see for example Psacharopoulos and Soumelis, 
1979 and, Papas and Psacharopoulos, 1987). Secondary school 
seniors have been asked to indicate their expected salaries if 
they remained with a secondary school degree, and if they had a 
university degree. Availability of these two types of 
information permits the estimation of an expected or, ex ante, 
rate of return to investment in university education. Table 5.14 
shows that the expected rate of return, as perceived by the 
students, is sizeable.
Table 5.14. ExDected Rates of Return 
Greece, 1974 and 1986
to Higher Education in
Year Institution/Gender
Expected 
Rate of Return 
(%)
1974
Non-Univ. Post-Secondary 
Non-selective University 
Selective University
20.0
28.0
44.0
29.4
1986
Males
Females
18.3
8.4
14.8
Source: 1974: from Psacharopoulos and Soumelis, 1979, p. 170
1986: from Papas and Psacharopoulos, 1987, p. 492
In detail. Table 5.14 shows that the expected rate of return to 
higher education for 1974 was 29.4% while the respective actual 
(ex post) for 1975 appears to be half the size, i.e. 15.7% (see 
Table 5.4). Similarly, the expected higher education yield for
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1986 appears to be 14.8% against 8.0% for 1985 (see Table 5.4) 
and 3.9% to 5.0% for 1987 (see Table 5.5), the latter referring 
to the public sector. Moreover, analogous discrepancies are 
observed when disaggregating for gender and when referring 
especially to males, while females seem to be more realistic as 
far as their labour market expectations are concerned. Thus, one 
could argue that it is exactly this rate of return that drives 
behaviour towards higher education, not the actual, ex post, rate 
of return. Again, consistent with the market forces discussed 
earlier, the expected rates of return have fallen significantly 
between 1974 and 1986, as a result of the squeeze of the wage 
differential cited earlier (see also Section 3.3).
Although international comparisons, in general, do not enjoy 
much credence in the literature, a selected citation of rates of 
return to schooling, in general, and higher education, in 
particular, will be given, so as to assess, relatively speaking, 
Greece's standing according to patterns observed internationally. 
Appendix Tables C-21 and C-22, present rates of return to 
educational investment for a set of selected countries —  mostly 
European —  borrowed from Psacharopoulos (1981 and, 1985). These 
countries are mostly European, and Hong Kong, Iran and Malaysia 
were included because of the significant number of higher 
education students studying abroad.
In detail, the Mincerian rate-of-return comparison (Appendix 
Table C-21) suggests that the yield on educational investment in 
Greece fares quite low as compared to above set of selected 
countries. However, when comparing the private returns to higher 
education, Greece appears to hold a competent position among the
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majority of the developed countries until 1985, while the higher 
educational investment levels low when the developing countries 
of Appendix Table C-22 are considered. A similar pattern is 
implicit from the social rate of return side.
Finally, the case of the social dimension of the returns to 
education is considered, in the form of the public subsidisation 
of higher education, as this was presented in Table 5.8 and 
Table 5.13 above. The advantage of the private over the social 
rate of return (or subsidisation index) has been following a 
declining pattern during the period 1960-1985, relatively 
speaking. This is justified on the basis of the previous 
argumentative rationalisation with respect to the private rate of 
return, which is applicable in this case as well. Social rates 
of return, in general, follow a similar declining path and, they
are consistently lower than the respective private ones (for an
international documentation see Appendix Table C-22) alongside 
with the evolution of the level of economic development and, the 
apparent educational expansion.
In detail, the only discrepancy appears in the latest year 
available, namely 1987, referring to analyses of public sector 
data. All post-secondary education levels considered, presume 
higher degrees of State subsidy than the observed for 1981 and 
1985, the highest being for post-graduate studies. This, in 
turn, suggests that that there exists room for private finance at 
the higher education level. To put it in Psacharopoulos* (1981, 
p. 333) words, "a shift of part of the cost burden from the state
to the individual and his family is not likely to lead to a
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disincentive of investing in higher education given the present 
high private profitability margin”.
5.4 SUMMARY
To this point, a wide variety/selection of rates of return 
estimates have been presented. These rates refer to both the 
individual and the society and, distinguish educational level, 
gender, and contol for the competitive and the non-competitive 
sectors of the economy. Also, given that the rate of return is a 
relative concept, various judgements on the economic efficiency 
of education should be based mostly on its ratios rather than its 
levels, being either private or social, with the exception of 
within year comparisons.
Table 5.15 attempts a grand summary of the rate of return 
results, presented in this Chapter, over time, that is, 1960 to 
1987, in juxtaposition with the changes of the educational 
composition of the population and the labour force. The rates 
presented distinguish for the competitive and the non-competitive 
sectors and refer to males for all the reasons expounded above 
(see Section 5.3). A graphic presentation of the data in 
question proves to be very illuminating. That is. Figures 5.1 
and 5.2 depict the shifts of the (reduced form) intersections of 
the implied supply and demand curves for educated labour. 
Whether the pattern refers to the labour force as a whole, or to 
those in the labour force with higher education, the trend is 
clearly downward. Thus, the message is clear; as educational 
intensity increases, the relative "price” of education (as 
measured by the rate of return) falls, a fact which is also
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Table 5.15. Educational Expansion and the Returns to Education in
Greece, 1960-1987
Private Rate of Return to Education (%)
Mean Years 
of Schooling
Percentage with 
Higher Education
Overall
(Mincerian)
Higher
Education
Index of 
Public 
Subsidisation
Year Labour 
Population Force
Labour 
Population Force
Private
Sector
Public
Sector
Private
Sector
Public
Sector
of Higher 
Education
1960 4.9 3.1 1.7 2.7 9.2 ■ ■ ■ 15.0 ... 50.9
1964 5.2 3.5 2.1 3.4 8.6 ... 14.4 ... 50.9
1975 6.2 5.8 4.1 7.4 4.8 6.4 15.1 15.9 24.1
1977 6.4 6.5 4.6 8.6 6.8 7.3 10.5 9.8 31.1
1981 6.9 7.9 5.9 10.9 4.9 4.0 13.7 10.7 27.0
1985 7.4 9.3 7.1 13.2 3.9 3.3 10.2 7.4 21.5
1987 7.7 10.0 7.7 14.4 2.6 ... 3.4 38.5
Source; Educational attainment of the population or the labour fore 
extrapolations and interpolations based on the NSSG 
Population Censuses of 1961, 1971 and 1981 
Rates of return: Appendix Tables C-3, C-15, and C-17 
Public Subsidisation Index: Table 5.8 
Note: Rates of return refer to males; (...) not applicable
1987 estimates refer to the Ministry of Education data
consistent with theory. This declining trend has been faster in 
the Greek case as compared to, say, the United States where the 
"resistance" of the returns, in spite of the rapid higher 
education expansion experienced during the 1960s, has proved to 
be more resilient (see Appendix Table C-22) . To put it in 
Welch's (1970, p. 36) terms, the failure of the rate of return to 
higher education in the USA to decline is due to "changes" that 
have taken place and which "have resulted in growth in demand for 
the investment good, education, sufficient to absorb the 
increased supply with constant or rising returns".
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Figure 5.1 
Educational Attainment of the Labour 
Force and the Overall Rate of Return
Rate of return (%)
10i
Public sector
Private sector
Mean years of schooling -  Labour force
Figure 5.2 
Higher Education Expansion and the 
Rate of Return to Higher Education
Rate of return to higher education (%)
18 -1 
16 - Private sector
14 -
12 - 
10 -
Public sector
2.5 3.5 4.5 5.5 6.5 7.5 8.5 9.5 10.5 11.5 12.5 13.5 14.5 15.5
Labour force w ith  higher education (%)
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In the Greek case though, demand for university graduates 
has not kept up with the increased supply documented earlier (see
Section 2.2.5). Hence, the returns to higher education have
fallen, regardless of the sector of employment. he
socialist Government alone cannot be blamed for the erosion of 
the earnings differential of higher education graduates (as 
argued in Section 3.2.2); market forces have been operating as 
well. To put it in yet differently (Tinbergen * s, 1975) terms,
education has lost in its race against technology —  the supply 
curve has shifted faster to the right relative to the demand 
curve for educated labour (for an elaboration see Figure 5.2).
In addition. Table 5.16, using data exclusively from the
public sector, shows a further deterioration of the returns to 
education in 1986 and 1987.
Table 5.16. Rates of Return to Schooling in Greece, Public Sector, 
1986-1987 (percent)
Year Mincerian
By Level of Education
(Overall) Secon­
dary
Non-Univ
Post-Sec
Higher Post-
Graduate
1986 a/ 2.3 1.1 1.8 3.1 1.1
1987 W 3.1 1.7 2.9 3.9 1.9
1987 c/ 4.0 2.9 ... 5.0 ...
Source; Based on Tables 5.2 and 5.5 
Note: Rates of return refer to both sexes 
(...) not available 
a/ Ministry of Finance 
b/ Ministry of Education 
c/ State-controlled bank, HIDE
According to the Mincerian estimate, the overall private rate of
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return to investment in education for those employed by the 
public sector is of the order of two to four per cent. 
Possession of a university first degree is associated with the 
highest rate of return, ranging from three to five per cent.
The public sector data also allow for a distinction between 
additional levels of education (see Table 5.16). They indicate 
that post-secondary, non-university education (the 3-year 
Technological Institutes) are associated with returns below two 
per cent. This significantly low yield points towards the 
economic inefficiency of such establishments and overturns the 
common belief that the strict vocational element in higher 
education programmes is conducive to economic development. It is 
suggested, therefore, that university graduates fit and are 
absorbed better by the Greek labour market. Moderate returns are 
also shown for those who are holders of post-graduate degrees, 
which appear to hold the last place, profitability-wise, among 
the rest of higher education levels. This identification is 
conflicting with the order of the respective approximate private 
rates of return of Table 5.7, where opposite conclusions were 
reached. It is reminded though, that the returns appearing in 
Table 5.16 may be an underestimate of the true ones, based on the 
argument discussed earlier.
It could be argued, then, that investment in human capital 
as a whole, with reference to education, suggests a very poor 
investment in Greece. Investment in higher education represents 
only a slightly more profitable activity, but one that has 
experienced a significant decline in its effectiveness over the 
years. The effect this decline has had on the demand for study
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abroad will be discussed in Chapter 7. We now move to a test of 
the educational screening hypothesis and an application of the 
earnings function method to evaluate teachers' pay in Greece.
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CHAPTER 6
FURTHER APPLICATIONS OF THE EARNINGS FUNCTIONS
In this Chapter we are going to consider two issues with 
particular importance in educational planning. In detail, in 
Section 6.1 we are going to test the empirical status of human 
capital theory, as thisiîchallenged by the Screening Hypothesis 
(see Section 1.1.1), so as to justify whether our rate of return 
findings —  of Chapter 5 —  fall within the human capital "laws" 
or are an outcome of certification. In Section 6.2 we are going 
to evaluate the pay standing of teachers in Greece against other 
employees with the same human capital characteristics, so as to 
assess whether scarce resources to education are allocated 
efficiently. Both issues are going to be tested as a direct 
application of the earnings functions in the field of the 
economics of education.
Therefore, given the importance of these estimates in 
forming public policy we should then ask: Could the observed
positive correlation between education and earnings be attributed 
to screening or certification? What does human capital tell us 
about the pay position of teachers in the Greek labour market? 
Consequently, are the scarce educational resources allocated 
efficiently?
6.1 TESTING THE SCREENING HYPOTHESIS
As we have already argued in Section 1.1.1 the screening 
hypothesis challenges directly human capital theory by suggesting
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that education primarily serves to screen individuals as opposed 
to enhancing their productivity. It is well known that the 
reason for testing such a proposition is to assess whether 
educational investments fall within the interests of the society 
rather than the individual. Any individual decision, in general, 
and whether to undertake further education, in particular, is 
based on a series of complex evaluations made by the individual 
which could be either economic or of some other kind. 
Consequently, what matters most to the individual in aiding 
his/her decision is the available information. If the signals 
he/she receives from the labour market are towards the 
additional certification argument (in the form of better pay) 
indisputably this will be a "push factor" in encouraging him/her 
to demand additional studies. The scene is completely opposite 
and much more serious from the societal angle. Scarce societal 
funds towards educational investments should be placed to 
increase the efficiency and equity of the educational mechanism 
rather than to be wasted as a simple certification —  that is, 
workers who are non-diploma holders will be actually rejected 
from jobs they could perform and they were competent to perform. 
The benefits of such a mismanagement would be exclusively for 
the individual and consequently the firm(s) he/she is going to 
be employed. Therefore, the value of such information on 
educational policy and planning is apparent.
6.1.1 Methodology
A number of empirical studies, designed to test the validity of 
the screening hypothesis have employed alternative data sets and
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techniques, suggesting no clear consensus on the matter by 
reporting contradictory results. To name but a few, the 
alternative methodologies "range from (a) comparisons of the 
rate of return to schooling between the competitive versus the 
non-competitive sectors of the economy (Psacharopoulos, 1979 & 
1983a; Lee, 1980; Shah, 1985; Cohn et al., 1986; Tucker, 1986),
(b) comparisons between those in dependent employment and the 
self-employed in terms of years of schooling (Riley, 1979; Katz 
and Ziderman, 1980; Cohn et al., 1986), (c) decomposition of
earnings (Tucker, 1985), (d) the effect of tenure (Liu and Wong, 
1982)" (Arabsheibani, 1989, p. 361), (e) analysis of the
relationship between the returns to schooling and job information 
(Albrecht, 1981; Cohn et al., 1986) and (f) comparisons between 
the salaries of workers in occupations relevant to their 
educational qualification to those with the same qualification 
working in jobs not directly related to their qualification
(Wiles, 1974; Miller and Volker, 1983; Arabsheibani, 1989).
Such an argument has not been tested for the Greek context 
since 1983. Psacharopoulos (1983a) experimented with the 1977 
NSSG data (for a description see Section 4.1.2.1) and fitted 
earnings functions separately for the competitive and the non­
competitive sectors of the Greek economy (see Psacharopoulos, 
1983a, Table C.2, p. 130).
Given the availability of more recent data, we are going to 
assess whether screening exists or not in the Greek labour 
market. In detail, we will utilise the lEIR data, described in 
Section 4.1.2.2 earlier in the thesis, referring to two post-1980 
periods, namely 1981 and 1985. Prior to any empirical analysis
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one should expect that a certain degree of screening should 
exist in the Greek labour market, especially in its weak form, 
given its structure and functioning (see Section 3.1 and, 
Psacharopoulos, 1983b and Tzannatos, 1987). It is also 
informally known that the recruitment policies of the employers 
in Greece are not so sophisticated and modernised, as compared to 
the industrialised countries.
A usual confusion among screenists is whether education has 
a sorting function. This is not the point; education must play a 
sorting role. However, the focus should be on whether education 
serves merely and solely as a screening device (for a discussion 
see Machulp, 1984).
In the analysis that follows the data we utilise do not make 
possible the separation of the sorting effect from the 
productivity-enhancing effect. What could be done instead is to 
test the proposition that education has only a sorting function, 
using a set of specific hypotheses suggested by previous research 
methodologies and especially the one on the weak versus the 
strong versions of the screening hypothesis implicit in 
Psacharopoulos*s (1979) analysis.
Psacharopoulos (op. cit.) investigates the existence of 
screening by advancing the proposition that screening is more 
likely to be found in the non-competitive sectors of the economy, 
where wage scales are often determined by the bureaucracy and 
linked to education, and where productivity would be more 
difficult to ascertain. If this is true, then the returns to 
schooling should be higher in the non-competitive sector than in
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the competitive sector.
In other words we should be indifferent to what is defined 
as "weak” screening, which acknowledges that employers use 
educational credentials to determine starting salaries, because 
in most instances this is a common practice. The point which we 
must test is if earnings at later years are determined indeed by 
productivity. In other words whether the earnings-age profiles by 
level of education continue to diverge rather than converge. This 
is the so-called "strong” screening hypothesis which asserts that 
if the profiles converge, education has only an informational 
value, so that earnings differentials by years of schooling must 
be attributed to screening. Since employers acquire information 
about workers' abilities over time, it would appear that earnings 
differentials by years of schooling should gradually diminish and 
ultimately disappear. In testing such an argument, the null 
hypothesis should be that the returns to education do not vary 
with the degree of competitiveness, while the alternative 
hypothesis states that the returns to education decrease with the 
degree of competition in the sector where people work. The 
methodology is based on the traditional human capital regression 
model (see Section 1.2.2) and the results appear in Table 6.1.
6.1.2____ Findings
In order to test the null hypothesis presented above we will look 
at the schooling coefficients of the fitted earnings functions 
among male employees of the lEIR data set by economic sector for 
the years 1981 and 1985. Table 6.1 shows, that the schooling 
coefficient or the rate of return to an additional year of 
schooling is highly significant and consistently higher for the
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private (competitive) than the public (non-competitive sector) 
sector of the Greek economy for both years (i.e. 1981 and 1985).
Table 6.1. Earnings Functions by Economic Sector, Males: 
lEIR Sample, 1981 and 1985
Independent Variables
Economic
Sector/Year N Constant
Schooling
(S)
Experience
(EX)
Adjusted 
EX^ IT
1981 b/
Public
Private
240
116
9.586
9.540
0.040*
0.049*
0.053* 
0.038** -
0.0006 53.78 
0.0006 29.94
1985 b/
Public
Private
256
124
10.571
10.403
0.033*
0.039*
0.045*
0.049*
0.0006** 60.92 
0.0009 33.15
Source; Appendix Table B-11
Notes; Public sector: employees in public administration, 
the social services, state-controlled Banks and 
parastatal firms 
Private sector: employees in manufacturing 
Dependent variable: natural logarithm of monthly earnings 
*/ and **/ denote statistical significance at the 1% and 
5% level respectively
In detail, the average rate of return in the private sector was 
found to be 0.049 (or 4.9%), while the respective statistic for 
the public sector was 0.040 (or 4.0%) for 1981. Similarly, the 
1985 data suggested a rate of return of 3.9% in the private 
sector as opposed to 3.3% in the public sector. In addition, for 
1977, the overall return to schooling did present an advantage in 
the private sector as compared to the public sector of the 
economy, i.e. 7.0% vs. 6.2% respectively (Psacharopoulos, 1983a, 
Table C.2, p.130).
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In summary, the eighties data suggests clearly a consistent 
anti-screening pattern meaning that the market forces work quite 
well in the small open economy of Greece. The same conclusion 
was also reached by Psacharopoulos (1979) for the U.K.. The fact 
that the schooling coefficient (or the overall rate of return to 
an extra year of schooling) has fallen to a lesser extent in the 
private than the public sector, also means that competitive 
employers value indeed the productivity enhancing nature of 
education and are willing to pay an extra premium to the more 
educated workers. In contrast, the public sector has experienced 
a more rapid decrease in the overall rate of return suggesting 
the indifference of this sector towards productivity. This was 
expected especially after the post-1982 egalitarian incomes 
policy for the public sector in the form of the introduction of 
the so-called "Integrated Payroll" (for a review see Section 
3.2.2) .
In addition and as an alternative test to the previous one 
towards the "strong" screening hypothesis is to compute and 
compare what Psacharopoulos (op. cit.) calls "mid-to-early career 
earnings ratios" by level of education and by economic sector. 
Results of the calculated middle career to early career earnings 
ratios for the lEIR Greek data referring to 1981 and 1985 appear 
in Table 6.2. There are two different noteworthy patterns 
elaborated in the following Table 6.2. First, it is found that - 
- although ascending —  there is no clear pattern regarding the 
mid-to-early career earnings ratios in the public sector of the 
economy as one completes more years of schooling (vertical 
relationship). In detail. Table 6.2 shows that the pattern was
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1. 713<1. 842>1. 750 for 1981, and 1. 578<1. 6101. 588 for 1985, 
referring to primary, secondary and, tertiary education.
Table 6.2. Mid-to-early Career Earnings Ratios by Level of
Education and Economic Sector, Males: lEZR Sample, 
1981 and 1985
Educational
Level
1981 1985
Public
Sector
Private
Sector
Public
Sector
Private
Sector
Primary 1.713 1.283 1.578 1.340
Secondary 1.842 1.406 1.610 1.329
Tertiary 1.750 1.618 1.588 1.444
Source; Based on the lEIR data set, see Section 4.1.2.2 
Notes: mid-to-early career correspond to groups with 0-6 and 
11-20 years of experience respectively
Contrary, the ascending pattern of these ratios is more elaborate 
when considering the private sector for both years (that is 
1.283<1.406<1.618 for 1981 and, 1.340<=1.329<1.444 for 1985). 
Regarding the horizontal relationship of the initial-to-mid 
career earnings ratios (that is, by economic sector and level of 
education) though, it is found from Table 6.2 —  common to both 
1981 and 1985 —  that the differential earnings growth is more 
pronounced in the non-competitive sector of the economy 
suggesting the existence of screening. This is justified on the 
grounds that it is the public sector where screening is likely to 
be applied even after workers have accumulated some work 
experience. Hence, in the light of the above results we gather 
that the age-earnings profiles do diverge as one completes more 
education, especially in the competitive economic sector. But we
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add that there is a confusion in the public sector in Greece when 
considering the secondary and higher education ratios. Albeit 
our results differ somewhat from those reached by Psacharopoulos 
using the 1975 U.K. data his main conclusion prevails and it is 
supported from the Greek data; there is no solid evidence to 
support the "strong" version of the screening hypothesis.
Given the importance of the screening issue for public 
policy, it should be pointed out that the results presented for 
the Greek setting are constrained by the data and methodology 
utilised. A re-examination of these issues with alternative 
data and approaches should be undertaken. The Greek data, 
however, do not offer results which prove the absence of 
screening. Instead, they only indicate the lack of support in 
favour of the screening hypothesis. In addition, the Greek 
evidence against the screening hypothesis, especially in its 
purest form, suggests that the human capital theory provides the 
most plausible explanation of earnings differentials by 
education, therefore it should be a legitimate practice.
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6.2 EVALUATING TEACHERS' PAY POSITION
Another application of the earnings functions, as argued in 
Section 1.2.5, is whether members in a profession are overpaid 
relative to those who have the same human capital and personal 
characteristics. This is of particular importance for the case 
of teachers. The reasoning behind testing for such an issue is 
because in a typical country teachers' salaries account for the 
largest single unit of public expenditure on education. In 
Greece for example, as Appendix Table D-2 shows, their percentage 
share was about 56 and 61 per cent for the years 1977 and 1984 
respectively referring to all levels of education. Thus, it is 
possible to assess whether reductions (or moderate pay increases) 
in teacher's relative pay are needed in order to achieve savings 
in public expenditure for education. This is of great interest 
especially in an era of economic austerity and budgetary cuts as 
the one Greece is facing today.
Also, the case that the vast majority of Greek teachers, 
irrespective of the level of education they are employed, are 
Civil Servants should be considered as well. In detail, 
according to NSSG data, during the late seventies the total 
number of teachers was about 95,000 and their percentage 
distribution by level of education was around 47, 43 and 10 per 
cent for primary, secondary and higher education respectively. 
In addition, only 4-5 per cent of those were employed in private 
primary and secondary schools. Therefore, by taking into account 
the strong social demand for the teaching profession in 
conjunction with the state-controlled limited number of places
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available for employment after graduation it would be plausible 
also to determine their investment criteria (according to the 
Ministry of Education there is at least a 3 year waiting period 
for employment after graduation in recent years).
6.2.1_____Methodology
The available literature on similar topics, especially in the 
field of labour economics, permits to establish the framework of 
the analysis for the Greek experience (see Arrow and Capron, 
1959, Rottenberg, 1962, and Psacharopoulos, 1975a and 1987b). The 
answer though, is not a straight forward one which rather 
depends on a set of individual labour supply decisions and macro 
demand conditions that are very difficult to document in an 
empirical way.
Having said that, a "rigorous criterion of overpayment is 
whether members in a profession receive rents, that is, salaries 
above for those for which they would be willing to supply their 
services to the profession. Unfortunately, evidence on this 
matter requires experimental data —  a luxury in which 
researchers can seldom indulge" (Psacharopoulos, 1987b, p. 315) . 
A second-best criterion suggested by Psacharopoulos (ibid.) —  
also extensively used by pay-review boards, and by the courts in 
cases of workers discrimination —  is whether members in a 
profession, like teachers, are overpaid indeed relative to those 
in other professions who have the same human capital and personal 
characteristics as teachers. The main reasons for the use of 
this approach as second-best are: first, that the reference
salary in the control group profession may itself be subject to 
rents; and second that it is very difficult to fully control for
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differences in personal characteristics between individuals, 
hence compare "similar" persons in the two professions.
In spite of the methodological drawbacks, the second 
approach will be used. The data utilised in testing for possible 
discrepancies come from the nationally representative NSSG 
Employee Survey of 1977 (for a detailed description see Section 
4.1.2.1). The sub-sample selected includes all the 1,730 
teachers, employed in all levels of education, the 760 employees 
in public administration, the 130 scientists, and the 301 
accountants of the principal data base. It is noted, that 
Psacharopoulos in his study for the Brazilian setting (ibid.) has 
chosen salespersons, clerks and engineers to be compared with 
primary school, secondary school and university teachers 
respectively. Unfortunately, for the Greek case it is not 
possible to distinguish for the various educational levels. 
Alternatively and if we accept that the above occupations are 
comparable to an extent to teachers in general, as far as their 
human capital characteristics are concerned, then they will 
provide the necessary, for the statistical analysis, control 
groups for the teaching occupation. The rationale is as follows; 
first, the public administrators were chosen to act as the main 
comparison group on assessing whether teachers are over- or 
underpaid; second, scientists and accountants were selected so as 
to provide an indication of the position of teachers in the 
labour market and assess their investment criteria.
It is evident from Table 6.3 that female teachers receive 
substantially less pay, almost 21 per cent, than males. A
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similar pattern is observed for the female employees in the rest 
of the occupations. Also, on aggregate, we could say that 
teachers being either male or female are paid less with the 
exception of their counterparts in public administration who seem 
to receive about 12 per cent less than teachers.
Table 6.3. Mean Monthly Earnings by Occupation and Gender:
NSSG Sample, 1977 */
Occupation Males Females Both sexes N
Teacher 15,578 12,293 13,861 1,730
Scientist 20,364 15,576 19,149 130
Accountant 18,182 12,687 17,178 301
Public
Administrator 13,759 10,927 12,507 760
Source; Based on the NSSG sample, see Section 4.1.2.1 
Note: */in current Greek Drachmas
Table 6.4 depicts the differences in human capital endowments 
among the teaching and the non-teaching occupations.
Table 6.4. Years of Schooling, and Age, by Occupation:
NSSG Seunple, 1977
Occupation Years of Schooling Age
Teacher 15.9 39.9
Scientist 15.4 37.9
Accountant 16.0 37.6
Public
Administrator 14.7 34.9
Source: Based on the NSSG sample, see Section 4
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6.2.2_____ Findings
Table 6.5 presents the results of the fitted earnings functions. 
Occupation was entered in a series of 0-1 dummy variables, having 
the value of 1 if the person belongs to the teaching profession 
and 0 otherwise. Each function has been fitted to a pair of 
occupations only, that is teacher and the comparison group, as 
well as separately among males and females, so as to take into 
account possible sex discrimination. Therefore, the coefficient 
for the teacher variable measures the percentage by which the pay 
of teachers differs from that of each comparison group, 
controlling for education, and experience.
That is, according to Table 6.5, male teachers in Greece who 
have the same education and work for the same amount of years as 
male public administrators, appear to be partly underpaid 7% 
relative to the control occupation (e‘°‘°^’-l=-0.067) . 
Concerning female pay, it is evident that they are even more 
underpaid, that is 12%, other things been equal. One comment in 
order here is that these results are contradictory as compared 
with the preliminary raw data averages in Table 6.3, and if 
relied on the latter one might have reached the opposite 
conclusion.
Comparing teachers to scientists it is found from Table 6.5 
that the former are in a significantly disadvantageous position 
and they earn 3 0% and 32% less than male or female scientists 
respectively. When contrasted to accountants, teachers seem to 
be on the low paid side as well, by earning 21% (males) and 14% 
(females) less, relative to the benchmark profession.
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Table 6.5. Earnings Comparison Functions by Gender:
NSSG Seunple, 1977
Independent Variable
Males Females
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Teacher Occupation -0.357 * 
(11.99)
-0.231 * 
(10.42)
-0.069 * 
(3.96)
-0.389 * 
(9.01)
-0.150 * 
(4.61)
-0.122 * 
(7.05)
Comparator Occupation:
Scientist a/ 0 - - 0 - -
Accountant b/ - 0 - - 0 -
Public Ackninistrator - - 0 - - 0
Controls:
Years of Schooling, S 0.056 * 
(5.91)
0.045 * 
(3.97)
0.063 * 
(11.00)
0.092 * 
(8.83)
0.091 * 
(7.12)
0.080 * 
(13.24)
Years of Experience, EX 0.038 * 
(10.42)
0.046 * 
(12.95)
0.037 * 
(12.64)
0.048 * 
(15.10)
0.049 * 
(6.29)
0.047 * 
(17.66)
Experience-squared -0.00035 * 
(3.88)
-0.00058 * 
(6.49)
-0.00036 * 
(4.93)
-0.00061 * 
(7.17)
-0.00063 * 
(7.38)
-0.00060 * 
(7.91)
Constant Term 8.516 8.504 8.140 7.750 7.515 7.679
R-squared (adjusted) 
N
0.450
923
0.399
1072
0.413
1250
0.580
937
0.563
959
0.536
1240
Source: Based on the NSSG sample. see Section 4.1.2.1
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are t-ratios
"0" = reference occupation (omitted dummy)
= variable not included in the regression 
a/ refers to Mathematics, Physics & Chemistry graduates 
b/ refers to Accounting and Economics graduates 
*/ indicates statistical significance at the 1% level
Our summary points are restricted by the validity of the 
control groups chosen for each purpose, as these have been 
already stated. If we by-pass, though, such a barrier and we 
accept that our control groups provide a reasonable point of 
reference, then the Greek data analysed referring to 1977 suggest
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the following:
(a) Raw data comparisons can be misleading when attempting to 
assess the teachers' pay position in Greece relative to other 
professions. Pay differentials can be reversed, and even if 
pointing toward the same direction it has been found that they 
underestimate the actual pay differences, when controlling for 
differences in endowments.
(b) The teaching profession in Greece referring to all levels of 
education is underpaid relative to the benchmark profession, that 
is public administration pay, where job security and tenure are 
paramount employment characteristics as well.
(c) The decision to join the teaching profession in Greece 
appears not to be justified if considered on purely economic 
grounds. Professions requiring almost the same human capital, 
effort in managing to enter the university, and credentials (that 
is principally scientists and, secondarily accountants), as 
teaching are far more rewarding. But it is probably the case 
that graduates may prefer teaching because of the psychic non- 
pecuniary benefits associated with it, as well as, other aspects 
closely linked with social mobility issues. Lastly, the case of 
the long vacations associated with the teaching profession as 
compared to the rest of the professions (i.e. three versus one 
month) and, the possibility of increased earnings through private 
tuition (else known in Greece as FRONTISTIRIA —  see also Section 
2.2.4) may offer a plausible explanation to the issue.
Though, an increase in the primary school teachers' pay 
during the mid-eighties, as well as the incomes policies of the
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eighties (see Section 3.2) might have distorted the pattern. 
Thus, in view of better and more recent data the exercise should 
be repeated. Finally, by no means the analysis is suggesting 
that teachers' salaries should be cut in order to achieve 
budgetary savings. On the contrary, on efficiency and 
productivity grounds, these resources were found to be well 
spent, considering the fact that the comparison was made with 
public administrators where productivity is an issue of high 
controversy.
6.3 SUMMARY
The empirical status of human capital in the context of the 
screening or certification debate has been tested for the Greek 
setting in Section 6.1 through the use of relatively recent data 
(that is for 1981 and 1985) . The results indicated the lack of 
support in favour of the screening hypothesis, especially in its 
purest form, suggesting that human capital theory provides the 
most plausible explanation of earnings differentials by 
education.
In addition, in Section 6.2, and as another application of 
the earnings functions, we have examined the pay position of the 
teaching profession in Greece. The results indicated that 
teachers, as compared to a number of other occupations, were in a 
disadvantageous pay position during the late 1970s, indicating 
that their investment criteria lie far behind the pecuniary 
aspects of their jobs, as well as, that —  on efficiency grounds 
—  these resources were found to be well spent.
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CHAPTER 7
THE DEMAND FOR STUDY ABROAD
For the 1964-1987 period we have demonstrated that there has been 
a dramatic decline of both overall and higher education level 
specific yields on investment in education in Greece. At the 
same time demand for domestic post-compulsory education has 
increased rapidly. Greece has also a long tradition in foreign 
study which illustrates the strong social demand for tertiary 
education.
This chapter looks at the issue of the demand for study 
abroad by analysing original unpublished data provided by the 
Bank of Greece. The study of such an issue is very important for 
a country where social demand for post-secondary education, and 
by extension "freedom of choice", is strictly curtailed by the 
State. This is also in conjunction with the fact that private 
higher education is constitutionally prohibited in Greece. How 
does the Greek case compare internationally? How did the figures 
of Greek students studying at higher education institutions 
abroad evolve during the period under consideration? Are post­
graduate studies the first preference given the lack of any such 
programmes in Greece? What are the countries of preference for 
foreign study? What are the disciplines Greeks tend to demand 
abroad? Finally, what are the socio-economic implications of 
such a "student migration" for the country and individual? These 
are the questions we will try to approach in this chapter, which 
are connected to the overall question on why someone should spend
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both money and four or five years of his/her life studying at the 
university if that person would realise only three per cent of 
the capital invested in education?
7.1 BACKGROUND INFORMATION
In numerous cases in the Greek literature the phenomenal 
migration of Greek students abroad is characterised as a major 
economic problem of the country because of the massive out-flow 
of foreign exchange (see Maddison et al, 1966, Sabethai, 1976, 
Theodorakopoulos, 1978, Kindis, 1980, Pesmazoglou, 1983,
Psacharopoulos & Kazamias, 1985 , and for an international
overview and bibliography on foreign students see Altbach, 1985). 
The actual implications of the phenomenon, however, lie far 
beyond the foreign exchange aspect. They indicate the 
insufficient supply of education in Greece, at both the 
undergraduate and, especially, postgraduate levels, the high 
educational aspirations of Greeks, as well as, the problem of the 
"brain-drain" and its consequences.
Theodorakopoulos (1978, p.274) illustrates that the origins 
of the phenomenal migration of Greeks to study abroad can be 
traced far back to the 15th century, after the conquest of 
Constantinopolis (Instabul), the last stronghold of the Byzantine 
Empire, by the Ottoman Empire. The young Greek offsprings of 
noble and wealthy families were forced to migrate abroad to 
study. The country that attracted the majority of the young 
Greeks until the Ethnic Uprising of 1821 was Italy, and 
especially the Universities of Pisa, Venice, Florence, Genoa and 
the well-known "Collegio Greco" of Rome. In later days, France
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and especially Austria will also be popular destinations. 
According to Cerais, "the young wealthy Greeks migrate not only 
for their jobs and businesses, but also to enrich their knowledge 
and to be educated. In some cities of Macedonia (Northern part of 
Greece) for example and especially Siatista, all families have at 
least one of their relatives abroad, in Italy, Hungary, Austria, 
Germany etc." (cited in Kordatos, G.K., 1925, "Modern Political
Historv". Vol. I, p. 125). The migration continues, highlighting 
the exceptional propensity of Greeks for higher education, after 
the liberation and independence of Greece (1829). Buchon (Paris, 
1847, cited in Pilavios, 1980) in "La Grece Continentale et la 
Moree" observed that "The least sophisticated Greek whom you 
employ for reading and conversation in his language, will put 
aside what little he earns by this to go and get his law degree 
in Paris. Hire a servant and he will save up to study medicine 
at Pisa" (cited in Andrews, K. , 1967, "Athens". London: Phoenix
House). The flow is uninterrupted, excepting great historic 
events like such as the Balkan Wars, the First World War, the 
Asia Minor disaster, the Second World War and, lastly, the 
internal turbulence of the 1940*s.
"Research indicates that there are myriad of push and pull 
factors involved in foreign study" (Altbach et al, 1985, p. 12). 
In many instances, therefore, there is more than one motivation 
involved in the decision of the prospective foreign student. As 
Altbach et al (1985, p. 12) summarise, it seems likely that a 
majority of the world's international students provide their own 
financial support and are not sponsored by any government or
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agency. This supports the argument that the decision to 
undertake foreign study is largely an individual one. A summary 
of reasons affecting individual decisions appears in Figure 7.1 
and there is no particular reason one could claim that the Greek 
case is an exception to the observed pattern. Thus, excess
demand for domestic higher education may not be the only factor 
which influences or dictates the flow of Greek students abroad. 
One has to take into account all other factors which can exert an 
influence.
Figure 7.1. Key Variables Affecting the Personal Decision of 
Students to study Abroad
Key Variables Pertaining to Key Variables Pertaining to
Home-Country (Push Factors) Host-Country (Pull Factors)
1. Availability of scholarships 1. Availability of scholarships
for study abroad. to international students.
2. Poor quality educational 2. Good quality education,
facilities.
3. Lack of research facilities. 3. Availability of advanced
research facilities.
4. Lack of appropriate educational 4. Availability of appropriate
facilities. educational facilities with
likely offer of admission.
5. Failure to gain acknission to 5. Presence of relatives willing
local institution(s). to provide financial assistance.
6. Enhanced value (in the market 6. Congenial political situation,
place) of a foreign degree.
7. Discrimination against 7. Congenial socio-economic and
minorities. political environment to
migrate to.
8. Politically uncogenial 8. Opportunity for general
situation. international life experience.
Source; Altbach et al, 1985, Chart 3, p. 13
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7.2 DATA SOURCES AND QUALITY
Data on Greek students studying at higher education institutions 
abroad is available from two sources. Firstly, the Bank of 
Greece (Student Foreign Exchange Control Department) and, 
secondly, UNESCO. The time span covered from the Bank of Greece 
data is 1956-86, and the UNESCO covers the years 1960-84.
In fact, the two sources supplement each other. This is 
because of their different methodologies in calculating the 
number of Greek students abroad. The Bank of Greece collects and 
reports on data for accounting purposes and so figures are 
presented on the number of students who have applied and finally 
got permission for foreign exchange to finance their studies 
abroad. UNESCO provides figures on students studying abroad by 
country of origin, collected through a statistical questionnaire 
administered annually to all countries and territories. A foreign 
student, according to UNESCO, is a student who is not a permanent 
resident in the country of study.
Observing data from both sources, can lead to some useful
conclusions, presented below. The Bank of Greece's statistics
seem to underestimate total foreign enrolment between 1960 and
1972, as compared with UNESCO. UNESCO data are more reliable and
accurate because of their sensitivity in catching students who do 
foreign
not receive exchange from Greece. Table 7.1 shows that since 
1973 the pattern is completely reversed in favour of the Bank of 
Greece. In the meantime, a general observation is that the 
UNESCO figures for Greek students studying abroad are an 
overestimate, as are those for USA and England. In contrast, 
German figures are an overestimate.
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Table 7.1. Greek Students Abroad According to Two 
Sources, 1961-84
Total Bank over 
UNESCO
Year Bank UNESCO Ratio
1961 8659 9700 0.89
1962 7964 9450 0.84
1963 7421 9200 0.81
1964 6652 9000 0.74
1965 6285 9200 0.68
1966 6577 9375 0.70
1967 7888 9500 0.83
1968 7346 9745 0.75
1969 8147 12512 0.65
1970 9985 14147 0.71
1971 12819 17034 0.75
1972 17490 19414 0.90
1973 22358 21358 1.05
1974 25628 22587 1.13
1975 29480 23363 1.26
1976 30436 31063 0.98
1977 36999 30945 1.20
1978 35928 31974 1.12
1979 37001 30080 1.23
1980 39786 31509 1.26
1981 41086 30597 1.34
1982 44465 32974 1.35
1983 44046 32145 1.37
1984 40324 34086 1.18
Source; Bank of Greece, Student Foreign Exchange 
Control Department (Unpublished Data) 
UNESCO, Statistical Yearbook, various years
Despite these differences which indicate that the UNESCO 
figures are more complete, it is interesting to investigate data 
from the Bank of Greece. Its data set is more detailed, and 
offers information on country of study (common to both sources), 
level of study (i.e. undergraduate, postgraduate, other), field 
of study (i.e. Humanities, Science, etc.), detailed cost figures 
classified also by country but not level of study, as well as 
some additional information. This, of course, does not mean that 
these figures (both flow and cost) are realistic. On the
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contrary, it is believed that they are an approximation and 
deviate by understating real sizes for reasons described below.
1. As we showed above, by definition, reported figures are 
underestimates of both the magnitude of student migration and 
foreign exchange out-flow.
2. It is possible that the studies of many students abroad 
are financed from their parents or relatives who are migrants 
to the country of study, e.g. USA, Canada, Australia, 
Germany, Belgium and other European countries where many 
Greeks have migrated.
3. In some other instances studies are financed from own 
capital abroad or from sources linked to the seamen's 
profession and activities;
4. It is also possible that the total or part of the cost of 
studying abroad is covered either by the students' work 
(usually part-time) in countries where employment was not 
impossible, e.g. Germany, USA, Canada, Australia etc., or by 
the Universities and other organisations in terms of awards, 
scholarships, bursaries and assistantships (usually 
applicable to post-graduate students). It is estimated that 
at least 500 Greek graduates are scholarship recipient for 
P/G studies or research at HE institutions abroad each year. 
These scholarships come either from state and private 
foundations in Greece, or directly from foreign governments;
5. Expenses for the purpose of education paid in Greek 
Drachmas are not included, e.g. transportation to and from 
the place of study, etc.;
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6. Expenses prior to registration borne by the student are 
also absent from the calculations, e.g. visits to the place 
of study to arrange for registration, or to attend language 
short-courses, as well as correspondence, test and 
application fees payable where applicable, etc.
7. Illegal flow of exchange from Greece to the place of study 
has to be taken into consideration as well, especially for 
students who have been refused permission to obtain foreign 
exchange by the Bank of Greece for not fulfilling all of the 
requirements. One may also add the "topping up" of the 
existing allowance, varying in quantity depending on the 
country of study. Theodorakopoulos (1978, p. 270), claims 
that such students support themselves "illegally" for at 
least one year or more.
Finally, as we have seen, there are differences between the 
two sources concerning the overall figures on the magnitude of 
Greek students' migration. In this analysis, information will be 
provided from both sources. International comparisons will be 
based on UNESCO data. Reporting on the Greek context we will 
utilise Bank of Greece data, which is more consistent and offers 
a variety of information, as compared to UNESCO.
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7.3 PRELIMINARY EVIDENCE
In addition to the information discussed in Section 7.2, the Bank 
of Greece also keeps some statistics which appear to have a 
qualitative nature and are presented in Table 7.2. This gives 
the number of new Greek students abroad, those re-qualified and 
crossed out for foreign exchange allowance, those who have 
completed, or terminated their studies, students who continue 
without foreign exchange allowance. National Scholarships* 
Foundation (IKY) award recipients, and students by place of 
domicile. When observing that Table, one is able to understand 
better the nature of the data and come to useful conclusions.
We see that the majority of the student population studying 
abroad comes from the capital and surrounding area and that a 
smaller proportion comes from other parts of the country. In 
detail, figures for 1961-68 show that, 55-65% of the students 
reside in the Athens area and only 35-45% in the rest of Greece. 
Therefore, Athens based students are more likely to study abroad 
and have a comparative advantage in terms of educational 
opportunities compared with their counterparts living elsewhere.
When moving to the number of new students appearing to the 
Bank of Greece records for each year, compared with total foreign 
enrolment, we observe that they form around 21-32% during the 
1960*s, 15-39% during the 1970*s. Then their representation
share has dropped considerably, being 20% in 1982, and 11% in 
1984 (first year domestic enrolments were about 40% of the total 
student body, for the 1960*s and 1970 *s).
If we also add to the number of new students above, those 
re-qualified from past years, they account for an additional 7%
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Table 7.2. Qualitative Statistics on Greek Students Abroad, 1961-84 (All Countries)
Total New Re- Crossed Complete Terminate Continue IKY Athens Rest of
Year Students Qual. Out Studies Studies no $ Greece
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
1961 8659 1826 330 2013 802 423 788 184 4648 4011
1962 7964 1653 340 2670 1041 744 885 156 4387 3577
1963 7421 1869 268 2680 1280 745 655 109 4319 3102
1964 6652 1465 347 2581 1242 781 558 103 4177 2475
1965 6285 1717 450 2534 1260 754 520 99 3915 2370
1966 6577 2095 400 2203 1325 493 385 94 4262 2315
1967 7888 2441 383 1513 804 385 324 77 5153 2735
1968 7346 2133 223 2898 1661 789 448 81 4548 2798
1969 8147 2642 482 2323 1304 569 450 118
1970 9985 3880 327 2369 1329 470 570 135
1971 12819 ... ...
1972 17490 ... ...
1973 22358 ... ...
1974 25628 ... ...
1975 29480 ... ...
1976 30436 7490 291 6825 3658 3167 208
1977 36999 9095 256 2788 1453 1335 129
1978 35928 5615 215 6903 3852 3051 126
1979 37001 5547 504 4978 2297 2681 103
1980 39786 5386 355 2956 1348 1608 102
1981 41086 6704 311 5715 3568 2147 103
1982 44465 9042 674 6337 3586 2751 109 • • •
1983 44046 5439 335 6193 3457 2736 162 # # *
1984 40324 4372 292 8386 3825 4561 153 • • •
1985 28754 ... ... ... ... ... ...
1986 27085 ... ... ... ... ... ... • • •
Source; Bank of Greece, Student Foreign Exchange Control Department, 
Note: (...) not available
(Unpublished Data)
during the 1960's but only for a negligible 1% during the 1980*s.
The number of those students who have been crossed out in 
the Bank's records —  because they have either successfully 
completed or terminated their studies, or continue with no 
official foreign exchange allowance —  is close to the number of 
new students for each year. Finally, only a small percentage of 
students are actually completing their studies, around 20% of the 
total for the 1960*s and a moderate 9% for the 1980*s.
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7.4 INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS
The supply-constrained tertiary education at home, in conjunction 
with other reasons presented in Section 7.1 provides an immediate 
explanation for the high numbers of Greek students studying 
abroad. Table 7.3 shows figures of students studying abroad per 
head of population for selected countries in the UNESCO Yearbook.
Table 7.3. Students Studying Abroad, Selected Countries, 
mid-1980s
Country
of
Origin Year
Students1 Abroad Students Abroad as % of
Total per lOOK 
Population
Total Higher University 
Domestic Domestic 
Enrolment Enrolment
Greece 1983 34,086 345 23.0 34.0
Germany 1985 22,424 37 1.4 1.7
France 1984 12,500 23 1.0 1.3
Italy 1984 17,935 31 1.5 1.5
U.K. 1984 14,513 26 1.4 4.2
Portugal 1984 4,187 41 3.7 5.2
Spain 1984 9,406 24 1.1 1.6
Cyprus 1985 9,801 1465 312.7 ...
Iran 1985 41,043 92 20.9 33.8
Malaysia 1985 40,493 260 43.4 93.5
India 1979 17,824 2 0.3 ...
China 1985 42,481 4 2.4 ...
Hong-Kong 1984 23,657 426 30.8 163.9
Canada 1985 16,245 64 1.3 2.2
U.S.A. 1985 19,707 8 0.2 0.3
Israel 1984 4,983 117 4.9 8.1
Japan 1984 15,335 13 0.6 0.8
Lebanon 1984 14,661 550 20.8 20.8
Turkey 1984 16,168 33 3.9 4.6
Source; UNESCO, 1987, Statistical Yearbook. Table 3.16 
Note: (...) not available
As shown in Table 7.3, this percentage on a per capita basis 
is the third highest in the world after Lebanon and Hong-Kong. 
For example, it is well known that Indians are also "over­
educated", but out of 750 million Indians only 17,824 are
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studying abroad as Table 7.3 suggests. This is also true even if 
one standardises this figure for postgraduate students. Even for 
Malaysia and Iran, where 40,493 and 41,043, respectively, 
students are reported (in Table 7.3) to study abroad in 1985, the 
per capita analogy is not as high as it is for Greece. The 
results are equally illuminating when considering foreign 
students as a proportion of both the total higher and the 
university domestic enrolment. Greece maintains the third 
position internationally, after Hong-Kong and Malaysia, followed 
by Iran and Lebanon, with two-digit proportions varying between 
23 and 34 per cent, while all the rest are defined well below. 
No wonder of course about China, where the fact of having 42,481 
students abroad does not mean a lot in the international 
comparative statistics. When one looks at the EEC countries, 
statistics also presented in Table 7.3 suggest, to a greater 
extent, that Greece is an "outlier".
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7.5 THE FLOW OF STUDENTS ABROAD
7.5.1 Bv level of Higher Education 
Table 7.4 enables us to look at the the magnitude of flow of 
Greek higher education students abroad during the past thirty 
years, and shows that the stable nature of the 1950s and 1960s is 
suddenly disturbed. That is the number doubled, tripled and 
quadrupled during the next decade, and has reached its peak in 
1982. However, the number decreased by as much as 30 per cent 
for the following two years. In addition. Table 7.4 shows that 
the turning point was during the seven years of the Military 
Dictatorship (1967-1974), when the number of Greeks studying 
abroad more than tripled, while domestic enrolment grew by only 
40 per cent for the same period.
Given the complete lack of organised postgraduate programmes 
in Greece, one should expect that the majority, or at least a 
sizeable proportion of those studying abroad, were pursuing 
postgraduate studies. On the contrary. Table 7.4 indicates that 
only a moderate percentage, about 15 to 20 per cent, was actually 
following such programmes. The rest of the students were seeking 
the ever-desirable first degree even at foreign Universities of 
"questionable” quality. In detail, a massive 80% of those 
students abroad were attending first degree courses throughout 
the 25-year horizon, although in absolute terms undergraduate 
foreign enrolment has risen more than five times and, in some 
instances, more than seven times from the early 1960*s to the 
mid-eighties.
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Table 7.4. Greek Students Abroad by Level of Higher Education,
1956-86
Year
Total
Level of 
Univ.
Higher Education 
Postgr. Other
(1) as % 
of Total 
H.E 
Domestic
(1) as % 
of Univ. 
Domestic 
Enrolment
1956 6467 5100 750 617 0.33 0.38
7638 5900 900 838 0.38 0.43
9033 7200 900 933 0.37 0.41
8782 7100 850 832 0.33 0.37
8516 7000 800 716 0.30 0.33
1961 8659 7056 793 810 0.28 0.31
7964 6185 878 901 0.22 0.25
7421 5619 957 845 0.17 0.19
6652 5056 906 690 0.12 0.13
6285 4834 841 610 0.10 0.12
1966 6577 5098 898 581 0.09 0.11
7888 5959 1189 740 0.10 0.12
7346 5524 1113 709 0.09 0.10
8147 6183 1368 596 0.10 0.11
9985 7944 1349 692 0.12 0.14
1971 12819 10176 1757 886 0.15 0.18
17490 13765 2556 1169 0.19 0.23
22358 17813 3177 1368 0.23 0.28
25628 20278 3866 1484 0.23 0.28
29480 23212 4551 1727 0.25 0.31
1976 30436 24221 4721 1494 0.25 0.32
36999 29927 5261 1811 0.30 0.38
35928 29638 4916 1374 0.28 0.37
37001 30432 5074 1495 0.31 0.44
39786 32111 5961 1714 0.33 0.46
1981 41086 33108 6150 1828 0.33 0.47
44465 36161 6280 2024 0.32 0.47
44046 35455 6756 1835 0.30 0.44
40324 31609 7144 1571 ... 0.36
28754 21586 6201 967 ... 0.26
1986 27085 18618 6287 2180 ... 0.24
Source; Bank of Greece, Student Foreign Exchange 
Control Department, (Unpublished Data) 
Note: (...) not available
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7.5.2 By Country of Study
As Table 7.5 demonstrates, the countries that attracted most of 
the Greek students were the European industrial countries, 
Romania and the USA. In detail, England, France, Germany, Italy, 
Romania and USA dominated total foreign enrolment and accounted 
for 90% of it for most of the years, while Italy alone accounted 
for 30% during the mid-eighties, and around 45% during the late 
1960*s and 1970*s. We can also see that countries like Austria 
and Germany, were dominated the early 1960*s, explaining 25% and 
34% of the total foreign enrolment, respectively. Their share 
has dropped dramatically by the end of the same decade to six per 
cent and 11% respectively. That was mainly because of the 
numerus clausus and quotas these countries introduced during the 
mid-seventies as far as foreign enrolment to their higher 
education institutions was concerned.
Table 7.5. Greek Students Abroad by Country of Study, 
selected years
Year 1961 1966 1970 1976 1981 1986
Country of Study 
1. England 563 864 1,410 6,208 6,987 4,072
2. Austria 2,171 1,024 631 509 365 270
3. Belgium 110 92 136 407 475 318
4. France 457 522 832 3,471 5,348 3,063
5. Germany 2,901 1,477 1,066 2,026 2,809 2,353
6. Switzerland 453 361 372 603 690 313
7. USA 646 675 988 2,428 4,956 3,666
8. Italy 1,257 1,465 4,345 13,444 13,753 8,502
9. Romania - - - - 2,459 2,055
10. Other Countries 101 97 185 1,340 3,232 2,415
Total (All Countries) 8,659 6,577 9,985 30,436 41,086 27,085
Source: Bank of Greece, Student Foreign Exchange
Control Department, (Unpublished Data) 
Note: (-) negligible or nil
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It seems, therefore, that the major changes in the formation 
of the shape of the country preferences of the Greek students 
abroad took place during the 1960*s, favouring countries like 
Italy, England, France and USA. On the other hand, countries 
like Austria and Germany have lost their influence, in relative 
terms, but maintain a stable number of students. In addition, 90% 
of the total foreign enrolment is explained during all the 1961- 
1986 period from six countries and Romania is appearing 
forcefully in the arena during the late 1970*s.
7.5.3 By Country and Level of Study 
All the above observations and conclusions, as suggested by Table 
7.6, are in line with the undergraduate level foreign enrolment 
as well. Moving to the postgraduate level enrolment, the most 
dominant countries appearing in Table 7.6 are only four; namely, 
England, France, Germany and the USA, accounting for more than 
90% of the total foreign postgraduate enrolment during all of the 
25 years. The respective share of each country for 1986 is 35%, 
25%, 6% and 25%.
In conclusion, one could say that the further training and 
education of highly qualified personnel and intelligence of the 
country depends heavily and is left in the hands of England, 
France, Germany and USA, which are countries with advanced 
educational systems. It is worthwhile noting that **Greeks who 
follow postgraduate studies abroad are very selective in terms of 
courses, universities and countries. The same could not be said 
though, for the students of the undergraduate level** (Kindis, 
1980, p. 75). On the other hand, even if fees are applicable in 
England and the USA, the student body accounted for 60% of the
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respective total in 1986 and more than 50% for the past three 
decades, elaborating on the strong preference of the students for 
English-speaking countries, irrespective of financial criteria.
Table 7.6. Greek Students Abroad by Level and Country of Study, 
1966, 1976 and 1986
Level of Study
All
Levels
(1)
Univ.
(2)
(2):(1)
(%)
P/G
(3)
(3):(1)
(%)
Country of Study 
1. England
Year
1966 864 463 53.59 248 28.70
1976 6,208 3,530 56.86 2,067 33.30
1986 4,072 1,770 43.47 2,169 53.27
2. Austria 1966 1,024 956 93.36 26 2.54
1976 509 415 81.53 66 12.97
1986 270 212 78.52 41 15.19
3. Belgium 1966 92 66 71.74 9 9.78
1976 407 300 73.71 60 14.74
1986 318 179 56.29 120 37.74
4. France 1966 522 261 50.00 214 41.00
1976 3,471 2,302 66.32 1,087 31.32
1986 3,063 1,251 40.84 1,538 50.21
5. Germany 1966 1,477 1,215 82.26 154 10.43
1976 2,026 1,469 72.51 440 21.72
1986 2,353 1,789 76.03 381 16.19
6. Switzerland 1966 361 271 75.07 19 5.26
1976 603 401 66.50 65 10.78
1986 313 209 66.77 59 18.85
7. USA 1966 675 471 69.78 127 18.81
1976 2,428 1,643 67.67 639 26.32
1986 3,666 1,891 51.58 1,579 43.07
8. Italy 1966 1,465 1,351 92.22 77 5.26
1976 13,444 13,099 97.43 101 0.75
1986 8,502 8,004 94.14 122 1.43
9. Romania 1966 - - ■ ■ ■ - ...
1976 - - ■ • ■ - ...
1986 2,113 2,055 97.26 19 0.90
10. Other 1966 97 44 45.36 24 24.74
Countries 1976 1,340 1,062 79.25 196 14.63
1986 2,415 1,859 76.98 259 10.72
Total 1966 6,577 5,098 77.51 898 13.65
(All Countries) 1976 30,436 24,221 79.58 4,721 15.51
1986 27,085 18,618 68.74 6,287 23.21
Source; Bank of Greece, Student Foreign Exchange 
Control Department, (Unpublished Data) 
Note: (...) not available
(-) nil or negligible
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7.5.4 Bv level and Field of Study
It is instructive to study the composition of the foreign study 
body by level and field of study through information provided by 
Table 7.7.
Table 7.7. Percentage Composition of Greek Students Abroad by 
Level of Education and Field of Study, 1961-1984
Year 1961 1966 1971 1976
Univ PG Univ PG Univ PG Univ PG
Nunnber of Students 7056 793 5098 898 10176 1757 24221 4721
As X of the Grand Total 81.5 9.2 77.5 13.7 79.4 13.7 76.7 15.5
Field of Study
A. Hunanities 3.3 8.2 2.9 7.0 2.9 11.2 4.3 11.2
B. Education 0.3 2.4 0.2 1.8 0.2 2.5 0.2 2.0
C. Art 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.0
D. Law 0.5 9.8 0.8 12.5 0.9 13.6 1.4 10.3
E. Social Sciences 4.7 12.8 7.7 17.6 6.9 15.1 8.8 20.2
F. Science 6.4 8.6 8.7 7.6 10.3 17.9 11.1 19.5
G. Technology 58.6 7.2 60.2 7.8 45.4 17.4 40.4 18.8
H. Medicine & Pharmacy 20.3 24.6 13.3 14.8 23.5 10.4 27.8 9.4
I. Agricultural Studies 4.8 6.2 3.8 6.1 7.4 3.5 2.1 3.9
J. Other 1.0 20.2 2.4 24.8 2.4 8.4 3.7 4.7
T o t a l 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source; Bank of Greece, Student Foreign Exchange Control 
Department, (Unpublished Data)
When asked. Technology is clearly the most popular field of 
study among first degree students during the last quarter of the 
century. It has declined, however, in importance during the 
years. That is, from 60% during the 1960*s, it fell to much less 
than half (27%) in the mid-1980's, relatively speaking. Second 
in importance over the period is the field of Medicine, to which 
almost one quarter of the students showed a preference over the 
years. Science more than doubled its share during the 25 year
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span, its share being 14% in 1984. Social Sciences were ranked as 
the fourth preference, expanding their share to 12% during the 
eighties, while all the rest accounted for less than 10%.
Table 7 .7  (continued)
Year 1981 1982 1983 1984
Univ PG Univ PG Univ PG Univ PG
Number of Students 33198 6150 36161 6280 35455 6756 31609 7144
As X of the Grand Total 80.8 15.0 81.3 14.1 80.5 15.3 78.4 17.7
Field of Study
A. Hunanities 6.1 12.3 7.6 12.9 8.6 12.7 8.5 12.4
B. Education 0.7 3.2 1.7 3.1 2.2 3.2 2.6 3.2
C. Art 1.5 0.0 1.4 0.0 1.4 0.0 1.4 0.0
D. Law 1.9 10.7 2.2 10.4 2.2 9.9 2.0 9.8
E. Social Sciences 10.1 20.8 11.2 21.3 11.3 19.8 11.9 19.5
F. Science 12.9 13.8 13.2 13.9 13.4 14.2 13.9 14.1
G. Technology 32.3 19.8 29.4 20.2 27.8 19.5 26.6 20.2
H. Medicine & Pharmacy 27.8 12.9 26.2 12.5 25.3 12.8 24.4 12.6
I. Agricultural Studies 1.7 3.2 1.8 2.7 1.9 2.9 1.9 2.5
J. Other 5.0 3.3 5.3 3.0 5.9 5.0 6.8 5.7
T o t a l 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
It seems that students, given their free choice of field, 
tend to choose those subjects which carry the highest social 
recognition and prestige, as well as the highest income in terms 
of remuneration during their working lives, and, by extension, 
high private rates of return, so as to be in a position to 
justify their investment. The latter is also reflected in the 
earnings of university graduates by field of study, as shown in 
Appendix Tables D-3 and D-4.
When moving to the postgraduate level, it is obvious that, 
during the 1960*s, the highest representation share was for 
students specialising in the Medical field (25%), but during the
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past two decades they represent 13%. The shift was in favour of 
those specialising in Social Sciences and those in Technological 
fields, accounting for a massive 20% each, highlighting the 
identification of the need in such subjects for development. Law 
graduates have showed a strong preference in specialising abroad, 
as opposed to first degree choice (because of the uniqueness of 
the Law system in Greece), and they formed about 10% throughout 
the years. Science graduates have increased rapidly their share 
from eight per cent in the 1960*s to 20% in the 1970*s, but 
declined to 14% lately. Humanities explained, through an 
ascending pattern during the years, around 13%, and Agriculture 
graduates, through a descending pattern, around three per cent of 
the total postgraduate enrolment. However, it is also obvious 
that students specialising in fields other than the previous ones 
have lowered their share from around 25% to five per cent in 
recent years. As in the case of undergraduate studies, the above 
preferences are also in line with financial data, on the earnings 
of foreign postgraduate degree holders, provided by Appendix 
Table D-5.
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7.6 THE COST OF STUDYING ABROAD
The most convincing argument against the phenomenon of studying 
abroad is the excessive out-flow of foreign exchange. In such a 
context we are going to examine the out-flow in conjunction with 
relevant figures for the economy.
The reported figures come from the Bank of Greece and are 
based on the actual amount of foreign exchange which was legally 
allowed out of the country. This is classified as "Studies 
Payments" under the accounting category "Travel Payments". Both 
categories belong to the broader accounting category of 
"Invisible Payments". As it has already been argued before in 
Section 7.2, the reported figures are underestimates because of 
those reasons explained above. Also, in some cases, they deviate 
from reality by as much as 50%, based on personal estimates under 
conservative assumptions. In addition, these figures do not 
distinguish between separate levels of higher education but 
appear as a total. We should also mention that, foreign 
expenditure includes maintenance costs, meaning that it is not 
absolutely comparable with the reported domestic expenditure.
According to the Bank of Greece figures, the total cost of 
studying abroad exceeded $236 million during the first post-war 
decade (1949-1962). Out of that figure, only 40% was due to the 
direct flow of foreign exchange out of the country. The rest was 
coming from sources outside Greece, such as scholarships from 
international organisations and foreign governments, or direct 
funding from relatives of the students abroad. The Public 
Current Expenditure for higher education in Greece during the 
same period was about $100 million, according to Ministry of
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Education estimates, which is exactly of the same order as the 
direct flow of exchange out of the country. In an OECD report 
(Maddison, 1966) that situation was characterised as an 
"incredibly high waste" for Greece (mentioned by Pesmazoglou, 
1983, p. 4).
Table 7.8. Annual Cost of Studying Abroad as Percentage of
Balance on Current Account, Invisible and Travel 
Payments, 1961-86 (in million US $)
Cost of Balance Invisible Cost Ab. Cost Ab Cost Ab.
Studies on Curr.Payments as % of as % of as % of
Abroad Account Bal.Cur.Invisible Travel
Year Account Payments Payments
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1961 7.1 -49.5 76.1 14.3 9.3 36.6
7.1 —50.0 87.6 14.2 8.1 32.5
7.0 -36.1 99.0 19.4 7.1 25.5
6.7 -171.3 129.3 3.9 5.2 17.3
7.0 -267.3 136.8 2.6 5.1 16.8
1966 7.3 -259.0 154.6 2.8 4.7 18.0
9.5 —224.5 184.0 4.2 5.2 23.3
9.3 -252.9 194.2 3.7 4.8 21.9
9.8 -348.2 240.7 2.8 4.1 20.4
12.8 -408.6 266.9 3.1 4.8 23.1
1971 19.4 -344.2 317.3 5.6 6.1 26.3
27.2 -401.5 402.1 6.8 6.8 28.4
37.2 -1191.5 570.3 3.1 6.5 32.8
52.2 -1145.2 720.4 4.6 7.2 40.1
56.7 —956.7 764.7 5.9 7.4 36.7
1976 55.6 -932.0 786.8 6.0 7.1 36.9
69.3 -1079.2 876.9 6.4 7.9 42.3
73.9 -957.9 1037.7 7.7 7.1 33.0
88.2 -1881.4 1366.7 4.7 6.5 29.2
102.6 -2216.1 1566.0 4.6 6.6 33.2
1981 96.3 -2421.0 2206.2 4.0 4.4 26.7
121.0 -1885.1 2055.8 6.4 5.9 32.3
119.5 -1875.9 2019.2 6.4 5.9 33.0
98.7 -2130.1 2068.0 4.6 4.8 29.1
98.9 -3275.7 2268.3 3.0 4.4 26.9
1986 117.0 -1772.1 2598.0 6.6 4.5 23.7
Source: 1961-84: Bank of Greece, 1986, Tables 14 & 18
1985-86: Bank of Greece, April 1987, "Monthly Statistical 
Bulletin". Economic Research Department, Vol. LII 
No. 4, Tables 38 & 42 (1985-86)
Chapter 7, p. 280
Table 7.8 shows a stable out-flow of foreign exchange 
pattern of about $7 million per year for the period 1961-1966. 
Between 1967 and 1969 the magnitude of the flow became $9.5 
million. From 1970 onwards it exceeded $12 million per year and 
is doubled every two years reaching $52 million in 1974. That 
is, of course, in line with the marked increase observed in the 
number of students abroad for the same period. From 1975 
onwards, the rate of increase was not so spectacular and the 
figure reached its peak, after almost doubling to $103 million, 
for the decade 1970-80, during 1980. It was during 1982 that 
the flow reached record heights ($121 million) and one could 
attribute that to the respective peak on foreign enrolment during 
the same year. Although the magnitude of the flow of students 
abroad was deteriorating during the following four years, one 
should expect the same pattern for the foreign exchange out-flow. 
This was indeed the case for 1983 and 1984, but then we can 
notice a slight increase in 1985 (while the number of students 
have dropped dramatically). That was followed by an unexpected 
20% increase from 1984 to 1986, the figure being $117 
million. This figure deserves further investigation and it will 
be discussed later.
If we examine in Table 7.8 the share that studies payments 
represent in the deficit on the Balance on Current Account of the 
country, we can identify that it formed a sizeable 15-20% until 
1963, but then dropped substantially and ranged around three per 
cent until the end of the 1960*s. The share became larger during 
the 1970*s when it was double, in general, as compared to the 
late 1960*s, reaching its peak during 1978 (7.7%). That was the
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highest for the whole of 1964 to 1986 period. During the 1980*s 
the share fluctuated between 6.6% (1986) and, a record bottom for 
the past 15 years, of three per cent (1985) . Finally, it is 
worthwhile mentioning that the deficit on the Balance on Current 
Account of the country have reached almost $3.3 billion in 1985 
(66 times higher than in 1961).
Let us now move to the share that studies payments occupy 
in the broader accounting category (where they fit) of invisible 
payments. We can observe from Table 7.8 a declining trend during 
the 1960's (from 9.3% in 1961 to 4.1% in 1969), but then the rate 
increased during the 1970*s to around 7%. A further decrease 
during the eighties resulted to the stabilisation of the share to 
less than 5%.
Comparing studies with travel payments, their high 
representation share is evident throughout the 25-year period, 
ranging between 16.8% (lower bounds) for 1965 to 42.3% (upper 
bounds) in 1977, and around 25% for 1986, as shown in Table 7.8.
Summarising then, it becomes obvious that the out-flow of 
foreign exchange for studies abroad has increased rapidly during 
the years, not only in absolute but also in relative figures. 
That is, it was forming a sizeable percentage of the deficit on 
balance on Current Account, as well as Travel and Invisible 
Payments of the country.
Table 7.9 elaborates on the excessive flow of foreign 
exchange out of the country by comparing those figures with the 
respective of the total domestic public expenditure for 
University and higher education. As we have already pointed out.
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though, these two figures are absolutely comparable. We can 
summarise from Table 7.9, that the total cost of studying abroad 
accounted for about 47% and 37% of the total University and 
higher education public and current expenditure, respectively, 
for the twelve year period, 1976-87. This is a very high price 
for a small country like Greece to pay, given that domestic 
higher education institutions are overcrowded, understaffed and 
increasingly in need for additional investments.
Table 7.9. Cost of Study Abroad and Domestic Public Current 
Expenditure, 197 6-87 (in billion Drachmas)
Year
AEI
(1)
TEI
(2)
Total
Higher
(3)
(%)
(1):(3)
Abroad
(4)
(%) 
(4): (3)
1981 9.191 2.035 11.226 81.9 5.336 47.5
1976-81 41.800 7.900 49.700 84.1 20.275 40.8
1982-87 162.900 45.300 208.200 78.2 76.302*/ 36.6
1976-87 204.700 53.200 257.900 79.4 96.577*/ 37.4
Source; Columns 1 & 2: Ministry of Education 
Column 4: Bank of Greece 
Notes: Cost abroad in drachmas derived by using average
annual exchange rates of the US dollar 
*/ figure for 1987 assumed to be the same as in 1986
When examining the cost of studying abroad by country of 
study presented in Table 7.10, we can identify that (i) five EEC 
countries (ie. England, Belgium, France, Germany and Italy) have 
increased their share by 10 percentage points from the 1960*s to 
the 1970's, absorbing 75-80% of the total student exchange. 
During the 1980's, there is a huge decline and their share have 
dropped to around 60%; (ii) 90-95% of the exchange towards 
eastern block countries went to Romania, which began accepting
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Table 7.10. Annual Cost of Foreign Study by Country of Study, 1961-86 (in thousand US $)
Year Total England Austria Belgium France Germany Switzerland USA Italy Romania
1961 7205 519 1546 46 387 2450 360 590 1053
1962 7099 615 1442 51 467 2505 339 622 1015 -
1963 7031 683 1267 60 429 2243 414 858 1026 -
1964 6745 949 1043 49 494 1947 408 911 889 -
1965 6952 1006 893 79 549 1831 443 1020 1039 -
1966 7291 1116 914 83 603 1678 433 1070 1308 -
1967 9534 1465 997 107 736 1734 642 1598 2166 -
1968 9263 1544 816 113 633 1674 826 1308 2196 -
1969 8009 1349 624 104 604 1326 550 1125 2159 -
1970 16528 2597 779 242 916 2756 707 3728 4525 —
1971 19393 3233 816 400 925 1863 721 4926 6090 —
1972 27238 4115 901 298 1639 2854 1023 4115 11769 -
1973 37214 5228 959 330 2162 3332 1212 6154 17142 -
1974 52155 7717 1184 397 3056 4132 1173 11454 21845 -
1975 56721 9586 1271 583 5198 4005 1437 10280 22723 -
1976 50224 10284 845 512 763 4457 3459 6099 22400 14
1977 61163 12736 1158 642 5364 4226 932 8050 27101 486
1978 66665 15196 758 507 7339 4800 788 7863 25337 1516
1979 79575 18011 741 557 9042 5547 887 9887 29198 3081
1980 102635 22601 867 820 11435 6869 1095 15329 35897 4597
1981 96282 18812 839 994 15714 7864 1133 22409 21260 1638
1982 121008 18874 1009 1286 11225 10869 1558 29281 32906 5425
1983 119470 17142 1022 1205 11410 10057 1529 31094 30736 6421
1984 98671 14078 753 1970 9931 9364 1667 26693 22760 5757
1985 98851 15106 696 1086 8844 10040 1316 28599 20633 5674
1986 117015 15942 1607 1462 11359 15067 3532 27986 27986 4022
Source: Bank of Greece, Economic Research Department,
Note: (-) nil or negligible
(Unpublished Data)
students in 1975, accounting for 3.5% of the total; (iii) Italy 
has strengthened substantially its position by the end of the 
1960*s, by doubling its share, as compared to the early 1960*s 
accounting for 1/4 of the total and just less than 1/2 for the 
five EEC countries mentioned above. During the mid-seventies, 
its share jumped to more than 1/3 of the total and over 1/2 of 
the EEC total. But Italy's share has declined gradually 
(although in 1980, Italy alone absorbed $35.9 million, or 35 
times more exchange as compared to the early sixties) and settled 
to the late 1960*s levels; (ivj things are also impressive for 
the case of the USA during the eighties. During that period, USA 
established their position and absorbed more exchange than any 
other country; and (v) finally, the picture for 1986 became 23.9% 
for USA, 23.9% for Italy, 13.6% for England, 12.9% for Germany, 
9.7% for France, 3.5% for Romania, 3.0% for Switzerland, 1.4% for 
Austria and 1.2% for Belgium. All nine countries accounted for 
93% of the total, leaving only 7% of the share for the rest of 
the world.
If we do a further disagreggation of the available cost data 
we will be able to find out, through averages, why some countries 
are more popular to students, based on purely financial criteria. 
A first look at Table 7.11 reveals the ascending pattern of the 
average cost per student abroad. That cost (in constant US 
dollars) was around $1,200 during the sixties, $2,000 during the 
seventies and $2,500 during the late-seventies early-eighties. 
The average cost per student abroad for 1985 became $3,500 and 
jumped to $4,300 in 1986. If we use those overall averages as a 
selection criterion whether a country is "cheap" or "expensive"
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Table 7.11. Annual Average Cost per Student Abroad by Country of Study, 1961-70 and 1976-86 (in US $)
Year Total England Austria Belgium France Germany Switzerland USA Italy Romania
1961 820 922 712 418 847 845 795 913 838
1962 892 1092 730 1133 1035 962 960 919 833
1963 943 1006 762 1333 941 950 1160 1302 909
1964 1007 1394 781 790 1062 959 1106 1395 896
1965 1114 1386 788 1013 1149 1086 1303 1553 924
1966 1110 1292 893 902 1155 1136 1199 1585 893
1967 1204 1355 974 915 1061 1122 1605 1887 1052
1968 1266 1343 981 1076 917 1370 2226 1475 1094
1969 1203 1014 875 1030 869 1188 1677 1132 803
1970 1282 1842 1235 1779 1075 2585 1901 3773 1041
1971 1513 ... ... ... ...
1972 1555 ... ... ... ...
1973 1664 ... ... ... ...
1974 2037 ... ... ... ...
1975 1923 ... ... ... ...
1976 1827 1657 1660 1258 220 2200 5736 2512 1666
1977 1873 1725 2189 1518 1253 1808 1432 2741 1689
1978 2057 2238 1813 1385 1663 2007 1333 2656 1727 ...
1979 2384 2589 1915 1403 1834 2249 1456 2890 2140 2066
1980 2579 3095 2337 1839 2150 2601 1677 3603 2557 2447
1981 2344 2692 2299 2093 2938 2800 1642 4522 1546 663
1982 2721 2776 2561 2360 2062 3285 1831 5002 2307 1829
1983 2713 2611 2711 2107 2128 2946 1759 5134 2253 1505
1984 2448 2328 2195 3391 1919 2913 2004 4600 1964 1464
1985 3440 3306 4218 3076 2767 4478 2143 7588 2062 2181
1986 4320 3915 5952 4597 3708 6403 11284 7634 3292 1903
SourceI Bank of Greece, Economic Research Department, 
Note; (...) not available
(Unpublished Data)
in terms of costs, we can say that countries considered "cheap" 
during the 1960's have reversed their positions during the 1980*s 
and vice versa. In detail, (a) England and Belgium appeared to 
be "expensive" countries back in the 1960*s but then turned to be 
just below the total average during the 1980*s; (b) Italy, France 
and Romania presented a very low cost throughout the years; (c) 
Austria, while very "cheap" during the 1960*s and 1970*s became 
suddenly "expensive" in 1985 and 1986; (d) Germany depicted a
high average cost during the years, but the highest of all 
belongs to the USA.
In conclusion, students and their families are aware of the 
cost of studying abroad and tend to choose those countries 
bearing a relatively low cost. On the other hand, this does not 
appear as the general rule since 1/4 of Greek students prefer 
"expensive" countries. There are, of course, other
considerations taken into account in deciding the place to study 
abroad, the three most important being: (1) remoteness of Greece
from the country of study, (2) the so-called "numerus clausus" 
(e.g. entrance examination tests, restriction to enrol in 
particular fields and quotas, or, in general, how easy it is to 
register with a higher education institution), and, lastly (3) 
the medium of instruction. All three previous reasons explain to 
an extent the low-cost choices towards Italy and Romania. 
Finally, it is worth noting that the increased mobility of the 
1990*s due to European integration and the fact that EEC students 
are treated as home students in the host EEC member country will 
contribute to the idea of universal European education with 
substantial economic benefits. The first of those benefits would
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be the minimisation of the "brain-drain” and economies of scale 
for the less developed member countries.
7.7 SUMMARY AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
So far we have portrayed the phenomenal migration of third level 
Greek students abroad. This, could not be predetermined as good 
or bad in the first place. This is so, given that knowledge is 
ecumenical, that is it has no intellectual or material limits. 
As in most cases, there are advantages and disadvantages, but it 
is clear, in this particular case, that room for improvement in 
the system exists. We could summarise the advantages and 
disadvantages of studying abroad, to both the individual and the 
society, as follows:
(i) Advantages
1. Given the complete lack of organised postgraduate (P/G) 
studies and research in Greece, P/G studies abroad act as a 
substitute and fill the gap, even at bi^ h cost.
2. Extremely low social cost while the vast majority of the 
students are either self-financed or financed by foreign 
institutions.
3. Enormous flow of additional educated human stock in the 
country during the past decades through return migration 
(one could evaluate benefits in the form of human capital 
formation).
4. Considerable economies of scale associated with third 
level education.
5. Transfer of technology in terms of new developments in 
science and modern theories.
6. Cultural plurality and development contribution, through 
experiences acquired abroad.
7. Highly specialised fields benefit more, because 
diseconomies of scale prevent their offering in Greece (ie. 
those demanding heavy investment for equipment).
(ii) Disadvantages
a. The "brain-drain" effects.
b. Huge flow of foreign exchange out of the country and the 
subsequent consequences in the balance of payments.
c. Because of the distant facing of Greek reality, knowledge
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is based sometimes on models and methodology unrealistic for 
Greece.
d. No planning in terms of the specialisations that the 
country needs.
e. Inequality effects and the "elitist" mentality of foreign 
graduates.
h. Forgone benefits from research (direct-indirect).
Finally, the analysis of the demand for study abroad draws
attention to a series of policy implications, which could be
summarised as follows:
1. Encourage private higher education in Greece in order to 
satisfy the excess social demand for higher education, as 
this will decrease the exodus of Greek students abroad, which 
in turn, will result in substantial foreign exchange savings. 
In addition, it has been argued that such a move will 
increase substantially the efficiency of the system in terms 
of management, quality of education, and responsibility, 
through the increased competition among public higher 
education institutions, and between private and public 
institutions (see World Bank, 1986, and James, 1987; for the 
Greek case, see Lambropoulos, 1990b);
2. Introduce user charges based on egalitarian criteria, that is 
selective fees (and student loan schemes), given the 
willingness of students to pay for their higher education, as 
witnessed by the fact that the vast majority of students 
privately finance their education abroad (see World Bank,
1986);
3. Some postgraduate programmes could be offered in Greece in
co-operation with foreign research centres and institutions
of higher education (ie. Social sciences. Medicine, 
Technology, etc.);
4. In view of the European integration of 1992, Greek
authorities should start thinking about making the higher 
education system more competitive and flexible; for example, 
the possibility of new undergraduate courses should be 
considered, especially those needing low investment, such as 
Anthropology, Tourism Development, Shipping Economics, and so 
on; and
5. Lastly, for better information distribution on the 
functioning of the labour market and available opportunities 
to students. Careers Offices should be established.
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CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the characteristics of 
education and employment in Greece, evaluate the effect of 
schooling on the earnings of employees in both the public and 
private sectors of the economy, and calculate rates of return to 
investment in education, in general, and to higher education, in 
particular. The Greek case is of specific interest to the 
educational planner because of the apparent excess demand for 
tertiary education during the post-World War II period.
Therefore, the study of the levels and ratios of the 
profitability of the educational investment will enable us to 
assess the effect of demand and supply forces in the Greek labour 
market, and thus rationalise the investment criteria of the 
Greeks in aspiring higher education.
8.1 FINDINGS
The majority of our findings are associated with the phenomenon 
of the apparent strong demand for higher education among Greeks, 
both domestically and abroad, which is amply demonstrated 
throughout the thesis (Section 2.2 and Chapter 7). In an attempt 
to answer the question on what drives the demand for education, 
we utilised the human capital approach. Based on the assumption 
that prospective students act as rational investors, the various 
economic indicators —  and mainly the rate of return to the
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specific level and kind of education —  would be the determinants 
of the excess demand for education.
It is instructive, however, to classify our findings in two 
separate categories, presented below. The first category is 
related to findings on the methodology utilised to study the 
economic aspect of educational investment. That is, the Human 
Capital model as it is presented in Chapter 1 of the thesis and 
empirically tested in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. The second category 
of findings refer to a set of distorted incentives pertaining to 
the Greek educational system today, stemming from Chapters 2 and 
3 of the thesis.
8.1.1 The Human Capital Model
The first major finding is associated with the importance of 
human capital variables, schooling and experience, in explaining 
the variance of earnings. The data sets we have analysed cover 
a time span of 13 years, that is from 1975 to 1987 (for an 
illustration and summary of the data sets see Figure 4.3). 
Although the data sets are not strictly comparable, they enable 
us to form an overall picture on the decomposition of earnings 
from salaried employment in Greece by fitting human capital 
earnings functions in Section 4.2. These functions have been
fitted separately for males and females in the private and the
public sectors of the economy.
The overall conclusion from these earnings functions 
analyses is that there is a strong and positive relationship 
between the education and the earnings of employees. The two
basic human capital characteristics of employees, that is
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schooling and labour market experience, account for more than one 
third of personal earnings. For example, in the case of the 1977 
national data (see Section 4.1.2.1) the two basic human capital 
variables explain 37 per cent of the earnings of employees, 
which is very good for cross-section estimates (Table 4.2). When 
we disaggregate for the two economic sectors, that is private and 
public, it is clear that the basic human capital model has 
superior explanatory power in the public sector. For example, 
the analysis of public sector employment data (Ministry of 
Education, see Section 4.1.2.3) show that human capital explains 
a significantly higher proportion of the earnings of employees, 
that is 66% (Table 4.10), compared to the private sector
employment analyses. That is expected and is mainly due to the
fact of the highly institutionalised pay of that sector (see 
Section 3.2.2) as opposed to the private sector, where
productivity related characteristics are valued more.
Further to the above, it has also been found that the basic 
human capital model behaves remarkably well. That is, the
schooling and experience variables are found, in the majority of 
the analyses, to be highly significant and negatively related, in 
the sense that the more the schooling the less the individual has 
had time to work. The negative and significant coefficient of 
the experience-squared variable indicated that earnings rise, and 
then level off as experience increases (except in the Ministry of 
Education data set where it is found to be positive, denoting 
non-strictly parabolic experience-earnings profiles —  see Table 
4.10). The step specification of the fitted earnings functions 
produced results indicating that secondary education has lost its
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importance in determining earnings over time, mainly because of 
its near universalisation (see Section 2.1.2). University 
education though, is found to be significantly and consistently 
associated with a considerable earnings premium over the other 
levels of education. However, the non-linear in years of 
schooling specification does not give a clear consensus 
concerning the signs of the coefficients.
A second major finding relates to the empirical status of 
human capital theory. The screening or certification hypothesis, 
claiming that education, or higher education in particular, acts 
only as a screen for ability and does not relate to productivity, 
has been tested for the Greek setting in Section 6.1. The 
results indicate the lack of support in favour of the screening 
hypothesis, especially in its purest form, suggesting that human 
capital theory provides the most plausible explanation of 
earnings differentials by education.
The third major finding, stemming from the earnings 
functions analyses of Section 4.2, is that males, ceteris 
paribus, earn on average more than females, while the effect of 
the income equalisation policies of the socialist administration 
of the 1980s —  as argued in Section 3.2 —  is evident for the 
year 1985.
When other personal characteristics of employees are entered 
in the analyses the explanatory power of the model increases 
substantially (that is by more than an additional 10 per cent, 
except for the case of the public sector payrolls where the 
increase varies from three to eight per cent —  Table 4.12). The
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inclusion of those characteristics in the human capital earnings 
functions points towards bias-free results, by leaving the 
schooling coefficient virtually unaffected. The extended 
earnings functions of Section 4.2.1.4 confirm that: (a) being
male is automatically associated with higher pay, (b) married 
employees earn on average more than their counterparts with no 
family responsibilities, (c) an additional child in the family 
implies higher earnings, and (d) specialised training is 
associated with a substantial earnings premium, significantly 
higher than that for an additional year of schooling.
Another finding, on methodological grounds, concerns the 
issue on the use of potential, in the absence of real, labour 
market experience in earnings functions. This issue is tested in 
Section 4.2.1.5. The analysis indicates that the potential 
specification of variable experience (that is, EX=AGE-S-6) used 
in earnings functions analyses points to the "correct" direction, 
although it is intuitively assuming no periods of unemployment.
Perhaps the most important finding is that market forces are 
stronger than any implicit or explicit regulatory policy. In the 
case of Greece it is found in this thesis that the earnings 
premium associated with higher education has declined in response 
to the increased supply of graduates. This has happened under 
both conservative and socialist administrations, both in the 
private and public sectors of the economy. In other words, as 
predicted by economic theory, the returns to education do decline 
over time pari passu with increases in the stock of human capital 
(as this is depicted in Sections 2.3.3 and 3.1.1 referring to the 
population and the labour force, respectively). The decline.
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however, is more impressive and faster in the non-competitive 
sector of the economy. In addition, the same was found to apply 
for the social rates of return, as they are studied relative to 
the index of public subsidisation. That is, the higher the 
rhythm of the evolution in enrolments, the less the degree of 
subsidy (Section 5.3).
In detail. Table 5.14 presents a grand summary of the 
estimates of the rate of return over time, in juxtaposition with 
the changes of the educational composition of the population and 
the labour force. Figures 5.1 and 5.2 depict the shifts of the 
(reduced form) intersections of the implied supply and demand 
curves for educated labour. Irrespective of whether the pattern 
refers to the labour force as a whole, or to those in the labour 
force with higher education, the trend is found to be clearly 
downward. Thus, we could argue that as educational attainment 
increases, the relative "price" of education (as measured by the 
rate of return) falls, suggesting a reverse relationship between 
the demand for and the returns to education. Therefore, one 
could say that the declining returns to education, in general, 
and to higher education, in particular, do not justify an acute 
incentive, whatsoever, to explain sufficiently the phenomenon of 
the excess demand for higher education among Greeks, both at home 
and abroad.
A significant finding of the thesis is that an explicit 
incomes policy or the setting of civil service pay scales are not 
adequate in themselves to achieve a more equal income 
distribution (as discussed in Section 3.2); market forces have
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been operating as well. Human Capital theory predicts, and it is 
confirmed in this thesis, that educational expansion, a natural 
phenomenon in every society, means an increase in the ratio of 
the more-to-less educated in the labour force that automatically 
leads to wage compression and hence to a more equal income 
distribution (Section 3.3, and Table 3.21).
Despite the spectacular drop in the profitability of 
educational investment during the period under consideration, we 
also find that individual demand substantially exceeds the 
availability of places. It is rational, therefore, to assume 
that it is not the low actual (or ex post) , but the 
unreal1stically high expected (or ex ante), rate of return that 
drives students to demand further education (Table 5.16). Thus, 
the perception which the secondary school graduates have 
regarding the labour market seem to be highly influenced by past 
trends, meaning that there may be some inertia in adjusting to 
the evolution of the "true" levels of the profitability of 
education, acting as a "push factor" for further post-secondary 
education, which is inelastic.
Finally, we found that there is no way that the State, in a 
democratic society, can set an effective cap (quotas) on higher 
education enrolments. If the market forces are such that the 
acquisition of a university degree is justified, students and 
their parents will find a way to circumvent the government-set 
restrictions. In the case of Greece, as evidenced in Chapter 7, 
excess demand for higher education has found an outlet abroad. 
In addition, the demand for study abroad inasmuch as it absorbs 
excess demand reflects the "true" intentions of students and
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their families (prospective investors) towards further education. 
A recent development, however, is the substantial decline in the 
demand for study abroad, best explained by the low and 
diminishing returns to investment in higher education evidenced 
in the thesis. This is a very important finding, given that 
study abroad is privately financed, in contrast to "free" public 
higher education at home, meaning that, among others, economic 
considerations predominate in any private decision to pursue 
further education.
8.1.2 Distorted Incentives
The thesis shows clearly the major incentives, which are 
distorted and result in the phenomenal excess social demand for 
higher education, pertaining to the Greek educational system 
today. They could be summarised in the following two categories. 
These are: (i) the low direct cost of attending higher education
(Section 2.2.5) and, (ii) the significant number of graduates 
employed in the public sector, stemming from the excessive use of 
educational qualifications as a method of hiring civil servants 
(Section 3.1).
The former distortion exists because of insufficient public 
funds to fully satisfy the demand for higher education and for 
this reason entry is restricted; in 1986, for example, less than 
one out of five candidates entered a proper university in Greece 
(Section 2.2.4), while one out of four higher education students 
by-pass the public finance filter and study abroad (Section 7.5). 
The second distortion exists because of the students' belief that 
"guaranteed employment" for higher education graduates is
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applicable for the public sector (Section 2.2.6), and because the 
public sector remuneration package is overestimated in terms of 
externalities (i.e. tenure, social security, job environment, 
automatic promotion, reduced responsibilities —  Section 3.2.2). 
Furthermore, in periods of low employment prospects for secondary 
school leavers (Section 2.2.6 and 3.1.4), or when government-set 
criteria favour the hiring of graduates, university study becomes 
cheap and investment in it can be carried out beyond the social 
optimum.
As established throughout the thesis, however, these 
incentives, created by the State, and influencing students and 
their families in demanding increasingly larger quantities of 
higher education, are not reflected in the rewards of individuals 
in the labour market (due to the diminishing and low returns to 
educational investments). It is therefore considered that the 
State is mainly responsible for the mismatches occurring today in 
the Greek labour market. Given the above, the argument that the 
Greek State, in its role, is providing the "directions" and the 
incentives to the students is further strengthened; and it should 
be the State, again, that should make every possible effort in 
correcting the previously recorded distortions. Any serious 
attempt to correct these distortions would result, undoubtedly, 
in the realisation of the numerous noble goals set in the past 
towards "true" educational reform.
Another important lesson is that excessive legislation 
cannot alter society, as this has been attempted through a series 
of Laws —  and more recently the Law-Framework (see Section 
2.2.3). This is justified on the grounds that so many attempts
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at reforming the educational system have failed, mainly because 
of abstraction from the dynamics that drive behaviour, along with 
the lack of technocrats in Greece in the field of educational 
policy analysis. A solution, therefore, would be the de-emphasis 
of the legislative front and the introduction/encouragement of 
the incentives system. If the distorted incentives previously 
recorded are corrected, then improvements in the educational 
system would follow automatically without a need for a new Law.
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8.2 POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Several policy implications could be drawn from the findings 
summarised in the previous section. In this section, we present 
these policy alternatives and consider their equity/efficiency 
aspects.
A major policy implication concerns educational finance. If 
the private rates of return to investment in education are found 
to be on the low side, the social returns to investment in
education are found to be even lower, due to the public
subsidisation of education (Table 5.14). Up to what point should 
a country publicly support higher education? Greece spends 15
percent of its state budget on education, and one quarter of that
budget is devoted to higher education. Higher education in
Greece is proclaimed to be free, that is, students attend 
university free of tuition. However, as we have already argued 
in Section 2.2.5, it is by no means free. The lower strata spend 
a larger percentage of their annual income on the higher
education of their offspring than do the upper strata (in terms 
of expenditures other than fees), while the former benefit much
less from these State subsidies. This is not to suggest that
investment in education should be decreased, but rather that 
other methods of educational finance should be explored, so as to 
achieve greater efficiency and equity in the educational system. 
Some possible alternatives are enumerated below.
Selective charges for attending domestic universities can 
enhance both the efficiency and equity aspects. These charges 
could range from zero, or even negative for poor students, to the
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full marginal cost of a higher education place for students from 
more prosperous families. The classification of students into 
those who pay and do not pay, could be directly related to their 
family income and/or wealth. A direct effect of this measure 
would be the automatic discouragement of casual applicants and 
the less able —  in other words, those who feel that they will 
not recover the cost of their education —  in applying for a 
higher education place, thus reducing the number of applicants 
for admission. Also, this system would act as a further 
incentive for students to graduate as quickly as possible, 
discouraging those who stay in the system for an "infinite" 
number of years (Section 2.2.2), keeping the cost of their 
education minimal, and it would increase internal efficiency. In 
addition, since students would have to pay for their schooling, 
they may demand higher quality of instruction.
The replacement of the present system of indiscriminate 
subsidy by the selective policy of recovering the costs of higher 
education would result in increased equity by providing the 
subsidy to those students in greater financial need. This, in 
conjunction with a scheme of low-interest educational loans, 
would increase both efficiency and equity because of the above 
reasons as well as the fact that it would provide additional 
revenue for the universities.
As we have already stated, private higher education is 
constitutionally prohibited in Greece (see Section 2.2.2, and 
Appendix A.3), and this clause of the Constitution could be 
viewed as the main reason for the exodus of Greek students abroad 
and the massive outflow of foreign exchange, evidenced in Chapter
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7. Given that a satisfactory solution could be achieved by 
removing this clause from the Constitution, a policy implication 
of significant importance is the encouragement of private 
tertiary education in Greece. The private higher education 
institutions could be either domestic or foreign subsidiaries. 
They would be free to set their level of tuition fees, and to 
apply their own criteria in the selection of staff and students.
These institutions would absorb a substantial part of the 
excess demand for higher education, and they would also introduce 
an element of competition with the public higher education 
institutions. The acceptance of private tertiary education 
institutions may result in the retention of scarce foreign 
exchange.
All in all, if we combine the issues of selective charges 
and private tertiary education, we may achieve a more efficient 
and equitable system of higher education. In such a case, the 
bulk of the government's subsidy for higher education could be 
given directly to students from families of low income, so that 
they could choose the institution they wish to attend. Also, 
they would be free to choose either a public or a private 
institution. The objective of equity would also be enhanced by 
adding a "freedom of choice" dimension in the system, while 
efficiency in the system would be encouraged by the increased 
competition among these institutions in attracting students.
Moreover, previous analysis suggests that more money should 
be allocated by the State, through the higher education budget, 
towards the direction of post-graduate studies (Table 5.15).
Chapter 8, p. 302
Such a move would suggest almost double the yield of first 
university degrees and, unquestionably, undergraduate post­
secondary, non-university diplomas. In addition, their operation 
should overcome any of the existing obstacles, given the recent 
evidence of the will of the State now that their legal status has 
been partially cleared. It would also be appropriate to 
introduce competitive post-graduate programmes in the post­
secondary, non-university cycle of education. Such a policy 
would increase the social profitability of this type of education 
and would offer incentives to students leading them willingly 
towards them, while providing the employers with the opportunity 
to justify higher rewards. This is in contrast to the recent 
government proposal of upgrading these institutions to university 
status.
In addition, apart from the statistically significant 
contribution of formal schooling on earnings, the importance of 
on-the-job training has explicitly been demonstrated as well 
(Section 4.2.1.4). Specialised on-the-job training is a 
paramount factor which enhances significantly the competitiveness 
and earnings capacity of employees, as well as the profitability 
of their educational investment, acting as a value added for the 
bearer. Therefore, the value of training should be seriously 
considered when formulating educational policy in Greece. In the 
context of the modernisation of Greek higher education, special 
provision for the introduction and organisation of various 
specialised seminars would lead to the enhancement of the 
educational activities of higher education institutions and will 
contribute to the efficiency of the labour force.
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Another policy implication relates to teachers* pay in 
Greece. In an attempt to evaluate their pay position, it is 
found that, given the scarce resources and **poor** finances 
evidenced in Section 2.2.6, they are relatively low-paid (see 
Section 6.2). However, this finding contradicts frequent 
statements about the significance of their role in the 
educational process of the country. An increase in teachers* 
salaries, according to their human capital characteristics, 
would, undoubtedly, result in the harmonisation of their pay with 
the rest of the civil servants, and would contribute towards 
improving the quality of education in Greece.
Finally, it is possible that the imminent European 
integration of 1992 will lead to the relaxing of current laws 
about the operation of private universities in Greece. This, 
with the acceptance of some of the policy alternatives suggested 
above, may result in increased efficiency and equity in the Greek 
system. Inasmuch as the above recommendations would lead to 
greater efficiency, the State should act to ensure that the 
education system serves the interests of the country, making 
Greece competitive among other European countries.
Chapter 8, p. 304
8.3 SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE WORK
The empirical part of this analysis demonstrates that one of the 
most serious issues concerning research on education and the 
labour market in Greece relates to scarcity of data. This is the 
main reason perhaps that there have been no rates of return 
estimates since 1977. In an attempt to fill this ”gap”, we have 
faced serious data problems and have had to use figures relating 
to the pay of individual companies. Our first suggestion is that 
there should be systematic collection of detailed data on 
earnings and personal characteristics of the population and 
additional data concerning the student body. This will stimulate 
significant research in the field of the Economics of Education 
in Greece, inasmuch it will encourage prospective researchers to 
get involved with research on education in general. The way this 
could be achieved is; first, by including questions on the 
income, earnings, and employment status of individuals in the 
Census questionnaire of the National Statistical Service of 
Greece (carried out every 10 years), and second, by introducing a 
series of new questionnaires, to be carried out by the same 
organisation, on specific educational issues. Special attention 
should be given to the elaboration of tracer studies. It is 
needless to say, however, that special provisions should be 
taken, so as for these data to be made available for "public" 
use.
A second suggestion, which is in conjunction to the above, 
concerns the close monitoring of the returns to education at, 
say, five-year intervals.
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Another recommendation, relates to the thorough study of the 
effectiveness of educational reforms, in terms of feasibility and 
technical evaluation studies, that is, before and after their 
implementation, respectively. In such a case, it is secured that 
educational reforms are going to be based on scientific research 
rather than value judgements.
A final recommendation, is about the further examination of 
the consumption aspect, or sociological explanation, of the 
excess demand for higher education. This is of particular 
interest for educational policy decisions, as it will throw 
additional light on this matter, which is of national importance.
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A.1 Tertiary Education Institutions
(a) University level education is provided by 6 universities, 1 
polytechnic and 6 other independent faculties at this level as 
follows:
1 .
11.
Ill
I V .
V .
Vll.
Vlll
I X .
X .
the University of Athens, founded in 1837, which has 7 
schools: Theology, Philosophy and Literature, Law,
Economics, Medicine, Science and Dentistry. The Faculty 
of Philosophy includes the departments of Archaeology, 
History and Foreign Languages;
the Metsovian National Technical University 
(POLYTECHNEIO, EMP) of Athens, founded in 1836, which 
has 6 schools : Civil Engineering, Mechanical and
Electrical Engineering, Architecture, Chemical 
Engineering, Topography-Agronomy, Marine Engineering and 
Naval Architecture;
the University of Thessaloniki, founded in 1925, which 
has 10 schools : Theology, Philosophy and Literature 
(including History, Archaeology and a separate Institute 
of Foreign Languages), Law and Economics, Medicine, 
Dentistry, Agriculture, Forestry, Veterinary Studies, 
Engineering, Science;
the University of Patras, founded in 1964, which has 3 
faculties : Science (Mathematics, Physics, Chemistry, 
Biology, Geology), Engineering (Electrical-Mechanical 
Engineering, Civil Engineering, Chemical Engineering), 
Medicine;
the University of loannina, founded in 1966 and given 
independent status in 1971, which has 3 faculties : 
Science, Philosophy (including Literature), Medicine; 
vi. the University of Thrace, founded in 1975, with 
faculties of Law (at Komotini) and Engineering (at 
Xanthi);
the University of Crete (at Rethymnon and Herakleion), 
founded in 1977, with faculties of Philosophy and 
Mathematics ;
Athens Graduate School of Economics and Business 
Sciences, founded in 1920;
Panteios School of Political Sciences, Athens, founded 
in 1930;
Piraeus Graduate School of Industrial Studies, founded 
in 1938;
xi. Thessaloniki Graduate School of Industrial Studies,
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founded in 1958;
xii. Athens Graduate School of Agriculture, founded in 1920;
xiii. Athens Graduate School of Fine Arts, founded in 1836.
The establishment of a Technical University in Crete
(Chania) is at a very early stage. The government has announced 
plans to found 3 new universities: for the Ionian Islands (based 
in Corfu), for the Aegean, and another university in Thessaly.
(b) Five technical-vocational post-secondary, non-university 
institutions (named KATEE in the first instance and then renamed 
to TEI) were established with IBRD capital loans in 1973. Eight 
new TEI have been established since 1977, bringing the total to 
13 TEI by the end of 1982. There are also 4 state and 12 private 
post-secondary, non-university vocational schools for various 
fields of engineering, whose diplomas are considered equivalent 
to those awarded by TEI.
Teacher training for primary school teacher was provided by 
special colleges, named Pedagogical Academies. These colleges 
have ceased to operate recently (1988/89) and teacher's education 
was upgraded to university level status, lasting 4 years instead 
of the existing 2 years.
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A.2 Law 1268/1982 for University Education
The most important innovations of the Law-Framework (Law 
1268/1982) are:
(a) the abolition of the” University Chair" system and its 
replacement by the "Department-Section" (TMIMA-TOMEAS) 
system which has been criticised in some quarters in giving 
too much power to individual professors;
(b) limitation in the number of times students may re-sit 
examinations and on the number of additional years they may 
take to complete their degrees;
(c) the substantial participation of representatives of the 
junior academic staff, the technical and administrative 
staff and the high representation share of the student body 
in the operation and decision-making procedures within each 
university, (ie. 30 per cent representation in the general 
departmental meetings and even higher in the elections of 
the Dean and the Rector);
(d) the establishment of the National Academy of Letters and 
Sciences (EAGE) and the National Council for Higher 
Education (ESAP) as the supreme control and advisory bodies 
responsible for the planning and development of the 
Universities, i.e. to co-ordinate academic and research
programmes and to decide on academic equivalences, on-going 
education at tertiary level and establishment of new 
courses;
(e) the establishment of Post-Graduate studies in Greece,
offered by the newly established Graduate Schools of each 
University; and
(f) the restructuring of the various grades of assistant
teaching staff to make all future appointments in these 
grades, as well as promotion from one grade to the next, 
dependent on judgement of the academic and research 
accomplishments of the individual by a team of academics
rather than by the Head of the Chair personally as it was
done until then.
Article 14 of Law 1268/1982 states that the prerequisite of 
a candidate for a university post is to hold a Doctorate degree 
in the field he/she is applying to. The puzzling part of the 
article though, is that a two-year elapsing period is required 
between the Doctorate award date and the date of application for 
the Lecturer post, becoming six years for Full Professors. It is
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obvious therefore, that elapsing time itself as a selection 
criterion acts as a deterrent to promising prospective academics. 
The aim of the law though, was to attract Greek academics from 
foreign Universities which case is not yet fully justified.
Also, the high representation rate of students in all 
procedures of academic life —  although it is gladly accepted in 
theory —  creates various problems, given the excessive 
politicisation, student activism and structure/administration of 
the Universities (see also Psacharopoulos, 1988) .
Additionally, although solicitude for P/G studies is 
anticipated in the law-framework in question, no such programme 
has been organised yet, mainly because of the existing poor 
financial situation and staff shortage.
It is also worthwhile pointing out that the non-university, 
post-secondary Technical Education Institutions (TEI) —  the 
equivalent of British Polytechnics —  have received no attention 
in the Law, particularly as far as P/G studies are concerned. 
This is contradicting to the official policy and proclamations of 
the Ministry of Education towards "upgrading" the TEIs and feeds 
with further suspicion prospective students (for a more detailed 
presentation of the TEIs* environment, see Dragonas & Kostakis, 
1986).
Finally, it becomes evident that the law itself encourages 
students to stay on for as many years as they wish, transferring 
in some cases past knowledge and contributing to the phenomenon 
of overcrowding, thus obstructing any planning policy and plan 
(conservative estimates suggest that the percentage of those
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students could be 15-20% of the student body per year). In 
detail, article 25 (paragraph 12) prescribes that the student 
completes his studies and is awarded his degree when he will 
successfully pass the examinations in the appropriate subjects 
and collect the appropriate number of units/credits. Article 29, 
Paragraph 9, states that after a certain time (1.5 times the 
duration of degree) the student loses some of his privileges, but 
Paragraph 1 of the same Article, states that the student status 
is gained by the time of registration in the University and 
expires when the degree is awarded.
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A.3 Article 16 of the 1975 Greek Constitution
The provisions contained in Article 16 of the 1975 Greek 
Constitution with regard to education are summarised as follows:
”1. Art and science, research and teaching, shall be free of 
impediment, and it shall be incumbent on the State to 
develop and advance them. Academic freedom and freedom in 
teaching shall be subject to the provisions of the 
Constitution;
2. Education shall be a fundamental concern of the State. Its 
purpose shall be to develop national and religious awareness 
and to provide for the moral, intellectual, physical and 
vocational education of the Greeks, and to engender their 
upbringings as free and responsible citizens.
3. Compulsory education shall last for not less than nine 
years.
4. All Greeks shall be entitled to free education in the state 
institutions, at all levels. The State shall support 
distinguished students and those in need of assistance or 
special protection, according to their abilities.”
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A.4 Tertiary Education Entrance "Beneficial Provisions”
These "beneficial provisions” for tertiary education, and 
especially university, entry can be summarised as follows:
(a) One could register on the grounds of being of Albanian 
refugee descent (minority group provision), even if he has never 
seen Albania (abolished in 1983/84).
(b) It is quite a common practice for intending students who 
fail to qualify for entry in the national entry examination to 
register (usually without further post-secondary qualifications) 
with an Italian, French, Romanian etc. university and then 
transfer to the corresponding year in a Greek university of their 
choice (lately only to the 2nd or 3rd year after examination).
(c) The children of Greek emigrants who domicile permanently 
abroad (OMOGENEIS) can register without sitting the national 
examination up to a maximum 5 per cent of the total student 
population enrolled. Athletes also get bonus marks and have a 
comparative advantage.
(d) Existing graduates from any institution can re-register as 
students for any other degree and if in a similar subject, they 
get generous credit. The latter is particularly popular among 
TEI students (towards proper engineering degrees) or para-medical 
colleges students (towards proper medical degrees).
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Table A-1. Primary Education, EEC Countries, mid-1980s
Number Pupil/
of Teaching Pupils Teacher
Country Year Schools Staff Enrolled Ratio
Greece 1975 9,633 30,953 935,730 30
1980 9,461 37,315 900,641 24
1984 8,941 37,942 889,648 23
Belgium 1984 4,383 43,958 739,522 17
Denmark 1984 2,557 34,807 415,148 12
France 1984 48,605 170,692 4,126,435 21
Germany 1984 19,626 136,154 2,306,479 17
Ireland 1984 3,337 15,521 420,665 27
Italy 1984 28,244 276,553 3,904,143 14
Luxemburg 1983 ... 1,660 25,695 15
Netherlands 1984 8,454 56,371 1,094,980 19
Portugal 1984 13,134 74,903 1,274,887 17
Spain 1984 6,054 117,730 3,569,744 30
U.K. 1984 24,993 244,000 4,275,000 ...
Source; UNESCO, 1988, Statistical Yearbook. Table 3.4 
Notes: (...) not available
Table A-2. Secondary Education, EEC Countries, mid-1980s
Country Year
Teaching
Staff
(1)
Pupils
Enrolled
(2)
Pupil/
Teacher
Ratio
(2):(1)
Greece 1975 661,796
1980 39,571 740,058 19
1984 48,217 802,817 17
Belgium 1986 103,999 812,991 8
Denmark 1984 ... 483,859 ...
France 1984 313,433 5,320,621 17
Germany 1984 426,623 5,568,164 13
Ireland 1982 21,060 316,878 15
Italy 1984 547,148 5,338,731 10
Luxemburg 1984 2,307 24,788 11
Netherlands 1985 109,292 1,439,275 13
Portugal 1984 40,250 529,855 13
Spain 1984 198,107 4,222,836 21
U.K. 1984 ... 5,024,000 ...
Source: UNESCO, 1988, Statistical Yearbook. Table 3.5 
(first two columns)
Note: (...) not available
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Table A-3. Registered Students Attending Lectures, 
Selected University Institutions, 1977
University School/Institution
Percent
attending
Philosophy, University of Athens 
Physics/Mathematics, University of Athens 
Law School, University of Athens 
National Technical University (Polytechneio) 
Panteios School of Political Sciences, Athens 
Piraeus Graduate School of Industrial Studies
89
39
21
38
26
10
Source: Psacharopoulos and Kazamias, 1985, Table 5.1
Table A-4. Higher Education Entrance Examinations, Success 
Rates, 1961-86
Success Rate (%) Success Rate (%)
Total Total
Year Higher University Year Higher University
1961 28.3 1976 22.7 13.0
28.5 ... 22.5 14.2
27.5 ... 24.5 14.5
36.9 ... 23.0 13.5
31.7 ... 28.4 16.7
1966 30.1 ... 1981 35.6 19.4
38.1 ... 42.2 20.8
25.6 20.7 37.8 17.1
22.3 17.7 39.5 17.7
24.6 19.8 34.4 15.4
1971 27.8 22.7 1986 29.3 14.2
29.2 24.5 1987 29.3 15.9
30.7 23.4 1988 32.2 17.7
27.6 21.3 1989 ... ...
24.5 18.0
Source: Derived from Table 2.8
Note: (...) not available
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Table A-5. Tertiary Education, EEC Countries, mid-1980s
Teaching Students Student/Teacher
Country Year Staff Enrolled Ratio
(1) (2) (2):(1)
Greece 1975 117,246
1980 10,542 121,116 12
1984 11,735 167,957 14
Belgium 1986 19,452 252,236 13
Denmark 1984 ... 114,559 ...
France 1984 ... 1,255,538 ...
Germany 1984 182,310 1,519,050 8
Ireland 1984 5,761 67,378 12
Italy 1984 49,997 1,181,953 24
Luxemburg 1983 318 982 3
Netherlands 1985 ... 404,866 ...
Portugal 1984 11,272 112,851 10
Spain 1984 47,539 857,036 18
U.K. 1984 79,544 1,006,969 13
Source: UNESCO. :1988, Table 3.7 (first two columns)
Note: (...) not available
Table A-6. University Level EducationI, EEC Countries, i
Teaching Students Student/Teacher
Country Year Staff Enrolled Ratio
(1) (2) (2):(1)
Greece 1975 5,956 95,385 16
1980 6,924 85,718 12
1984 6,778 111,446 16
Belgium 1986 5,349 103,505 19
Denmark 1984 ... 88,812 ...
France 1984 44,678 967,490 22
Germany 1984 134,566 1,311,475 10
Ireland 1984 3,238 37,813 12
Italy 1984 49,472 1,173,910 24
Netherlands 1985 ... 168,858 ...
Portugal 1984 6,949 81,293 12
Spain 1984 46,632 804,273 17
U.K. 1984 31,043 345,760 11
Source; UNESCO, 1988, Table 3.7 
Note: (...) not available
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Table A-7. Total Third Level Students by Field of Study,
1980 and 1985
Field of Study
1980 
Total Females
1985 
Total Females
Total 121,116 50,204 167,957 81,181
Teacher Training 
Humanities 
Fine Arts
6,138
12,238
1,177
3,366
8,885
687
12,710
26,451
1,721
9,770
17,506
1,058
Law
Social Sciences 
Business Admin.
9,919
15,910
17,157
5,344
7,684
6,369
11,805
18,485
19,038
6,668 
9,425 
9,507
Mass Communication 
Home Economics 
Service Trades
291
220
1,309
160
220
586
537
337
2,104
417
159
1,203
Natural Science 
Mathematics 
Medical Science
7,449
5,901
13,249
2,271
2,212
6,602
8,643
7,276
19,700
3,195
2,550
10,741
Engineering 
Architecture 
Industrial Progr.
21,831
965
427
3,217
497
212
27,525
1,525
478
4,748
739
212
Transport & Com.
Agriculture
Other
670
4,957
1,078
119
1,725
48
1130
8,492
0
103
3,180
0
Source: UNESCO, 1988, Table 3.8
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Table A-8. Total Third Level Graduates by Field of Study, 1984
Field of Study
1984
Total Females
Total 27,818 14,073
Teacher Training 4,954 3,589
Humanities 2,952 2,089
Fine Arts 284 175
Law 1,637 967
Social Sciences 2,253 1,171
Business Admin. 4,060 2,064
Mass Communication 81 55
Home Economics 32 32
Service Trades 461 273
Natural Science 1,590 562
Mathematics 1,095 384
Medical Science 2,713 1,494
Engineering 3,674 565
Architecture 156 86
Industrial Progr. 69 38
Transport & Com. 815 103
Agriculture 992 426
Source: UNESCO. 1988. Table 3.10
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Table A-9. Percentage Distribution of the Public Current 
Expenditure, 1960-84
Year
Total 
Expenditure 
(min. Drs.)
Defence Education
% GNP
Health
1960 12,307 38.0 13.8 1.95 8.0
13,386 36.5 13.9 8.8
14,602 34.0 13.9 9.8
15,840 32.6 14.5 10.3
18,407 30.1 15.8 10.5
1965 21,076 30.5 16.0 2.10 11.1
23,621 30.8 16.2 10.9
28,130 35.0 15.4 9.7
30,225 35.8 15.2 9.3
33,872 37.0 14.8 9.3
1970 37,742 36.7 15.0 1.85 4.3
41,362 36.0 15.2 9.6
45,963 36.4 14.8 9.8
55,444 35.0 15.1 9.9
78,071 40.7 13.8 9.1
1975 102,007 44.5 12.7 1.83 8.5
124,332 42.1 13.2 1.87 9.5
153,840 36.9 13.9 2.02 9.6
185,150 41.1 14.9 2.12 9.9
233,530 39.2 14.2 2.05 10.6
1980 280,050 35.7 13.3 1.89 11.5
368,550 36.7 13.0 1.99 11.2
471,210 35.3 13.7 2.15 11.8
579,370 33.8 15.0 2.44 12.1
1984 724,490 33.9 15.2 2.51 11.2
Source: National Accounts of Greece of the respective years
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Table A-10. Educational
mid-1980s
Finance Statistics, EEC Countries,
Country Year
Total
GNP
Public Educ. Exp. 
■— as % of ———————
Budget
Higher Education 
Allocation 
(%)
Greece 1984 2.6 8.9a/ 22.3
Belgium 1985 6.1 15.2 16.7
Denmark 1986 7.7 13.4 20.7
France 1983 6.0 18.5 12.1
Germany 1985 4.6 9.2 20.8
Ireland 1985 6.7 8.7 17.7
Italy 1983 4.8 9.6 10.1
Netherlands 1984 6.9 16.8 26.6
Portugal 1985 4.6 8.7b/ 12.7
Spain 1985 3.3 14.1 14.Oc/
U.K. 1984 5.2 11.3 21.4
Source: UNESCO, 1988, Table 4.1 (first two columns) and Table 4.3 
(last column)
Notes: a/ figure from 1984 State Budget
b/ refers to 1983 
c/ refers to 1979
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Table A-11. State Budget: Total and Educational Expenditure, 
1961-84 (million current Drs)
Expenditure
Year Total Education (%)
(1) (2) (2):(1)
1961 16,665 1,252 7.5
20,190 1,370 6.8
21,288 1,521 7.1
26,543 2,272 8.6
1965 29,593 2,547 8.6
34,195 2,988 8.7
41,604 3,611 8.7
45,697 3,937 8.6
51,221 4,027 7.9
1970 54,570 3,883 7.1
59,570 4,428 7.4
68,229 5,156 7.6
72,304 5,913 8.2
79,129 8,581 10.8
1975 133,876 10,591 7.9
166,792 12,156 7.3
193,967 15,455 8.0
252,996 28,131 11.1
319,764 33,936 10.6
1980 375,285 41,584 11.1
661,612 53,709 8.1
720,564 72,173 10.0
952,565 85,381 9.0
1984 1,212,143 107,514 8.9
Source: Pesmazoglou, 1987, Table 3, p. 82
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Table A-12. Distribution of the Population (over 10 years)
by Educational Level and Gender, 1961-1981 (%)
1961 1971 1981
Educational Level
Total Males Females Total Males Females Total Males Females
Higher Complete 1.8 2.9 0.8 2.9 4.3 1.6 5.9 7.8 4.1
Higher Incomplete 1.3*/ 1.9*/ 0.8*/ 1.6 2.1 1.1 1.9 2.3 1.5
Secondary Complete 6.3 7.0 5.6 9.4 10.0 8.8 13.6 13.5 13.7
Secondary Incomplete 8.1*/ 10.6*/ 5.8*/ 7.7 9.5 6.1 9.9 12.0 7.9
Primary Complete 35.2 40.3 30.5 41.7 45.8 37.9 43.9 45.7 42.1
Primary Incomplete**,r 29.5 29.7 29.3 22.7 22.1 23.2 16.2 15.1 17.3
111i terates 17.8 7.6 27.2 14.0 6.2 21.3 8.6 3.6 13.4
Population over 10 6877.5 3314.2 3563.3 7269.2 3515.7 3753.5 8215.0 3995.6 4219.4
in (000)
Total Population 8388.3 4091.7 4296.6 8768.4 4286.8 4481.6 9739.6 4779.6 4960.0
in (000)
Population over 10
as % of the Total 82.0 81.0 82.9 82.9 82.0 83.8 84.3 83.6 85.1
Average Years of
Schooling 5.0 5.8 4.1 5.7 6.5 5.0 6.9 7.5 6.3
Source; NSSG, Population Censuses for 1961, 1971, and 1981 
respectively
Notes: */ Estimates based on the 1961 * full secondary* column and 
the 1971 proportion of secondary school graduates who 
have had some higher education 
**/ Includes the *not classified elsewhere* category
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Table A-13. Distribution of the Population (over 10 years)
by Educational Level and Region, 1961-1981 (%)
1961 1971 1981
Urban S-Urban Rural Urban S-Urban Rural Urban S-Urban Rural
Educational Level
Full Higher 3.2 1.2 0.6 4.4 1.9 0.9 8.4 4.0 1.9
Part Higher 2.7 0.4 0.2 2.8 0.4 0.2 2.9 0.8 0.4
Full Secondary 11.5 3.8 1.4 15.1 5.2 1.9 19.1 9.3 4.9
Part Secondary 12.1 7.2 4.1 10.1 7.2 4.2 11.6 9.6 6.9
Full Primary 34.6 36.2 35.6 40.5 44.0 42.9 40.2 47.1 49.5
Part Primary 24.1 32.7 34.2 18.2 25.8 28.6 12.6 19.1 22.0
111 i terates 11.8 18.5 23.9 8.9 15.5 21.3 5.2 10.1 14.4
Regional Population 3083.0 889.5 2905.0 3925.7 835.8 2507.7 4754.9 945.3 2514.8
in (000)
Total Population 6877.5 6877.5 6877.5 7269.2 7269.2 7269.2 8215.0 8215.0 8215.0
in (000)
Regional Population
as % of the Total 44.8 12.9 42.2 54.0 11.5 34.5 57.9 11.5 30.6
Average Years of
Schooling 6.2 4.5 3.8 6.8 5.1 4.2 7.9 6.1 5.2
Source: NSSG, Population Censuses for 1961, 1971, and 1981 
respectively
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Table B-1. Mean Sample Characteristics by Gender and Type of Employment:
NSSG Data Set, 1977 (Salary Earners)
Entire Sample Private Sector Public Sector
Characteristic
Both
Sexes Males Females
Both
Sexes Males Females
Both
Sexes Males Females
Earnings (Drs per month) 15,441
(8,132)
17,313
(8,668)
11,287
(4,600)
15,272
(9,652)
16,972
(9,986)
9,129
(4,629)
17,521
(7,680)
18,847
(7,744)
12,094
(4,285)
Years of Schooling 13.8
(3.7)
13.7
(3.8)
14.1
(3.4)
11.9
(4.2)
12.1
(4.3)
11.2
(3.9)
14.5
(2.9)
14.5
(9.3)
14.6
(2.3)
Age 39.6
(10.5)
41.4
(10.3)
35.4
(9.8)
37.9
(11.3)
39.7
(11.1)
31.4
(9.9)
41.7
(10.3)
43.3
(10.0)
35.4
(9.0)
Experience 18.0
(11.0)
19.4
(10.9)
15.0
(10.6)
17.8
(12.0)
19.1
(11.9)
13.4
(11.4)
19.2
(10.3)
20.4
(10.2)
14.4
(9.5)
Age when employed 21.5
(3.6)
22.0
(3.6)
20.4
(3.3)
20.0
(4.3)
20.6
(4.2)
18.0
(4.1)
22.2
(3.2)
22.5
(3.2)
20.8
(2.4)
Marital Status 0.7
(0.4)
0.8
(0.4)
0.6
(0.5)
0.7
(0.5)
0.8
(0.4)
0.4
(0.5)
0.8
(0.4)
0.9
(0.3)
0.7
(0.5)
Nimber of Children ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Number of Observations 7,058 4,865 2,193 1,319 1,033 286 1,462 1,175 287
Note: Numbers in parentheses
(...) not available
are standard deviations
Table B-2. Mean Sample Characteristics by Gender and Type of Employment:
lEIR Data Set, 1975
Characteristic
Entire Sample Private Sector Public Sector
Both
Sexes Males Females
Both
Sexes Males Females
Both
Sexes Males Females
Earnings (Drs per month) 16,449 16,736 16,095 10,952 11,925 8,398 17,803 18,420 17,161
(11,442) (11,310) (11,614) (5,502) (6,060) (2,168) (12,105) (12,213) (11,985)
Years of Schooling 10.7 10.7 10.8 10.5 10.1 11.3 10.8 10.9 10.7
Age
Experience
(4.4) (4.5) (4.4) (4.2) (4.4) (3.8) (4.5) (4.5) (4.5)
12.7 12.5 13.0 10.6 10.6 10.8 13.3 13.2 13.3
(8.2) (8.1) (8.2) (7.8) (7.8) (7.9) (8.2) (8.2) (8.2)
Age when employed ... ... ... ... ...
Marital Status 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
(0.5) (0.5) (0.5) (0.5) (0.5) (0.5) (0.5) (0.5) (0.5)
Nimber of Children ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Nimber of Observations 587 324 263 116 84 32 471 240 231
Note; Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations
(...) not available
Table B-3. Mean Sample Characteristics by Gender and Type of Employment:
lEIR Data Set, 1981
Characteristic
Entire Sample Private Sector Public Sector
Both
Sexes Males Females
Both
Sexes Males Females
Both
Sexes Males Females
Earnings (Drs per month) 39,711 40,912 38,190 33,600 36,280 27,254 41,848 43,151 40,499
(20,977) (21,647) (20,030) (18,998) (21,257) (9,599) (21,233) (21,521) (20,891)
Years of Schooling 10.6 10.4 10.7 10.7 10.3 11.6 10.5 10.5 10.5
Age
Experience
(4.4) (4.5) (4.4) (4.4) (4.5) (4.1) (4.5) (4.5) (4.5)
12.8 12.8 12.8 11.4 11.8 10.6 13.3 13.3 13.3
(8.1) (8.1) (8.2) (7.7) (7.8) (7.6) (8.2) (8.2) (8.2)
Age when employed ... ... ...
Marital Status 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
(0.5) (0.5) (0.5) (0.5) (O.S) (0.5) (0.5) (0.5) (0.5)
Nurter of Children • • • ... ...
Nimber of Observations 637 356 281 165 116 49 472 240 232
Note; Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations
(...) not available
Table B-4. Mean Sample Characteristics by Gender and Type of Employment:
lEiR Data Set, 1985
Characteristic
Entire Sample Private Sector Public Sector
Both
Sexes Males Females
Both
Sexes Males Females
Both
Sexes Males Females
Earnings (Drs per month) 84,248 85,662 82,533 67,691 71,769 58,820 90,102 92,391 87,812
(33,911) (35,109) (32,369) (28,074) (31,148) (16,895) (33,885) (34,997) (32,643)
Years of Schooling 10.5 10.4 10.7 10.5 10.0 11.3 10.6 10.5 10.6
Age
Experience
(4.5) (4.5) (4.4) (4.4) (4.5) (4.1) (4.5) (4.5) (4.5)
12.9 12.9 13.0 12.1 12.3 11.6 13.3 13.3 13.3
(8.1) (8.1) (8.2) (7.9) (7.9) (7.9) (8.2) (8.2) (8.2)
Age when employed ... ... ...
Marital Status 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
(0.5) (0.5) (0.5) (0.5) (0.5) (0.5) (0.5) (0.5) (0.5)
Number of Children ... ... ...
Number of Observations
—  — .--------------------
693 380 313 181 124 57 512 256 256
Note; Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations
(...) not available
Table B-5. Mean Sample Characteristics by Gender:
Public Sector Data Set, 1986 and 1987
Characteristic
1987
State-controlled Bank: (HIDB)
1987
Ministry of Education
1986 
Min. of Finance
Both
Sexes Males Females
Both
Sexes Males Females
Both
Sexes
Earnings (Drs per month) 87,415 93,468 77,394 69,587 73,875 66,724 62,333
(23,479) (24,971) (16,483) (10,597) (10,320) (9,794) (12,153)
Years of Schooling 13.0 13.5 12.2 13.6 13.9 13.5 13.4
(3.4) (3.5) (3.0) (2.7) (2.8) (2.6) (2.8)
Age 43.0 45.3 39.1 41.0 44.2 38.9
(10.2) (10.0) (9.3) (7.5) (7.4) (6.8)
Experience 18.2 19.6 15.6 14.0 15.6 12.9 12.4
(8.6) (9.4) (6.3) (6.9) (7.8) (6.1) (8.1)
Age when employed 25.4 25.8 24.8 27.4 29.0 26.4
(7.0) (7.4) (6.2) (4.7) (4.3) (4.7)
Marital Status 0.7 0.9 0.5 0.6 0.8 0.5 0.8
(0.5) (0.4) (0.5) (0.5) (0.4) (0.5) (0.4)
Number of Children 1.3 1.4 1.1 0.8 1.1 0.6 1.1
(1.0) (1.0) (1.0) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (1.0)
Ninber of Observations 786 490 296 632 253 379 18,337
Note: Numbers in parentheses
(...) not available
are standard deviations
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Table B-6. Earnings Functions by Economic Sector, Males:
NSSG Sample, 1977
All Sectors Private Sector Public Sector
Independent Variable Mincerian step Mincerian step Mincerian Step
Years of Schooling, S 0.048 * 
(31.30)
0.068 * 
(21.70)
0.073 * 
(27.01)
Years of Experience, EX 0.053 * 
(29.91)
0.054 * 
(30.19)
0.057 * 
(14.73)
0.057 * 
(14.89)
0.043 * 
(15.65)
0.045 * 
(16.31)
Exper i ence-squa red -0.00088 * 
(22.01)
-0.00091 * - 
(22.57)
0.00104 * 
(12.13)
-0.00106 * 
(12.47)
-0.00051 * 
(8.19)
-0.00058 * 
(9.18)
Educational Level
- Secondary Incomplete 0.193 * 
(6.62)
0.165 * 
(3.18)
0.177 * 
(3.54)
- Secondary 0.301 * 
(14.24)
0.273 * 
(7.06)
0.290 * 
(7.57)
- University Incomplete 0.298 * 
(6.63)
0.236 * 
(3.04)
0.520 * 
(5.71)
- University 0.497 * 
(29.03)
0.694 * 
(21.35)
0.682 * 
(20.54)
Constant Term 
R-squared (adjusted) 
N
8.406
0.313
4,865
8.674
0.310
4,865
8.218
0.385
1,033
8.650
0.403
1,033
8.096
0.545
1,175
8.585
0.546
1,175
Source: Based on the NSSG data set
Notes: Absolute t-values in parentheses
Dependent variable: natural logarithm of monthly earnings 
"Primary-education-or-less" is the omitted education dummy 
* and ** indicate statistical significance at the 1% and 5% 
level, respectively
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Table B-7. Earnings Functions by Economic Sector, Females:
NSSG Sample, 1977
All Sectors Private Sector Public Sector
Independent Variable Mincerian Step Mincerian Step Mincerian Step
Years of Schooling, S 0.068 * 
(32.62)
0.074 * 
(15.90)
0.086 * 
(12.96)
Years of Experience, EX 0.051 * 
(26.34)
0.054 * 
(28.16)
0.043 * 
(8.57)
0.043 * 
(8.70)
0.042 * 
(7.37)
0.040 * 
(6.64)
Experience-squared -0.00083 * 
(16.83)
-0.00090 * 
(18.74)
-0.00061 * 
(5.01)
-0.00070 * 
(5.81)
-0.00055 * 
(3.79)
-0.00048 * 
(3.13)
Eckjcational Level
- Secondary Incomplete 0.250 * 
(4.66)
0.100
(1.46)
0.536 * 
(2.60)
- Secondary 0.584 * 
(20.92)
0.375 * 
(8.13)
0.817 * 
(6.98)
- University Inconplete 0.501 * 
(9.13)
0.381 * 
(3.51)
0.729 * 
(5.07)
- University 0.780 * 
(30.72)
0.778 * 
(16.08)
1.125 * 
(9.73)
Constant Term 
R-squared (adjusted) 
N
7.810
0.524
2,193
8.086
0.529
2,193
7.818
0.520
286
8.302
0.548
286
7.633
0.514
287
7.907
0.526
287
Source: Based on the NSSG data set 
Notes: Absolute t-values in parentheses
Dependent variable: natural logarithm of monthly earnings 
"Primary-education-or-less” is the omitted education dummy 
* and ** indicate statistical significance at the 1% and 5% 
level, respectively
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Table B-8. Mincerian Earnings Functions, Non-linear in '8',
by Economic Sector, Males: NSSG Sample, 1977
All Private Public
Independent Variable Sectors Sector Sector
Years of Schooling, S 0.055 * -0.031 0.022
(5.16) (1.46) (1.24)
Years of Experience, EX 0.053 * 0.058 * 0.044 *
(29.74) (15.11) (15.91)
Experience-squared -0.00088 * -0.00107 * -0.00054 *
(21.72) (12.61) (8.56)
Schooling-squared -0.0003 0.005 * 0.002 *
0.65 (4.65) (2.95)
Constant Term 8.375 8.664 8.349
R-squared (adjusted) 0.313 0.397 0.548
N 4,865 1,033 1,175
Table B-9. Mincerian Earninas Functions. Non-linear :in 'S',
by Economic Sector, Females: NSSG Sample, 1977
All Private Public
Independent Variable Sectors Sector Sector
Years of Schooling, S 0.101 * -0.025 0.134
(9.15) (1.03) (3.29)
Years of Experience, EX 0.050 * 0.042 * 0.042 *
(25.67) (8.67) (7.18)
Experience-squared -0.00078 * -0.00066 * -0.00053 *
(15.44) (5.53) (3.55)
Schooling-squared -0.002 * 0.005 * 0.002
(3.11) (4.17) (1.19)
Constant Term 7.649 8.296 7.354
R-squared (adjusted) 0.526 0.547 0.514
N 2,193 286 287
Source: Based on the NSSG data set 
Notes: Absolute t-values in parentheses
Dependent variable: natural logarithm of monthly earnings 
* and ** indicate statistical significance at the 1% and 5% 
level, respectively
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Table B-10. Mincerian Earninas Functions« All Sectors, Males:
lEIR Sample/ 1975, 1981 and 1985
Independent Variable 1975 1981 1985
Years of Schooling, S 0.062 * 0.043 * 0.037 *
(11.85) (10.15) (11.61)
Years of Experience, EX 0.062 * 0.045 * 0.042 *
(4.97) (4.64) (5.48)
Experience-squared - 0.00097 ** -0.00048 -0.00060 **
(2.23) (1.36) (2.28)
Constant Term 8.325 9.577 10.506
R-squared (adjusted) 0.476 0.445 0.473
N 324 356 380
Table B-11. Mincerian Earninas Functions by :Economic Sector, Males:
lEiR Sample,r 1975, 1981 and 1985
1975 1981 1985
Independent Variable Private Public Private Public Private Public
Years of Schooling, S 0.048 * 0.064 * 0.049 * 0.040 * 0.039 * 0.033 *
(5.44) (10.65) (5.73) (8.81) (6.36) (10.93)
Years of Experience, EX 0.042 ** 0.070 * 0.038 0.053 * 0.041 * 0.045 *
(2.07) (4.74) (1.91) (4.75) (2.81) (5.98)
Experience-squared -0.00087 -0.00113 ** -0.00064 -0.00060 -0.00092 -13.00059 **
(1.17) (2.23) (0.89) (1.57) (1.79) (2.31)
Constant Term 8.503 8.288 9.540 9.586 10.403 10.571
R-squared (adjusted) 0.343 0.505 0.299 0.538 0.331 0.609
N 84 240 116 240 124 256
Source; Based on the lEIR data set
Notes: Absolute t-values in parentheses
Dependent variable: natural logarithm of monthly earnings
* and ** indicate statistical significance at the 1% and 5% 
level, respectively
Appendixes, p. 334
Table B-12. Mincerian Earnings Functions, All Sectors,
Females: lEIR Sample, 1975, 1981 and 1985
Independent Variable 1975 1981 1985
Years of Schooling, S 0.054 * 
(8.10)
0.038 * 
(8.22)
0.030 * 
(9.10)
Years of Experience, EX 0.067 * 
(4.27)
0.052 * 
(4.74)
0.042 * 
(5.30)
Experience-squared — 0.00110 ** -0 
(1.97)
.00061
(1.61)
-0.00054 ** 
(1.97)
Constant Term 
R-squared (adjusted) 
N
8.276
0.398
263
9.508
0.484
281
10.507
0.497
313
Table B-13. Mincerian Earninas Functions by Economic Sector. 
Females: lEIR Sample, 1975, 1981 and 1985
1975 1981 1985
Independent Variable Private Public Private Public Private Public
Years of Schooling, S -0.010
(0.94)
0.062 ♦ 
(9.15)
0.005 0.047 * 
(0.41) (10.36)
0.029
(1.90)
0.036 * 
(12.61)
Years of Experience, EX 0.035
(1.65)
0.070 * 
(4.31)
0.038 0.057 * 
(1.50) (5.24)
0.029
(1.62)
0.047 * 
(6.67)
Experience-squared -0.00065
(0.84)
-0.00118 ** 
(2.10)
-0.00073 -0.00075 ** 
(0.80) (1.99)
-0.00053 -0.00065 * 
(0.85) (2.70)
Constant Term 8.860 
R-squared (adjusted) 0.257 
N 32
8.237
0.448
231
9.821 9.426 
0.122 0.583 
49 232
10.540
0.201
57
10.478
0.655
256
Source: Based on the lEIR data set 
Notes: Absolute t-values in oarentheses
Dependent variable: natural logarithm of monthly earnings
* and ** indicate statistical significance at the 1% and 5% 
level, respectively
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Table B-14. Mincerian Earnings Functions, Non-linear in 'S',
All Sectors, Males: lEIR Sample, 1975, 1981, 1985
Independent Variable 1975 1981 1985
Years of Schooling, S -0.283 * -0.204 * -0.122 *
(6.94) (4.84) (3.73)
Years of Experience, EX 0.063 * 0.045 * 0.041 *
(5.38) (4.62) (5.62)
Experience-sguared -0.00100 ** -0.00046 -0.00060 **
(2.45) (1.37) (2.33)
Schooling-squared 0.016 * 0.011 * 0.007 *
(6.94) (5.90) (4.86)
Constant Term 9.870 10.685 11.217
R-squared (adjusted) 0.544 0.494 0.503
N 324 356 380
Table B-15. Mincerian Earnings Functions. Non-linear in 'S',
All Sectors, Females: lEIR Sample, 1975, 1981, 1985
Independent Variable 1975 1981 1985
Years of Schooling, S -0.268 * -0.185 * -0.121 *
(5.45) (4.41) (3.76)
Years of Experience, EX 0.066 * 0.050 * 0.042 *
(4.41) (4.82) (5.48)
Experience-squared -0.00104 ** -0.00057 -0.00055 **
(2.01) (1.59) (2.05)
Schooling-squared 0.015 * 0.010 * 0.007 *
(5.45) (5.33) (4.73)
Constant Term 9.741 10.526 11.187
R-squared (adjusted) 0.458 0.530 0.530
N 263 281 313
Source; Based on the lEIR data set 
Notes: Absolute t-values in parentheses
Dependent variable: natural logarithm of monthly earnings 
* and ** indicate statistical significance at the 1% and 5% 
level, respectively
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Table B-16. Mincerian Earnings Functions, Non-linear in '8',
by Economic Sector, Males: lEiR Sample, 1975-1985
Independent Variable
1975 1981 1985
Private Public Private Public Private Public
Years of Schooling, S -0.296 * -0.263 * -0.251 * -0.186 * -0.169 * -0.107 *
(3.81) (4.45) (2.94) (4.15) (2.64) (3.39)
Years of Experience, EX 0.044 * 0.070 * 0.037 * 0.053 * 0.039 * 0.045 *
(2.40) (5.06) (1.92) (4.99) (2.81) (6.25)
Exper i ence-squa red -0.00090 0.00114 ** -0.00059 0.00060 ** -0.00088 0.00060 *
(1.35) (2.40) (0.86) (1.65) (1.77) (2.44)
Schooling-squared 0.016 * 0.015 * 0.014 * 0.010 * 0.010 * 0.006 *
(4.45) (5.56) (3.53) (5.08) (3.27) (4.47)
Constant Term 10.024 9.762 10.887 10.600 11.343 11.196
R-squared (adjusted) 0.468 0.560 0.364 0.582 0.381 0.637
N 84 240 116 240 124 256
Source; Based on the lEIR data set 
Notes: Absolute t-values in parentheses 
Dependent variable: natural logarithm of monthly earnings 
* and ** indicate statistical significance at the 1% and 5% 
level, respectively
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Table B-17. Mincerian Earnings Functions, Non-linear in '8',
by Economic Sector, Females: lEiR Sample, 1975-1985
Independent Variable
1975 1981 1985
Private Public Private Public Private Public
Years of Schooling, S 0.039 -0.269 * -0.181 ** -0.172 * -0.018 -0.105 *
(0.52) (4.20) (2.06) (3.97) (0.28) (3.61)
Years of Experience, EX 0.035 0.070 * 0.033 0.057 * 0.029 0.047 *
(1.64) (4.53) (1.35) (5.52) (1.62) (6.96)
Experience-squared -0.00065 -0.00116 ** 0.00062 0.00075 ** -0.00054 -0.00065 *
(0.84) (2.19) (0.71) (2.10) (0.85) (2.82)
Schooling-squared -0.002 0.015 * 0.009 ** 0.010 * 0.002 0.007 *
(0.67) (5.20) (2.14) (5.07) (0.52) (4.88)
Constant Term 8.626 9.727 10.720 10.408 10.697 11.111
R-squared (adjusted) 0.242 0.505 0.187 0.623 0.190 0.684
N 32 231 49 232 57 256
Source: Based on the lEIR data set 
Notes: Absolute t-values in parentheses 
Dependent variable: natural logarithm of monthly earnings 
* and ** indicate statistical significance at the 1% and 5% 
level, respectively
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Table B-18. Step Earnings Functions, All Sectors, Males:
lEIR Szunple, 1975, 1981 and 1985
Independent Variable 1975 1981 1985
Years of Experience, EX 0.063 * 
(5.38)
0.045 * 
(4.62)
0.041 * 
(5.62)
Experience-squared -0.00100 ** -0 
(2.45)
.00046
(1.37)
0.00060 ** 
(2.33)
Educational Level
- Secondary 0.018
(0.32)
0.011
(0.22)
0.059
(1.55)
- University 0.666 * 
(13.58)
0.475 * 
(11.49)
0.391 * 
(12.60)
Constant Term 
R-squared (adjusted) 
N
8.745
0.544
324
9.874
0.494
356
10.747
0.503
380
Source: Based on the lEIR 
Notes: Absolute t-values 
Dependent variable 
"Primary-education 
* and ** indicate
data set 
in parentheses
: natural logarithm of monthly earnings 
-or-less” is the omitted education dummy 
statistical significance at the 1% and 5%
level, respectively
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Table B-19. Step Earnings Functions by Economic Sector, Males:
lEiR Sample, 1975, 1981 and 1985
Independent Variable
1975 1981 1985
Private Public Private Publi c Private Public
Years of Experience, EX 0.044 ** 0.070 * 0.037 ** 0.053 * 0.039 * 0.045 *
(2.40) (5.05) (1.93) (4.99) (2.81) (6.25)
Experience-squared -0.00090 -0.00114 ** -0.00059 0.00060 -0.00088 -0.00060 **
(1.35) (2.40) (0.86) (1.64) (1.77) (2.44)
Educational Level
- Secondary -0.049 0.047 -0.007 0.014 0.029 0.057
(0.55) (0.68) (0.08) (0.27) (0.39) (1.57)
- University 0.556 * 0.681 * 0.542 * 0.442 * 0.435 * 0.354 *
(6.89) (11.90) (6.55) (9.98) (7.14) (11.89)
Constant Term 8.825 8.726 9.882 9.861 10.675 10.788
R-squared (adjusted) 0.468 0.560 0.364 0.582 0.381 0.637
N 84 240 116 240 124 256
Source: Based on the lEIR data set
Notes: Absolute t-values in parentheses
Dependent variable: natural logarithm of monthly earnings 
"Primary-education-or-less" is the omitted education dummy 
* and ** indicate statistical significance at the 1% and 5% 
level, respectively
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Table B-20. Steo Earninas Functions, All Sectors, Females:
lEIR Sample, 1975, 1981 and 1985
Independent Variable 1975 1981 1985
Years of Experience, EX 0.066 * 0.050 * 0.042 *
(4.41) (4.83) (5.48)
Experience-squared -0.00104 ** -0.00057 -0.00055 **
(2.01) (1.59) (2.05)
Educational Level
- Secondary 0.002 0.002 0.029
(0.03) (0.05) (0.77)
- University 0.598 * 0.417 * 0.327 *
(9.30) (9.37) (10.01)
Constant Term 8.671 9.786 10.715
R-squared (adjusted) 0.458 0.530 0.530
N 263 281 313
Source; Based on the lEIR data set 
Notes : Absolute, t-values in parentheses
Dependent variable: natural logarithm of monthly earnings 
"Primary-education-or-less” is the omitted education dummy 
* and ** indicate statistical significance at the 1% and 5% 
level, respectively
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Table B-21. Step Earnings Functions by Economic Sector, Females:
lEIR Sample, 1975, 1981 and 1985
Independent Variable
1975 1981 1985
Private Public Private Publi c Private Public
Years of Experience, EX 0.035 0.070 * 0.033 0.057 * 0.029 0.047 *
(1.64) (4.53) (1.35) (5.52) (1.62) (6.96)
Exper i ence-squared -0.00065 -0.00116 * -0.00062 -0.00075 ** -0.00054 -0.00065 *
(0.84) (2.19) (0.71) (2.10) (0.85) (2.82)
Educational Level
- Secondary -0.014 0.035 -0.162 0.061 0.059 0.073 **
(0.15) (0.47) (1.45) (1.20) (0.71) (2.16)
- University -0.115 0.670 * 0.073 0.506 * 0.161 0.382 *
(1.03) (10.34) (0.64) (11.62) (1.93) (13.76)
Constant Term 8.777 8.662 9.941 9.740 10.643 10.715
R-squared (adjusted) 0.242 0.505 0.187 0.623 0.190 0.684
N 32 231 49 232 57 256
Source: Based on the lEIR data set
Notes: Absolute t-values in parentheses
Dependent variable: natural logarithm of monthly earnings 
"Primary-education-or-less" is the omitted education dummy 
* and ** indicate statistical significance at the 1% and 5% 
level, respectively
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Table B-22. Earnings 
1986 and
Functions
1987
, Males: Public Sector Sample,
1986 a/ 1987 b/ 1987 c/
Independent Variable Mincerian step Mincerian step Mincerian step
Years of Schooling, iS 0.023 * 
(67.64)
0.026 * 
(12.64)
0.043 * 
(19.73)
Years of Experience, EX 0.023 * 
(59.51)
0.023 * 
(59.42)
0.007 ** 
(2.09)
0.005
(1.56)
0.037 * 
(14.98)
0.038 * 
(14.80)
Experience-squared -0.00023 * 
(17.17)
-0.00023 * 
(17.06)
0.00011
(1.19)
0.00015 ** 
(1.62)
-0.00053 * 
(10.03)
-0.00054 * 
(9.90)
Educational Level
- Secondary 0.063 * 
(16.90)
0.088 * 
(3.42)
0.231 * 
(9.45)
- Non-Univ., Post-Sec. 0.117 * 
(3.05)
0.134 * 
(3.61)
--
- University 0.186 * 
(49.06)
0.222 * 
(8.65)
0.422 * 
(18.32)
- Post-Graduate 0.207 * 
(18.35)
0.255 * 
(7.10)
—
Constant Term 
R-squared (adjusted) 
N
10.489
0.633
18,337
10.837
0.644
18,337
10.709
0.608
212
10.935
0.627
212
10.408
0.629
468
10.865
0.663
468
Source; Based on the public sector data set 
Notes: Absolute t-values in parentheses
Dependent variable: natural logarithm of monthly earnings 
"Primary-education-or-less" is the omitted education dummy 
* and ** indicate statistical significance at the 1% and 5% 
level, respectively 
(-- ) not applicable
a/Ministry of Finance, refers to both sexes 
b/Ministry of Education 
c/State-controlled Bank (HIDB)
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Table B-23. Earnings Functions, Females: Public Sector Sample,
1986 and 1987
1986 a/ 1987 b/ 1987 c/
Independent Variable Mincerian Step Mincerian Step Mincerian Step
Years of Schooling, S 0.023 * 
(67.64)
0.029 * 
(16.23)
0.028 * 
(9.94)
Years of Experience, EX 0.023 * 
(59.51)
0.023 * 
(59.42)
0.013 * 
(4.15)
0.011 * 
(3.58)
0.046 * 
(9.22)
0.046 * 
(9.35)
Exper i ence-squared -0.00023 * 
(17.17)
0.00023 * 
(17.06)
0.00000
(0.03)
0.00006
(0.64)
-0.00100 * 
(6.15)
-0.00100 * 
(6.26)
Educational Level
- Secondary 0.063 * 
(16.90)
0.116 * 
(5.67)
0.114 * 
(4.59)
- Non-Univ., Post-Sec. 0.117 * 
(3.05)
0.179 * 
(4.01)
—
- University 0.186 * 
(49.06)
0.256 * 
(12.19)
0.274 * 
(9.83)
- Post-Graduate 0.207 * 
(18.35)
0.272 * 
(6.07)
—
Constant Term 
R-squared (adjusted) 
N
10.489
0.633
18,337
10.837
0.644
18,337
10.549
0.660
336
10.781
0.671
336
10.483
0.512
267
10.686
0.526
267
Source; Based on the public sector data set 
Notes: Absolute t-values in parentheses
Dependent variable: natural logarithm of monthly earnings 
"Primary-education-or-less” is the omitted education dummy 
* and ** indicate statistical significance at the 1% and 5% 
level, respectively 
(-- ) not applicable
a/Ministry of Finance, refers to both sexes 
b/Ministry of Education 
c/State-controlled Bank (HIDB)
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Table B-24. Mincerian Earnings Functions, Non-linear in *8',
Males: Public Sector Sample, 1986 and 1987
Independent Variable 1986 a/ 1987 b/ 1987 C /
Years of Schooling, S -0.024 * 
(11.50)
-0.017
(1.33)
0.022
(1.39)
Years of Experience, EX 0.023 * 
(59.52)
0.005
(1.65)
0.037 * 
(14.96)
Experience-squared -0.00023 * 
(17.17)
0.00016
(1.87)
0.00054 * 
(10.11)
Schooling-squared 0.002 * 
(22.78)
0.002 * 
(3.43)
0.001
(1.35)
Constant Term 
R-squared (adjusted) 
N
10.755
0.643
18,337
10.996
0.64
212
10.476
0.664
468
Table B-25. Mincerian Earninas Functions, 
Females: Public sector Sample,
Non-linear in 
1986 and 1987
' 8 ' ,
Independent Variable 1986 a/ 1987 b/ 1987 c/
Years of Schooling, S -0.024 * 
(11.50)
-0.010
(0.92)
-0.190
(1.16)
Years of Experience, EX 0.023 * 
(59.52)
0.011 * 
(3.59)
0.046 * 
(9.35)
Experience-squared -0.00023 * 
(17.17)
0.00070
(0.70)
0.00100 * 
(6.26)
Schooling-squared 0.002 * 
(22.78)
0.002 * 
(3.65)
0.002 * 
(2.94)
Constant Term 
R-squared (adjusted) 
N
10.755
0.643
18,337
10.782
0.675
336
10.723
0.526
267
Source: Based on the public sector data set 
Notes: Absolute t-values in parentheses
Dependent variable: natural logarithm of monthly earnings 
* and ** indicate statistical significance at the 1% and 5% 
level, respectively 
a/Ministry of Finance, refers to both sexes 
b/Ministry of Education 
c/State-controlled Bank (HIDB)
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Table C-1. Mincerian Rates of Return to Schooling
Males, Entire Samples, 1975-85
Rate Number
of of
Return Observations Adjusted
Sample Year (%) (N) R-squared
lEIR 1975 6.2 324 0.48
NSSG 1977 4.8 4,865 0.31
lEIR 1981 4.3 356 0.45
lEIR 1985 3.7 380 0.47
Source: lEIR: from Appendix Table B-10 
NSSG: from Appendix Table B-6
Table C-2. Mincerian Rates of Return to Schooling, 
Females, Entire Samples, 1975-85
Rate Number
of of
Return Observations Adjusted 
Sample Year (%) (N) R-squared
lEIR 1975 5.4 263 0.40
NSSG 1977 6.8 2,193 0.52
lEIR 1981 3.8 281 0.48
lEIR 1985 3.0 313 0.50
Source: lEIR: from Appendix Table B-12
NSSG: from Appendix Table B-7
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Table C-3. Mincerian Rates of Return to Schooling by Economic
Sector, Males, 1975-87 (percent)
Economic Sector
Sample Year Private Public
lEIR 1975 4.8 6.4
NSSG 1977 6.8 7.3
lEIR 1981 4.9 4.0
lEIR 1985 3.9 3.3
Public
Public
Sector
Sector
a/
b/
1987
1987
2.6
4.3
Source:
Notes:
lEIR: from Appendix Table B-11 
NSSG: from Appendix Table B-6 
Public Sector: from Appendix Table B-22 
a/ Ministry of Education 
b/ State-controlled Bank (HIDB)
Table C!-4• Mincerian Rates 
Sector, Females,
of Return 
1975-87
to Schooling b] 
(percent)
Economic Sector
Sample Year Private Public
lEIR 1975 */ 6.2
NSSG 1977 7.4 8.6
lEIR 1981 */ 4.7
lEIR 1985 */ 3.6
Public Sector b/ 1987 ... 2.9
Public Sector c/ 1987
_____
. . . 2.8
NSSG: from Appendix Table B-7 
Public Sector: from Appendix Table B-2p 
Notes: */ statistically insignificant 
a/ Ministry of Education 
b/ State-controlled Bank (HIDB)
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Table C-5. Mincerian Rates of Return to Schooling by Level of
Education, Males, Entire Samples, 1975-85 (percent)
Level of Education
Sample Year Primary Secondary Higher
lEIR 1975 -9.1 10.1 22.9
NSSG 1977 */ 5.1 4.8 4.5
lEIR 1981 -7.2 6.0 14.8
lEIR 1985 -3.8 4.6 10.2
Source; lEIR: from Appendix Table B-14 
NSSG: from Appendix Table B-8 
Note: */ not statistically significant
Table C-6. Mincerian Rates of Return to Schooling by Level of
Education, Females, Entire Samples, 1975-85 (percent)
Level of Education
Sample Year Primary Secondary Higher
lEIR 1975 —8.8 9.2 21.2
NSSG 1977 8.3 6.5 5.3
lEIR 1981 -6.5 5.5 13.5
lEIR 1985 -3.7 4.7 10.3
NSSG: from Appendix Table B-8
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Table C-7. Mincerian Rates of Return to Schooling by Level of
Education, Both Sexes, Public Sector, 1975-87 (%)
Sample Year Primary Secondary TEX d/
Higher Education
Post-
University graduate
lEIR 1975 —8.8 9.2 ... 21.2 ...
NSSG 1977 */ 4.3 7.6 ... 9.9 ...
lEIR 1981 —6.0 6.0 ... 14.0 ...
lEIR 1985 -2.2 6.2 ... 11.8 ...
Public Sector a/ 1986 0.0 2.4 3.6 4.0 4.8
Public Sector b/ 1987 0.6 3.0 4.2 4.6 5.4
Public Sector c/ 1987 */ 1.6 4.1 ... 5.8 ...
Source
Notes:
lEIR: from Table 4.24 
NSSG: from Table 4.12 
Public Sector: from Table 4.36 
(...) not available 
*/ not statistically significant 
a/ Ministry of Finance 
h/ Ministry of Education 
c/ State-controlled Bank (HIDB) 
d/ Non-university, Post-secondary
Table C-8. Mincerian Rates of Return to Schooling by Level of
Education, Males, Public Sector, 1975-87 (percent)
Higher Education
Post-
Sample Year Primary Secondary TEI c/ University graduate
lEIR 1975 -8.3 9.7 ... 21.7 ...
NSSG 1977 */ 4.8 7.5 ... 9.2 ...
lEIR 1981 —6.6 5.4 ... 13.4 ...
lEIR 1985 -3.5 3.7 ... 8.5 ...
Public Sector a/ 1987 */ 0.7 3.1 4.3 4.7 5.5
Public Sector b/ 1987 */ 3.3 4.4 ... 5.1 ...
Source: lEIR: from Appendix Table B-16 
NSSG: from Appendix Table B-8 
Public Sector: from Appendix Table B-24 
Notes: (...) not available
*/ not statistically significant 
a/ Ministry of Education 
b/ State-controlled Bank (HIDB) 
c/ Non-university, Post-secondary
Table C-9. Mincerian Rates of Return to Schooling by Level of
Education, Females, Public Sector, 1975-87 (percent)
Higher Education
Post-
Sample Year Primary Secondary TEI c/ University graduate
lEIR 1975 -8.9 9.1 ... 21.1 . .
NSSG 1977 */ 11.1 8.8 ... 7.3 • •
lEIR 1981 -5.2 6.8 ... 14.8 • •
lEIR 1985 —2.1 6.3 ... 11.9 • •
Public Sector a/ 1987 */ 1.4 3.8 5.0 5.4 6 2
Public Sector b/ 1987 */ 0.6 3.1 ... 4.8 • •
Source: lEIR: from Appendix Table B-17 
NSSG: from Appendix Table B-9 
Public Sector: from Appendix Table B-25 
Notes: (...) not available
*/ not statistically significant 
a/ Ministry of Education 
b/ State-controlled Bank (HIDB) 
c/ Non-university, Post-secondary
Table C-lO. Mincerian Rates of Return to Schooling by Level of
Education, Both Sexes, Private Sector, 1975-85 (%)
Sample Year
Level of Education
Primary Secondary Higher
lEIR 1975 -8.3 6.1 15.7
NSSG 1977 2.3 9.5 14.3
lEIR 1981 —8.6 7.0 17.4
lEIR 1985 —4.6 3.8 9.4
Source: lEIR: from Table 4.24 
NSSG: from Table 4.12
Table C-11. Mincerian Rates of Return to Schooling by Level of 
Education, Males, Private Sector, 1975-85 (percent)
Sample Year
Level of Education 
Primary Secondary Higher
lEIR 1975 -10.4 8.8 21.6
NSSG 1977 */ 2.9 8.9 12.9
lEIR 1981 -8.3 8.5 19.7
lEIR 1985 -4.9 7.1 15.1
Source: lEIR: from Appendix Table B-16 
NSSG: from Appendix Table B-8 
Note: */ not statistically significant
Table C-12. Mincerian Rates of Return to Schooling by Level of
Education, Females, Private Sector, 1975-85 (percent)
Sample Year
Level of Education 
Primary Secondary Higher
lEIR 1975 */ 1.5 0.9 -2.5
NSSG 1977 */ 3.5 9.5 13.5
lEIR 1981 -6.4 3.5 10.7
lEIR 1985 */ 0.6 3.0 4.6
Source: lEIR: from Appendix Table B-17 
NSSG: from Appendix Table B-9 
Note; */ not statistically significant
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Table C-13. Rates of Return to Schooling by Level of Education,
Males, Entire Samples, 1975-85 (percent)
Sample Year
Secondary 
(vs. Primary) (vs
Higher 
. Secondary)
lEIR 1975 0.3 16.2
NSSG 1977 5.0 4.9
lEIR 1981 0.2 11.6
lEIR 1985 1.0 8.3
Source: lEIR: from Appendix Table B-18 
NSSG: from Appendix Table B-6
Table C-14. Rates of Return to Schooling by Level of Education, 
Females, Entire Samples, 1975-85 (percent)
Secondary Higher
Sample Year (vs. Primary) (vs. Secondary)
lEIR 1975 0.0 14.9
NSSG 1977 9.7 4.9
lEIR 1981 0.0 10.4
lEIR 1985 0.5 7.5
NSSG: from Appendix Table B-7
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Table C-15. Rates of Return to Schooling by Level of Education,
Males, Public Sector, 1975-87 (percent)
Sample Year
Secondary
vs.
Primary
TEI c/ 
vs. 
Secondary
University Postgraduate 
vs. vs. 
Secondary University
lEIR 1975 0.8 */ ... 15.9 ...
NSSG 1977 4.8 ... 9.8 ...
lEIR 1981 0.2 */ ... 10.7 ...
lEIR 1985 1.0 */ ... 7.4 ...
Public Sector a/ 1987 1.5 1.5 3.4 1.7
Public Sector b/ 1987 3.9 ... 4.8 ...
Source: lEIR: from Appendix Table B-19 
NSSG: from Appendix Table B-6 
Public Sector: from Appendix Table B-22 
Notes: (...) not available
*/ not statistically significant 
a/ Ministry of Education 
b/ State-controlled Bank (HIDB) 
c/ Non-university, Post-secondary
Table C-16. Rates of Return to Schooling by Level of Education,
Females, Public Sector, 1975-87 (percent)
Sample Year
Secondary
vs.
Primary
TEI c/ 
vs. 
Secondary
University Postgraduate 
vs. vs. 
Secondary University
lEIR 1975 0.6 **/ ... 15.9 ...
NSSG 1977 13.6 ... 7.7 ...
lEIR 1981 1.0 **/ ... 11.1 ...
lEIR 1985 1.2 ... 7.7 ...
Public Sector a/ 1987 1.9 2.1 3.5 0.8
Public Sector b/ 1987 1.9 ... 4.0 ...
Source: lElR: from Appendix Table B-20
NSSG: from Appendix Table B-7 
Public Sector: from Appendix Table B-23 
Notes: (...) not available
*/ not statistically significant 
a/ Ministry of Education 
b/ State-controlled Bank (HIDB) 
c/ Non-university, Post-secondary
Table C-17. Rates of Return to Schooling by Level of Education,
Males, Private Sector, 1975-85 (percent)
Sample Year
Secondary 
(vs. Primary) (vs.
Higher
Secondary)
lEIR 1975 -0.8 */ 15.1
NSSG 1977 4.6 10.5
lEIR 1981 -0.1 */ 13.7
lEIR 1985 0.5 */ 10.2
Source: lEIR: from Appendix Table B-19
NSSG: from Appendix Table B-6
Note: */ not statistically significant
Table C-18. Rates of Return to Schooling by Level of Ec
Females1, Private Sector, 1975-85 (percent)
Secondary Higher
Sample Year (vs. Primary) (vs. Secondary)
lEIR 1975 -0.2 */ */
NSSG 1977 6.3 10.1
lEIR 1981 -2.7 */ 5.9 */
lEIR 1985 1.0 */
---------------—,------------- —--------------------------
2.6 */
NSSG: from Appendix Table B-7 
Note: */ not statistically significant
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Table C-19. Mean Monthly Earnings by Level of Education,
1964-1987 (in current Drs.)
Higher
Sample Year
Secondary Non-Univ./ 
Post-Sec. University
Post­
graduate
KEPE 1964 a/ 2,792 — — — 5,100 ———
lEIR 1975 a/ 12,010 — — — 24,105 — —
NSSG 1977 a/ 13,639 — — — 16,837 — — —
lEIR 1981 a/ 32,873 — — — 53,192 — — —
lEIR 1985 a/ 76,130 ------ 105,283 — — —
Public
Sector 1987 a/ 65,754 67,336 75,129 79,213
Source: KEPE:
lEIR:
NSSG:
from Table 3.16
analyses for the respective
from Table 3.17
years
Public Sector: from Table 3.18
Note: (-- ) not applicable
a/ refers to net monthly earnings because of the non 
availability of gross salary in the sample
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Table C-20. The Returns to Education by Sector, Selected
Countries (percent)
Country Sector Reference Competitive
Non-
Competitive
Greece-1977 Private, Public 7.0 6.2
Greece-1981 Private, Public 4.9 4.0
Greece-1985 Private, Public 3.9 3.3
Brazil Private, Public 19.3 14.9
Colombia-1 Private, Public 14.6 13.4
Colombia-2 Informal, Formal 11.7 12.9
Guatemala Self-Employed, Employees 12.7 10.6
Japan Fam. Workers, Employees 19.3 6.5
Malaysia Private, Public 22.5 17.7
Pakistan Self-Employed, Employees 7.6 7.4
Portugal Private, Public 8.0 4.9
United Kingdom Private, Public 8.7 6.3
Tanzania Private, Public
. . ' —' ... r — . "
14.2 10.7
Appendix Table B-2 
Greece-1981 & -1985: own estimates. Appendix Table C-3 
Note: Rates of return for Greece-1981 & -1985 refer to males
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Table C-21. The Coefficient on Years of Schooling: Mincerian 
Rate of Return, by Year, Selected Countries
Country Year Coefficient
(percent)
Greece 1960 9.2
1964 8.6
1975 6.2
1977 4.8
1981 4.3
1985 3.7
1987 2.6
Austria 1981 11.6
Brazil 1970 19.2
Colombia 1965 17.3
1971 16.7
1973 17.6
1974 12.8
1975 15.4
1977 14.4
1978 14.4
1984 11.0
Cyprus 1975 12.5
1979 9.8
1981 5.2
1984 11.0
France 1962 16.3
1970 19.2
1977 15.4
Germany 1974 12.1
1977 12.6
Hong Kong 1976 6.3
1981 6.1
Iran 1975 11.6
Malaysia 1970 14.0
1978 22.8
Portugal 1977 9.1
United Kingdom 1972 9.7
1975 8.0
United States 1959 10.7
1969 7.8
—------ ——:----- ■ — -... - ...
1973 8.2
Appendix Table B-1 
Greece: 1975, 1981, 1985 and 1987, own estimates. 
Appendix Tables C-1 and C-3
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Table C-22. The Returns to Investment in Higher Education,
by Year, Selected Countries (percent)
Country Year Social Private
Greece */ 1960 13.7 15.0
1975 20.3 15.1
1977 4.5 10.5
1981 12.2 13.7
1985 7.9 10.2
1987 2.6 3.4
Austria 1981 ... 4.2
Belgium 1960 6.7 8.7
Brazil 1970 13.1 13.9
Colombia 1973 ... 20.7
1976 18.4 24.9
Cyprus 1975 9.7 14.8
1979 7.6 14.1
1984 ... 14.1
Denmark 1964 7.8 10.0
France 1962 ... 9.3
1969 10.9 9.6
1976 ... 9.3
Germany 1964 ... 4.6
1978 ... 10.5
Hong Kong 1976 12.4 25.2
Iran 1972 15.0 ...
1976 13.6 18.5
Italy 1969 ... 18.3
Malaysia 1978 ... 34.5
Netherlands 1965 5.5 10.4
Norway 1966 7.5 7.7
Spain 1971 12.8 15.5
Sweden 1967 9.2 10.3
United Kingdom 1971 7.0 27.0
1972 8.2 9.9
1973 8.0 16.0
1975 7.0 22.0
1977 6.0 17.0
1978 7.0 23.0
United States 1939 10.7 ...
1949 10.6 ...
1959 11.3 ...
1969 10.9 15.4
1972 ... 7.8
1976 5.3
Source: Unless otherwise stated, Psacharopoulos, 1985,
Appendix Table A-1
Greece: own estimates, Tables 5.26 and 5.34
Note: (...) not available
*/ Social and Private rates of return for Greece are
not strictly comparable, because of different
estimation method
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Table D-1. Economically Active Population by Educational Level, 
and One-digit Occupational Code, 1961, 1971, 1981
Educational Higher Secondary Primary Others Total
Level Education Education Education
Occupation Graduates Graduates Graduates
Professional, 1961 72,000 28,300 20,400 6,500 127,200
Technical and Related 1971 111,300 37,860 28,920 8,140 186,220
1981 256,205 41,837 31,606 2,631 332,279
Administrative, Execu­ 1961 7,800 12,900 7,100 700 28,500
tive and Managerial 1971 11,140 9,080 1,820 340 22,380
1981 25,558 23,386 11,479 1,196 61,619
Clerical and 1961 7,900 102,000 29,200 3,900 143,000
Related 1971 18,640 171,160 54,180 5,400 249,380
1981 38,504 240,594 53,456 3,169 335,723
Tradesmen and 1961 2,600 36,700 124,900 55,200 219,400
Related Workers 1971 4,680 53,920 137,440 35,640 231,680
1981 12,542 94,685 167,245 26,599 301,071
Farmers 1961 400 17,800 855,900 1,075,900 1,950,000
1971 880 12,280 674,040 643,280 1,330,480
1981 1,535 20,539 595,997 355,161 973,232
Craftsmen Labourers 1961 200 27,500 426,900 248,200 702,800
and Non-agricultural 1971 1,100 51,220 685,900 228,000 966,220
1981 12,136 110,404 854,089 142,768 1,119,397
Services Workers 1961 10,200 36,500 190,800 112,900 350,400
1971 2,520 22,360 140,280 62,860 228,020
1981 15,356 52,566 170,109 40,049 278,080
Not Classified 1961 3,600 27,900 75,900 34,400 141,800
1971 10,660 16,120 27,160 15,560 69,500
1981 22,442 50,986 58,376 10,628 142,432
Total 1961 104,700 289,600 1,731,100 1,537,700 3,663,100
1971 160,920 374,000 1,749,740 999,220 3,283,880
1981 384,278 634,997 1,942,357 582,201 3,543,833
Source: NSSG, Population Censuses of the respective years
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Table D-2. Educational Budget, (Actual) 1977 and 1984 *
1977 1984
Level of 
Education
Total Teachers
Salaries
' Total Teachers * 
Salaries
Primary 10,880 7,280
(66.9)
47,300 33,300
(70.4)
Secondary 8,730 5,184
(59.4)
50,970 31,950
(62.7)
Tertiary 6,040 1,950
(32.3)
26,900 10,450
(38.8)
All Levels 25,650 14,414
(56.2)
125,170 75,700
(60.5)
Notes; Figures in parentheses are percentages and refer 
to the respective row totals 
*/ Current prices in million Drachmas
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Table D-3. Mean Annual Earnings of University Graduates
by Field of Study, 1977
Field of Study
Mean
Earnings
(Drs)
Earnings
Index
Number of 
Observations
A. Humanities 181,724 94 597
B. Education 186,192 96 900
C. Art 192,633 99 12
D. Law 290,215 149 326
E. Social Sciences 238,764 123 1,303
F. Science 222,097 114 461
G. Technology 324,948 167 340
H. Medicine & Pharmacy 192,105 99 442
I. Agricultural Studies1 238,351 123 176
J. Military 301,608 155 300
Sample Total 194,213 100 8,756
Source: PsacharoDOulos 
Table 17.2,
, G., and
p. 266
Kazamias, A., 1985,
Table D-4. Mean Annual Earnings of New University Gradi
by Field of Study, 1977
Mean Earnings Number of
Field of Study
Earnings
(Drs)
Index Observations
A. Humanities 115,771 88 117
B. Education 96,407 74 73
C. Art - - -
D. Law 124,563 95 30
E. Social Sciences 141,016 108 162
F. Science 143,031 109 92
G. Technology 203,360 155 43
H. Medicine & Pharmacy 128,529 98 67
I. Agricultural Studies 131,744 101 32
J. Military 214,900 164 2
Sample Total 130,948 100 711
Source: Psacharoooulos 
Table 17.8,
, G., and 
p. 269
Kazamias, A. 1985,
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Table D-5. Mean Annual Earnings of Foreign Postgraduate Degree
Holders by Field of Study, 1977
Field of Study
Mean
Earnings
(Drs)
Earnings
Index
Number of 
Observations
1. Humanities 351,400 85 40
2. Law 595,000 143 8
3. Social Sciences 469,840 113 25
4. Science 440,667 106 21
5. Technology 555,692 134 13
6. Medicine & Pharmacy 228,000 55 7
7. Vague Answer 378,378 91 37
Sample Total 414,808 100 151
Source: Psacharoooulos 
Table 17.2,
, G., and
p. 266
Kazamias, A., 1985,
Appendixes, p. 366
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